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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the development and implementation of federally funded scientific 
defence research in Canada during the earliest decades of the Cold War. With a particular focus 
on the creation and subsequent activities of the Defence Research Board (DRB), Canada’s first 
peacetime military science organization, the history covered here crosses political, social, and 
environmental themes pertinent to a detailed analysis of defence-related government activity in 
the Canadian North. Three contextual chapters on the history of federal defence research in 
Canada provide the foundation for a close study of defence research projects pursued and 
supported by the Canadian government. The dissertation focuses on northern Canada to explore 
and explain key developments in the history of tripartite defence relations between Canada, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom while also providing new perspectives on the impact of 
the Cold War in Canada.  
To meet the impending challenges of the early postwar period, senior officials in the 
Canadian defence establishment decided to create the Defence Research Board and involve 
select scientists in discussions about policy for science and defence in North. The decision to 
include scientists in the policymaking process was a deliberate and functional approach that 
helped the Canadian government secure and strengthen its security partnership with the United 
Kingdom and the United States during the early Cold War. When senior officials championed 
science as a means to bolster Canada’s commitment to Western security, the Defence Research 
Board became the primary vehicle to achieve this policy aim. Select scientists obtained the 
political power to design, implement, and administer policies for the distribution and use of 
federal funds made available for scientific defence research. This was a calculated move by 
senior Canadian officials who wanted to further bilateral defence relations with the United States 
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while maintaining close ties to the United Kingdom. Including scientists in government allowed 
the Canadian defence establishment to focus its limited resources on specific fields of research in 
which Canada could leverage geography and “expertise” to fulfill its political agenda for postwar 
security and defence in the North.  
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Introduction 
 
 
In 1948, the Defence Research Board (DRB), Canada’s first peacetime military science 
organization, cooperated with the Army Directorate of Military Training to sponsor the 
production of an Arctic training film titled Going North.1 Produced by the National Film Board 
(NFB), Going North depicts geography, climate, and winter living conditions of the Canadian 
Arctic and sub-Arctic through the experience of five soldiers training in northern Canada.  
Originally produced as the first in a series of winter training films, officials sponsored the 
production of Going North to introduce and educate soldiers and civil servants about living and 
performing military duties in the Canadian North. Presented in the film as “the least known area 
of Canada,” the Arctic represents a harsh space to be tamed by science, exploited for resources, 
and defended by specially trained men. The film portrays military kit as well as living and 
transport techniques developed by modern science and engineering, and the narrative emphasizes 
the importance of research and development (R&D) to the northward expansion of Canada’s 
southern population. 
When considered against the backdrop of postwar security policy, Going North is a 
microcosm of Canada’s early experience with Cold War Arctic science. The DRB conceived the 
film under the assumption that civilian applications would follow naturally from military 
research. Its production depended on the cooperation of defence officials, scientists, military 
personnel, and executives of the NFB. The film seems to have been screened only for 
government and military personnel, but details on the security classification of the film remain 
unclear. In the end, Going North was the first and only release in what was supposed to be a 
                                                 
1 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), WO 48369, ISN 439946, “Going North.” For a NFB description and 
reference to the film, see Donald W. Bidd, ed., The NFB Film Guide: The Productions of the National Film Board of 
Canada from 1939 to 1989 (Montréal: National Film Board of Canada, 1991), 214. 
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three-part series of Arctic training films.2 No others films appeared in the series and Going North 
became an entry on the index of the NFB archives. 
This dissertation focuses on the circumstances and attitudes that gave rise to the science 
portrayed in Going North. Driven by the politics of national security and by a strong belief in the 
advantages of high technology, Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) utilized 
science to assist the armed forces in the North and simultaneously bolster the Canadian 
contribution to Western security. During the early Cold War, the federal government invested 
large sums to attract academic scientists to defence research. By 1953, more than 100 academic 
staff members and nearly 300 graduate students from twenty Canadian universities had received 
annual research grants amounting to $500,000 from the Defence Research Board, a single branch 
of DND, established in 1947 to provide scientific and technical assistance to the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force.3 These numbers increased over the next twenty years and by the 1970s more than 
fifty universities across Canada had received DRB funding at a total annual expenditure of $3 
million.4 When combined with the $4.5 million awarded annually for industrial research, each 
year the DRB allocated approximately $7.5 million of federal money to military R&D at the 
height of the Cold War.5 
The Defence Research Board implemented a wide program at eleven locations in Canada, 
each designed to investigate specific problems in support of the military and scientific needs of 
                                                 
2 Initially, the Canadian Army and the DRB considered releasing Arctic training films in three phases. Going North 
was a result of the first phase, which aimed to produce a film illustrating how to overcome the difficulties of Arctic 
climate and terrain. Although the film seems to have been the sole release of the proposed three-phase production 
plan, the NFB also produced Vigil in the North (1954), which also shows military training in northern Canada. On 
the three-phase production plan, see LAC, Record Group (RG) 24 F-1, vol. 3234, file DRBS 3-750-43-2, “Minutes 
of the 5/47 Meeting of the Arctic Research Advisory, 12 December 1947,” p. 5. 
3 Edmond Cloutier, The Defence Research Board and the Defence Scientific Service (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
1953), 17. 
4 Defence Research Board: The First Twenty-Five Years (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1972), 15. 
5 Ibid., 15-16. 
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Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. The northern-most facility was Defence 
Research Northern Laboratory (DRNL), located at Fort Churchill on the western shore of 
Hudson Bay in Manitoba’s northeast corner. Situated below the Arctic Circle, this location 
provided an ideal sub-Arctic environment to establish a research facility for northern science. 
Located on Canada’s tree line, the Churchill area enabled researchers to study the extremes of 
climate and terrain encountered in northern latitudes. The importance of northern environmental 
science emerged towards the end of the Second World War when Canada’s top military officials 
began to assess the strategic importance of the Arctic while planning for the postwar period.  
 DRNL, a multi-purpose research facility for year-round northern studies, was a key 
venue for the Canadian defence establishment during the early Cold War. What concerned North 
American defence officials the most was not a large-scale Arctic invasion, which seemed 
unlikely in the immediate postwar years. Instead, strategic analysts in Canada and the United 
States feared the possibility of bomber and rocket attacks on urban and industrial centres around 
the Great Lakes. Officials considered an air attack launched by expeditionary forces lodged on 
the fringes of the Canadian Arctic potentially more dangerous than an attack launched from the 
Soviet Union itself. Although the likelihood of an offensive incursion in the North was remote, 
Canada participated in cooperative measures with the United States and the United Kingdom that 
utilized science as a means to understand and overcome practical issues associated with northern 
military operations. The establishment of a permanent research laboratory at Fort Churchill, 
where the United States military had been stationed since 1942, gave the Canadian government 
an invested stake in matters considered important to the North Atlantic Alliance. Not only did the 
location offer a suitable northern laboratory unique to Canada’s geography and environment, but 
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the research facility also housed international scientists and contributed to an important network 
of scientific information exchange. 
The Arctic sciences in Cold War Canada were not restricted to Fort Churchill. DRNL 
served as a base of operations for scientists and military personnel engaged in various defence-
related studies, both in and outside Canada. Researchers often travelled through Churchill to gain 
access to more remote locations in the Canadian North, and funding provided by the Defence 
Research Board led to the creation of university laboratories in southern Canada that were 
designed to simulate the effects of a northern environment. A postwar interest in the defence and 
development of the Canadian North coalesced into a unique relationship among government 
departments, military personnel, civilian scientists, and industrial partners. In this effort, the 
DRB pursued science as a means to address and pronounce Canada’s commitment to North 
American defence and Western security.  
The dissertation aims to investigate and understand the impact of the Cold War Arctic 
sciences in Canada and on Canadian international relations between 1947 and 1963. I use the 
Defence Research Board, and in particular the role and influence of its Defence Research 
Northern Laboratory, as a lens through which to explore and interpret my subject. I argue that 
Canada’s top military and defence officials considered science important to the development and 
implementation of policies for defence in northern Canada during the early Cold War, and that 
the creation and subsequent activities of the Defence Research Board allowed Canada to reaffirm 
and strengthen its international position within the Western security alliance.  
To be clear, Canada did not have a science policy during the early Cold War. In fact, the 
Government of Canada first officially considered a national science policy in November 1967 
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when the Senate decided to establish a Special Committee on Science Policy.6 The committee’s 
hearings began in March 1968 and ended in June 1969, leading to a four-volume report on the 
development of a national science policy for Canada.7 Within a year of the first volume 
appearing in 1970, the activities of the newly-formed Ministry of State for Science and 
Technology marked the beginnings of Canada’s first federal policy for science.8 
Prior to the establishment of an official science policy, the Canadian government utilized 
various bureaucratic structures to govern the conduct of science. During the period under 
investigation in the dissertation, the federal government spread responsibilities for the North 
across various departments, agencies, and among select individuals. Administration in the North 
influenced the development and implementation of scientific activities related to defence, 
particularly in the eastern region around Hudson Bay. In the absence of a regional government, 
scientific research in the Northwest Territories was the responsibility of the federal departments 
that undertook the research.9 For the Defence Research Board, this meant scientists had the 
power to create, implement, and administer scientific research projects. The DRB developed 
internal levels of bureaucracy to ensure quality and efficiency of work, but the structures put in 
place allowed scientists to pass judgement on their own ideas.  
The dissertation deals exclusively with defence research to avoid any confusion with 
policies developed to govern general scientific activities in the Canadian North. On 1 April 1947, 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that the Canadian government created the Science Secretariat in 1964 and the Science Council in 
1966. In 1968, the Science Council published an assessment of government science; see Science Council of Canada, 
Towards a National Science Policy (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1968). 
7 Canada, Parliament, Senate, Special Committee on Science Policy, A Science Policy for Canada: Report of the 
Senate Special Committee on Science Policy – Vol. 1. A Critical Review: Past and Present (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
1970); Vol. 2. Targets and Strategies for the Seventies (1972); Vol. 3. A Government Organization for the Seventies 
(1973); Vol. 4. Progress and Unfinished Business (1977). 
8 Philip Enros, Environment for Science: A History of Policy for Science in Environment Canada (Toronto: Philip 
Enros, 2013), 11.  
9 LAC, RG 85, vol. 298, file 1009-2[1], Arctic Research Advisory Committee, “Recent Activities in the Canadian 
Arctic,” December 1948, p. 2. 
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an amendment to the Department of National Defence Act (R.S.C. 1927, c. 136) provided for the 
establishment of the Defence Research Board.10 In addition to the Chiefs of Staff of the three 
services, the President of the National Research Council, and the Deputy Minister of National 
Defence, the initial Board included prominent academic scientists from a number of Canadian 
institutions: Charles Best of the University of Toronto; Paul Gagnon of Laval University; J.H.L. 
Johnstone of Dalhousie University; Otto Maass of McGill University; and Gordon Shrum of the 
University of British Columbia.11 Under the guidance of this Board, the Canadian government 
established defence research as a “fourth arm” of the services.12 
The bureaucratic structure of the Defence Research Board is vital to understanding the 
role and influence of defence research in Canada during the early Cold War. Upon establishment 
of the DRB, the administration and governance of Canadian defence research became the 
responsibility of the individuals appointed to serve on the various committees and panels created 
to support the organization as a whole. Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton described 
the impetus for, and importance of, defence research in his 1947 policy statement: 
The advisory committees [of the DRB] will serve to make available to the armed forces 
the best scientific advice that is available in government, university and industrial 
research laboratories. These committees will also help to keep the whole scientific 
community of the country in touch with the problems of defence to facilitate rapid 
mobilization in time of need.13 
 
With regard to the Canadian North, the Defence Research Board established an 
interdepartmental Arctic Research Advisory Committee with Hugh Keenleyside, the Deputy 
                                                 
10 Hon. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, Canada’s Defence: Information on Canada’s Defence 
Achievements and Organization (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1947). This document is also available 
in Canada’s National Defence Volume 1: Defence Policy, ed., Douglas L. Bland, (Kingston, ON: Queen’s 
University School of Policy Studies, 1997), 9-56; details on “Defence Research” and the DRB provided on pp. 47-
48. 
11 Colonel R.D. Harnkess of the Northern Electric Company was also among the appointed members.  
12 Claxton, Canada’s Defence. 
13 Ibid. 
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Minister of Mines and Resources, as Chairman. The committee helped coordinate the scientific 
efforts of government departments in the North and identified areas that required further 
research. A collective recognition of the need for a coordinated effort emerged out of the DRB’s 
Arctic deliberations, which produced a recommendation to Cabinet that resulted in the creation 
of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development (ACND) in January 1948. The ACND 
considered and advised on policy matters concerning civilian and defence activities in the North, 
but the allocation of resources and personnel required a flexible government approach to ensure 
proper and adequate administration.14 
The period 1947 to 1963 represents an intriguing period to study the development of 
Canadian policies for science and the North during the early Cold War. Scholars have used the 
term “Whole of Government” to explain the federal approach to northern policy and planning 
during this period.15 The Advisory Committee on Northern Development was relatively inactive 
following a series of initial meetings in 1948-49, until it emerged rejuvenated in 1953 because of 
a change in the priorities of Louis St. Laurent’s Liberal government. Before then, administration 
in the North was collaborative and co-dependent. Yet, even during the mid-1950s when the 
ACND was most actively involved in the development and advisement of northern policy, 
administration in the North remained inadvertently flexible. Although key personalities such as 
Keenleyside observed the need for a consistent and growing government presence in the North, 
the harsh climate of Canada’s northlands posed continuous problems for effective administration. 
To overcome the practical issues of administration and governance in the North, members of the 
ACND championed science as a means to protect and promote federal priorities with regards to 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 See, for instance, P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Daniel Heidt, The Advisory Committee on Northern Development: 
Context and Meeting Minutes, 1948-66, Documents on Canadian Arctic Sovereignty and Security (DCASS) Number 
4 (Calgary: Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, 2015), viii. 
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social, economic, and military development. In turn, the Defence Research Board became the 
primary vessel for government science in the North.  
Prior to the Royal Commission on Government Organization of 1960-63, scientific 
research projects supported by the Defence Research Board were not subject to external review. 
In other words, the DRB was fully responsible for the administration and governance of the 
defence research activities carried out under its patronage. While the top-down Board, 
committee, and panel structure enabled the Defence Research Board to review projects on a 
semi-annual and annual basis, scientists who received a financial grant from the DRB had full 
autonomy to carry out the defence research project. Once a grant application received approval 
from the DRB, the lead scientist on the application became solely responsible for the project. 
Officials with the DRB did not administer, govern, or otherwise oversee defence research 
projects supported by the organization. This would have been impractical considering the large 
volume of grants distributed by the Defence Research Board. But practicality aside, the DRB 
distributed grants with the expectation that the grant-receiving scientist was the person most 
suited to carry out and monitor the defence research project in accordance with the wider policies 
of the Defence Research Board. In short, scientists who received financial support from the 
DRB, because of the power granted to the DRB under the National Defence Act, had 
considerable authority to conduct a range of scientific activities under the umbrella of defence 
research.  
This dissertation explores the growth of defence research in Canada, the emergence of the 
Defence Research Board, the funding structure of the organization, and then uses the context of 
the early Cold War to examine the impact of scientific defence research conducted in the 
Canadian North. The circumstances covered here provide insight into the influence of scientific 
9 
 
 
 
ideas, the power of federal priorities, and the function of government administration in Canada 
during a significant period in world affairs.  
By examining the interplay between economics, technology, military, and politics this 
dissertation accepts the premise that Canada’s postwar defence policy was shaped by societal 
factors and the nature of the Cold War within which science, defence, and diplomacy were 
practiced. Analysis of this sort yields original findings about Canadian Cold War priorities 
concerning security and science in the North. Defence research offered a means to address two 
crucial anxieties about the Canadian North during the early Cold War. The first relates to long-
standing government concerns over territorial control in the North, and specifically the role of 
science and technology in asserting that control. To be precise, the scientific focus of the 
Defence Research Board placed its research establishments at the centre of a broader political 
agenda to secure and strengthen Canadian sovereignty and security in the North.  
Defence Research Northern Laboratory was particularly useful in establishing cognitive 
and territorial claims over the North. This was especially important during the immediate 
postwar period, as senior officials in the Canadian government responded to American wartime 
activity in the North. Approximately 43,000 military personnel and civilians from the United 
States worked in northern Canada constructing airfields, military bases, supply roads, and 
weather stations during the Second World War.16 The looming threat of a possible Soviet attack 
over the Pole exacerbated uncertainty in Ottawa over American activity in the North after the 
war. Knowing that the United States was prepared to defend its interests in the North with or 
without Canada, officials in Ottawa had to craft policies for the postwar period that would 
protect and promote Canadian autonomy in the North. As Hugh Keenleyside remarked in 1949, 
                                                 
16 Shelagh Grant, Sovereignty or Security?: Government Policy in the Canadian North, 1936-1950 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1988), 125. 
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Canada had “not gained independence from London in order to relinquish it to Washington.”17 
He shared Mackenzie King’s concern that Canada might be separating from Britain only to be 
absorbed by the United States. As documented in the dissertation, the history of defence research 
in northern Canada suggests science was useful to address Canadian anxieties over territorial 
sovereignty in the North during the first two decades of the postwar period.  
 Science also addressed the real concerns or anxieties over Soviet activity in the Arctic. 
The requirements of postwar defence in the North extended beyond Canada’s limited defence 
budget. Adequate defence in the North depended on access to the resources and capabilities of 
the United States. Fort Churchill and Defence Research Northern Laboratory gave Canadian 
officials a tangible asset that represented Canada’s physical, financial, and scientific contribution 
to Western security in the North. This was not only important from the practical standpoint of 
security; competition mattered as well. The Arctic was an ideal stage to demonstrate scientific 
prowess, and both the United States and the Soviet Union invested heavily in Arctic science as a 
means to show dominance over nature. A close study of the history of the DRB and its 
connection to the North reveals that the competitive aspects of the Cold War affected Canadian 
defence policy. The marriage of scientific and military affiliations in the North represented 
Canada’s firm commitment to Western democratic values, and Canadian officials accepted the 
idea that support for modern science and engineering was essential to ensure Western superiority 
in the postwar period.  
 
Official / Internal Publications on the Defence Research Board 
As a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, Canada’s Cold War defence posture was highly 
scientific and technical. Tripartite defence relations with Britain and the United States depended 
                                                 
17 Keenleyside, quoted in Grant, Sovereignty or Security?, 191. 
11 
 
 
 
on coordination among various research initiatives and establishments, many of which were 
located on Canadian soil. While a few studies have broached this field, historical scholarship on 
Canada during the early Cold War has yet to examine the relationship of science and technology 
to national security and defence. The first historical overview of the DRB appeared in 1958 when 
Donald Goodspeed published A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada.18 
Goodspeed’s account covers the formative years of the DRB and provides important details for 
understanding the institutional history of the organization. The book is thorough in its coverage 
of the events and discussions that led to the creation of the DRB and its affiliated research 
establishments, including the Defence Research Northern Laboratory. Goodspeed’s perspective 
is analytically narrow, however. He wrote the book while he was a Captain in the Historical 
Section of the Canadian Army in 1956-57, and this early publication date did not permit the 
contributions of DRB experts to be placed in the broader context of Canada’s Cold War 
experience. In fairness, Goodspeed’s book covers well the origins and evolution of the DRB in 
the early Cold War years and thus remains extremely valuable to the history of Canada’s postwar 
science and technology policy covered in this dissertation. 
In addition to Goodspeed’s official history, there have been several informal internal 
histories of the Defence Research Board authored or co-authored by its employees.19 In the case 
                                                 
18 Donald James Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958). 
19 See, for instance, Jim Norman and Rita Crow, A History of the Defence Research Establishment Ottawa (Ottawa: 
Defence Research Establishment Ottawa, 1992); John R. Longard, Knots, Volts and Decibels: An Informal History 
of the Naval Research Establishment, 1940-1967 (Dartmouth, NS: Defence Research Establishment Atlantic, 1993); 
H.P. Tardif, Recollections of CARDE/DREV, 1945-1995 (Courcelette, Quebec: Defence Research Establishment 
Valcartier, 1995); Alain Gelly and H.P. Tardif, Defence Research Establishment Valcartier, 1945-1995: 50 Years of 
History and Scientific Progress (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1995); R.P. Chapman, Alpha and 
Omega: An Informal History of the Defence Research Establishment Pacific, 1948-1995 (Dartmouth, NS: Defence 
Research Establishment Atlantic, 1998); Suzanne Board, A Brief History of the Defence Research Establishment 
Ottawa, 1941-2001 (Ottawa: Defence Research and Development Canada, 2002); Robert L. Gaede and Harold M. 
Merklinger, Seas, Ships and Sensors: An Informal History of the Defence Research Establishment Atlantic, 1968-
1995 (Dartmouth, NS: Defence Research Establishment Atlantic, 2003). 
12 
 
 
 
of the Defence Research Northern Laboratory, former superintendent Archie Pennie compiled an 
excellent account of individual reminiscences by employees who had lived and worked at Fort 
Churchill.20 The first-hand perspectives offer unmatched insight of particular importance to this 
dissertation, for which it was possible to gather only limited oral history material.21 Internally 
published reports are also valuable to the historical record, such as an annotated bibliography of 
DRNL projects compiled for the Defence Scientific Information Service by G.K. Davies in 
1965.22 Moreover, the DRB produced a small number of short publications that provide 
historical background information as well as brief overviews of the research projects considered 
by the organization to have made important contributions to Canadian scientific development.23 
That many publications about the Defence Research Board derive from the desire of 
former employees to record the history of defence research in Canada is indicative of a 
community of like-minded individuals. Defence scientists often speak highly of their colleagues 
in written records. This is evident in a 1994 book titled Perspectives in Science and Technology, 
which is a collection of articles originally presented two years prior to publication at a 
symposium in honour of the DRB’s founding Chairman, Omond Solandt, who is described by 
the editors of the book as a “physician, soldier, scientist, and above all, innovator … whose 
                                                 
20 A.M. Pennie, Defence Research Northern Laboratory 1947-1965 (Ottawa: Defence Research Board, 1966). 
Pennie also assembled a collection of readings for the DRB’s research establishment at Suffield, Alberta; see Archie 
Pennie, Suffield Experimental Station, 1941-1961 (Ralston, AB: Defence Research Board: 1961). 
21 Unfortunately, many of the persons with direct knowledge of and experience with the Defence Research Northern 
Laboratory are deceased. I was unable to interview former employees of DRNL, although I did speak with citizens 
of the town of Churchill and former employees of Fort Churchill, the military base where DRNL was located. To 
supplement this material, I used interviews originally conducted for an oral history project initiated by the Canadian 
War Museum, which, fortunately for this dissertation, included an interview of Archie Pennie conducted prior to his 
death. See Canadian War Museum (CWM) Archives: Sound Recordings 31D 10 Pennie, “Interview with Flight 
Lieutenant Archie Pennie [sound recordings]: CWM Oral History Project,” Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Canadian War 
Museum, 16 January 2009. 
22 G.K. Davies, An Annotated Bibliography of Unclassified Reports by Defence Research Northern Laboratory, 
1947-1965, Defence Scientific Information Service (DSIS) Report No. B-13 (Ottawa: Defence Research Board, 
Department of National Defence, 1969). 
23 See Cloutier, The Defence Research Board and the Defence Scientific Service; Defence Research Board: The 
First Twenty-Five Years. 
13 
 
 
 
record was outstanding in organizing and managing the practical application of science to 
problems in war and peace.”24 The collection features first-person accounts written by some of 
the scientists and engineers who not only experienced Canadian research and development 
during the Second World War but who also contributed significantly to the growth and utility of 
collective Allied science in the early postwar period. The first-hand experiences and perspectives 
of the contributing authors highlights the pace and intensity of technological growth in both 
Europe and Canada at a time when non-military expertise became increasingly important to 
developments in international security.   
The collection provides direct insight into the influential role Solandt played as a pioneer 
in the field of operations research and as a visionary in Canadian science. Amongst the twenty 
speakers whose papers comprise the collection, George Lindsey, a prominent defence analyst for 
the DRB, contributed an essay titled “The Management of Science in the Defence Research 
Board.”25 Solandt’s ability to cultivate constructive links between scientists and the bodies or 
groups whose activities their research supported impressed Lindsey the most. In the concluding 
remarks of the collection, Lindsey and fellow editors Cecil Law and David Grenville reflect on 
Solandt’s determination. In their estimation, Solandt resisted “the pressures of bureaucracy to 
submit to the management of scientific personnel to the procedures applied to the administrative 
civil service, which were not well adapted to the problem of identifying and quickly employing 
unusual individuals with special qualifications.”26  
 
 
                                                 
24 C.E. Law, G.R. Lindsey, and D.M. Grenville, eds., Perspectives in Science and Technology: The Legacy of 
Omond Solandt—Proceedings of a Symposium Held at the Donald Gordon Centre, Queen's University in Kingston, 
Ontario, 8-10 May 1994 (Kingston: Queen’s Quarterly, 1994), vii-viii. 
25 Ibid., 239. 
26 Ibid. 
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Historical Secondary Sources on the DRB 
While the Defence Research Board has received little direct attention, several Canadian-focused 
scholars have published histories that reference some of the activities of the organization. 
Stephen Bocking’s work has broached the topic of the DRB’s contribution to the field of aerial 
geography, and he has written generally on the intersection of government science and colonial 
authority in northern Canada.27 Andrew Godefroy’s research covers the history of Canada’s 
space-related activities, which includes detailed analysis of the DRB’s Alouette satellite program 
and the Churchill Rocket Range.28 Edward Jones-Imhotep is a well-published author on 
electronics research and the crosscurrents of technology and nature pertaining to Canadian 
science in the Cold War.29 Both John Vardalas and Scott Campbell have written on the DRB’s 
financial research connection to computing, while Vera Pavri-Garcia’s research examines 
intergovernmental cooperation and exchange between the Defence Research Board and the 
Department of Communications in the 1960s.30 Most recently, Jason Ridler wrote a biography of 
                                                 
27 Stephen Bocking, “A Disciplined Geography,” Technology and Culture 50, no. 2 (2009), 265-290; Bocking, 
“Indigenous Knowledge and the History of Science, Race, and Colonial Authority in Northern Canada,” in 
Rethinking the Great White North: Race, Nature, and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada, Andrew 
Baldwin, Laura Cameron, and Audrey Kobayashi eds., (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011), 
39-61. 
28 See, in order of publication date, Andrew B. Godefroy, Defence and Discovery: Canada’s Military Space 
Program, 1945-74 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011); Godefroy, “Wartime Military 
Innovation and the Creation of Canada’s Defence Research Board” in Canada and the Second World War: Essays in 
Honour of Terry Copp, Geoffrey Hayes, Mike Bechthold, and Matt Symes eds., (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier 
University Press, 2012), 199-218; Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War 
Army (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014). 
29 Edward Jones-Imhotep, “Disciplining Technology: Electronic Reliability, Cold-War Military Culture, and the 
Topside Ionogram,” History and Technology 17 (2000): 125-175; Jones-Imhotep, Communicating the Nation: 
Northern Radio, National Identity and the Ionospheric Laboratory in Cold War Canada (Harvard University: PhD 
Dissertation, 2002); Jones-Imhotep, “Nature, Technology, and Nation,” The Journal of Canadian Studies 38, no. 3 
(2004): 5-36; Jones-Imhotep, “Laboratory Cultures,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the History of 
Science, Technology and Medicine 28 (2005): 7-26. 
30 John N. Vardalas, The Computer Revolution in Canada: Building National Technological Competence 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); Scott M. Campbell, The Premise of Computer Science: Establishing Modern 
Computing at the University of Toronto (1945-1964) (University of Toronto: PhD Dissertation, 2006); Vera Pavri-
Garcia, “Technological Doublespeak”: Metaphors, Public Policy and the Development of Canada’s First Domestic 
Communications Satellite System, 1966-1970 (University of Toronto: PhD Dissertation, 2005).  
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Omond Solandt for his doctoral thesis that he later published as a full-length book.31 Ridler 
covers Solandt’s involvement in defence research during the Second World War and with the 
establishment of the DRB.  
Although these scholars deal in part with some of the research activities or individuals of 
the Defence Research Board, only one recent history discusses the organization as a primary 
focus. In 2012, Jonathan Turner defended his doctoral dissertation, which provides an 
institutional history of the DRB between 1947 and 1974.32 Turner’s study focuses primarily on 
the management structures of the DRB within the Department of National Defence. He also 
examines the impact of intergovernmental politics on the creation and implementation of policies 
for defence research in Canada. As the first scholarly examination covering the whole of DRB’s 
history, his work is an institutional survey study similar to Goodspeed’s official history. The 
details covered by Turner are impressive. His research is comprehensive in scope and provides a 
sufficient historical foundation from which to explore the history of the Defence Research Board 
in relation to scientific, technical, military, political, and international developments concerning 
Canada and the early Cold War. 
The current body of scholarship available on defence research in Canada leaves many 
unanswered questions about the specialized activities of the Defence Research Board. While 
Goodspeed and Turner cover a wide range of important topics in their work, survey histories 
require supplementary analyses based on specific and closely defined research questions. In 
addition to Godefroy’s work on space research, only one publication has examined the wider 
                                                 
31 Jason Sean Ridler, State Scientist: Omond Mckillop Solandt and Government Science in War and Hostile Peace, 
1939-1956 (Royal Military College of Canada: PhD Dissertation, 2009); Ridler, Maestro of Science: Omond 
Mckillop Solandt and Government Science in War and Hostile Peace, 1939-1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2015). 
32
 Jonathan Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” (The Institute for the History and 
Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto: PhD Dissertation, 2012).  
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impact of DRB activity on Canada. In Pathogens for War, historian Donald Avery discusses 
Canadian involvement in biological science and germ warfare research during and after the 
Second World War.33 Much of the book concentrates on research conducted at the DRB’s 
Suffield Experimental Station (SES), situated near Medicine Hat, Alberta on land acquired by 
the Government of Canada during the war. Avery provides a thorough overview of SES and his 
work shows the value of delving deep into the history of a single research establishment of the 
DRB.  
Inspired by the opportunity to explore uncharted territory of Canada’s early Cold War 
history, this dissertation examines the DRB’s interest and scientific activity in the Canadian 
North. The research focuses almost exclusively on the Defence Research Northern Laboratory 
and the various sciences facilitated by Fort Churchill. The literature relevant to this topic derives 
from three separate but interconnected fields: Cold War science, Canadian international history, 
and the Canadian North.  
 
Cold War Science  
While Canadian histories that focus on Cold War science are scarce, Canada’s historical 
literature is a rich field that includes important and relevant studies on government science and 
technology. Prior to his work on the Suffield Experimental Station, Donald Avery published an 
important book titled The Science of War in 1998, which describes the emergence and evolution 
of the Canadian contribution to Allied military technology during the Second World War.34 A 
year before Avery’s book appeared, George Lindsey published an edited collection titled No Day 
                                                 
33 Donald H. Avery, Pathogens for War: Biological Weapons, Canadian Life Scientists, and North American 
Biodefence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). 
34 Donald Avery, The Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology during the Second World 
War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998).  
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Long Enough in which he and the contributing authors described their personal experiences with 
wartime research and development.35 Many of the authors had joined the Defence Research 
Board after the war, and the collection of articles is a valuable resource on the direction of 
Canada’s federal scientific defence effort during the early postwar years. The dissertation utilizes 
this scholarship in the first two chapters, which explore the history of defence research in Canada 
and militarization in the North during and after the Second World War. Context of the pre-Cold 
War period is necessary to fully appreciate and understand why senior military and defence 
officials in the Canadian government pursued and supported northern defence research as a 
means to bolster Canada’s position within the Western security alliance.  
Several older sources remain highly valuable to the historical study of Canada’s early 
Cold War defence research. Robert Bothwell has produced two works on the history of atomic 
energy in Canada, Nucleus and Eldorado.36 Together with the works of Wilfrid Eggleston 
(National Research in Canada) and Mel Thistle (The Inner Ring) on the National Research 
Council, the institutional history of federal science in Canada during the interwar years and the 
Second World War is well covered.37 Eggleston also wrote Scientists at War, a study that focuses 
on influential figures, wartime science, and the direction of government priorities.38  
Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the History of Science, Technology and 
Medicine has released two special issues of particular relevance to the field. The first appeared in 
                                                 
35 George Lindsey, ed., No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1997).   
36 Robert Bothwell, Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984); 
Bothwell, Nucleus: The History of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). 
37 Wilfrid Eggleston, National Research in Canada: The NRC, 1916-1966 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1978); Mel W. 
Thistle, The Inner Ring: the Early History of the National Research Council of Canada (Toronto: University Press, 
1966). Also, see Eggleston, foreword by C.J. Mackenzie, Canada's Nuclear Story (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1965). 
38 Wilfrid Eggleston, Scientists at War (London: Oxford University Press, 1950). Incidentally, Eggleston’s title has 
recently reappeared on the cover of an American study about the ethics of weapons research during the Cold War; 
see Sarah Bridger, Scientists at War: The Ethics of Cold War Weapons Research (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2015).  
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1991 when Richard Jarrell and Yves Gingras edited a collection of articles on the National 
Research Council.39  The second feature appeared as a special issue of the Journal in 2012 when 
Philip Enros guest-edited papers under the theme of “Science in Government,” to which 
Jonathan Turner contributed an article on the political origins of the Defence Research Board.40  
 Outside of Canadian literature, there is a wealth of historical scholarship on Cold War 
science in Britain and the United States. By questioning the impact of government on science, 
scholars in the United States continue to debate the so-called “Forman thesis,” which maintains 
national security concerns distorted the natural or true path of the physical sciences in the Second 
World War and Cold War.41 The production of knowledge remains a key issue in this debate, but 
American scholarship also tackles issues concerning the production of technology. Authors such 
as Seymour Melman have sought to determine if the demands of the national security state 
enhanced or inhibited processes of research and development.42 Chapter 3 of the dissertation asks 
similar questions of the Defence Research Board. While the United States expended greater 
financial and physical resources on R&D than Canada during the early Cold War, representatives 
of the Department of National Defence openly voiced concerns for Western security in order to 
attract civilian scientists to defence research. A critical appraisal of the DRB’s funding structure 
suggests defence research supported and grew fundamental scientific research in Canada. 
Whereas military patronage may have impeded or altered the trajectory of the social and physical 
sciences in the United States, Canada’s approach to defence research was one of openness rather 
                                                 
39 Yves Gingras and Richard A. Jarrell, Building Canadian Science: The Role of the National Research Council 
(Ottawa: Canadian Science and Technology Historical Association, 1991).   
40 Jonathan Turner, “Politics and Defence Research in the Cold War,” Scientia Canadensis: Canadian Journal of the 
History of Science, Technology and Medicine 35, nos. 1-2 (2012): 39-63. 
41 See Paul Forman, “Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as Basis for Physical Research in the United 
States, 1940-1960,” Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences 18, no. 1 (1985): 149-229.  
42 See Seymour Melman’s The Defense Economy: Conversion of Industries and Occupations to Civilian Needs 
(New York: Praeger, 1970); Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971); 
and The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974). 
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than direction. The Defence Research Board supported fundamental research in the hope that a 
wide and diverse approach to science might produce results with a military applicability. Only 
after rearmament for the Korean War (1950-53) did Canada’s postwar approach to defence 
research change, and the DRB increased its support of scientific projects directly applicable to 
military activity. 
Although scholars of Canada should be careful in their use of such themes as the 
“military-industrial-academic complex,” it seems imprudent not to learn from the analytical 
developments that have yielded deep insights for American Cold War scholarship.43 The term 
military-industrial complex has sparked scholarship and debate since President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower warned of the perils of militarization—secrecy, corruption, state power, and 
coercion—in his farewell address of early 1961.44 Deeply critical of the influence of defence on 
economy, the original concept has since been applied to a myriad of studies concerning the role 
of government in society. The term broadened to include “academic” when historians of science 
began to investigate the deep financial linkages between state and university affiliations in the 
United States during the Cold War.45 While critics charged the military with creating a “warfare 
state,” recent scholarship has re-examined the military-industrial-academic complex to explain 
the importance of military patronage to the growth of scientific research in the United States. 
Mark Solovey, for instance, has replaced the word “complex” with “nexus” to explain how 
                                                 
43 For an assessment of the “military-industrial-academic complex,” see John Cloud, “Imaging the World in a 
Barrel: CORONA and the Clandestine Convergence of the Earth Sciences,” Social Studies of Science 3, no. 2 
(2001): 231-251. 
44 Joy Rohde, Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research during the Cold War (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), 5. 
45 See, for instance, Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic 
Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). The broadening of American Cold 
War scholarship resulted from interdisciplinary studies of the period that introduced historians to new forms of 
analysis. For a brief yet sophisticated exploration of this development, see David A. Hounshell, “Epilogue: 
Rethinking the Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technology in the Cold War; Rethinking the Social Study of 
Science and Technology,” Social Studies of Science 31, no. 2 (2001): 289-297. 
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government support of academic research led to a greater visibility and influence of the social 
sciences in national affairs.46  
Understanding the complex relationship between military and scientific authorities in the 
United States allows us to further understand the role, structure, and influence of defence 
research in Canada. Indeed, scholarship on science and technology in the Cold War United States 
is analytically broad. The literature is comprised of institutional histories that explain the origins 
of such government establishments as the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects 
Agency, but also a range of sociocultural studies that situate government science within broader 
Cold War contexts.47 Some of the most relevant works on American military research include 
Donald MacKenzie’s Inventing Accuracy, Stuart Leslie’s The Cold War and American Science, 
and Paul Edwards’ The Closed World.48 While these books were some of the first to address the 
military-industrial-academic complex as a major Cold War theme, the topic continues to inspire 
historical scholarship. This is evident in Solovey’s recent work on the militarization of the social 
sciences that produced an edited collection titled Cold War Social Science and a monograph 
titled Shaky Foundations; both provide wider context for understanding the function of defence 
research in the early postwar period.49 Furthermore, Joy Rohde’s Armed with Expertise and 
Audra Wolfe’s Competing with the Soviets represent two recently published and important 
                                                 
46 Mark Solovey, Shaky Foundations: The Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2013). 
47 On the history of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA or DARPA, which stands for Defense ARPA), 
see Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). 
48 Donald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: An Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1990); Leslie, The Cold War and American Science; Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1997). Also, see an edited collection compiled by Merritt Roe Smith, Military Enterprise 
and Technological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985).  
49 Mark Solovey and H. Cravens, Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and 
Human Nature (New York: Springer, 2012); Solovey, Shaky Foundations. 
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syntheses on science, technology, and the United States government.50 Both books engage 
deeply with the Cold War connection between military, industry and the academy.  
In relation to a history of the Defence Research Board, these studies on the military 
patronage of science in the United States tell us much about the influence of the American 
national security state in Canada during the early Cold War. In the first decade after the Second 
World War, the United States military funded more research than any other federal agency.51 A 
significant amount of military R&D occurred in university laboratories and industrial research 
institutes sponsored by the Pentagon. But as Rohde contends in her historical assessment of 
Pentagon-sponsored social research, “Americans embraced, challenged, and adapted to political 
and intellectual militarization.”52 While some social scientists embraced military-related research 
as a means to protect and promote the goals of the national security state, others voiced concerns 
over the increasing militarization of American democracy. Rohde traces this debate as it played 
out in the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), a multidisciplinary research institute 
created by the United States Army in 1956.  
Although Canada’s Defence Research Board emerged nine years prior to SORO, 
important questions arise when comparing the research initiatives of both organizations. SORO 
dealt exclusively with political matters, whereas the DRB sponsored defence research in a 
variety of scientific fields and did not insist on research closely aligning with defence priorities. 
In this respect, the DRB was not a significant force for the militarization of science. 
Nevertheless, despite their differences, SORO and the DRB both occupied a unique space 
between academia and government. Indeed, the creation and subsequent activities of the Defence 
                                                 
50 Audra J. Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets: Science, Technology, and the State in Cold War America (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012); Rohde, Armed with Expertise. 
51 Rohde, Armed with Expertise, 5. 
52 Ibid., 6. 
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Research Board partly reflect Canada’s response to American militarization and the influence of 
postwar Western security ideology. This is particularly apparent in the history of Canada’s 
Arctic-related defence research during the early Cold War, where the DRB sponsored research in 
the North to bolster Canada’s scientific contribution to the tripartite security alliance. Ultimately, 
while the military-industrial-academic complex does not apply directly to Canada, the concept is 
useful to assess the history of Canadian defence research during the Cold War. Unlike the 
American Pentagon, Canada’s defence establishment was not the primary patron of academic 
research in this period. Yet the Defence Research Board was one of only two federal funding 
agencies (the other was the National Research Council) to support academic research, which 
means political priorities for defence and security did influence the academic sciences in Canada. 
The Arctic is particularly important because it represents an area of Cold War research that 
demonstrates the union of military and scientific affiliations in Canada, a relationship facilitated 
largely by the funding structure and organizational mandate of the Defence Research Board. 
British literature on the postwar militarization of science is also useful to the Canadian 
context. Of the more relevant studies is David Edgerton’s Warfare State.53 Although not 
concerned with analyzing the strategic importance of the Polar Regions to western security in the 
early Cold War, Edgerton’s thematic approach to the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research marries the American military-industrial-academic complex with postwar defence 
history in the United Kingdom. His work builds on older scholarship such as Ronald Clark’s The 
Rise of the Boffins, which chronicles the contribution of science to British national security in 
wartime.54 
                                                 
53 David E.H. Edgerton, Warfare State: Britain, 1920-1970 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
54 Ronald William Clark, The Rise of the Boffins (London, UK: Phoenix House, 1962). 
23 
 
 
 
Historiography on Cold War defence research in the United States and the United 
Kingdom is particularly relevant to the dissertation because of the relative youth of the field in 
Canada, but also due to the nature of the Western security alliance and the history of scientific 
information exchange among all three tripartite partners in the early postwar period. The Defence 
Research Board opened liaison offices in Washington and London, and as documented in the 
dissertation, officials with the DRB shaped Canadian priorities for defence research in response 
to the diverse yet specific research and development projects undertaken outside of Canada. To 
secure the benefits of a security partnership with both the United States and the United Kingdom, 
the DRB had a mandate to avoid duplication of effort and pursue only research areas where 
Canada could make a unique contribution to the tripartite collective. For reasons of geography, 
terrain, climate, and population senior officials in Ottawa leveraged the Canadian North and the 
federal government strengthened Canada’s primary security partnership during the early Cold 
War. Understanding the history of defence research in the two countries most closely allied with 
Canada thus helps to explain the perception by top Canadian officials of the role of science in 
supporting the national interest for defence and security, both at home and abroad. 
 
Canadian International History and the Cold War 
The literature on the history of Canadian foreign policy in the post-1945 period is substantial, 
and a number of particular studies in this area helpfully shaped the dissertation. Charles Stacey’s 
Arms, Men and Governments and Jon McLin’s Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963 
are two canonical texts that are still valuable in understanding the strategic circumstances 
encountered by the Canadian state and military in the immediate postwar period, even though 
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McLin concentrates on the Diefenbaker years.55 For broad examinations of the Cold War and 
Canadian foreign relations, Robert Bothwell’s The Big Chill and Alliance and Illusion provide 
good syntheses of Canadian foreign policy in this era, and Greg Donaghy’s Canada and the 
Early Cold War, 1943-1957 focuses on key, relevant years.56 Historians such as Isabel Campbell 
(Unlikely Diplomats) and Ryan Touhey (Conflicting Visions) have also contributed to our 
understanding of Canada’s Cold War role internationally, with specific studies that address the 
role played by Canada and Canadians in particular regions, Europe and Asia respectively.57 
Campbell’s work is especially valuable to Chapter 6 of the dissertation, which examines the 
increasingly international role played by scientists of the Defence Research Board during and 
after the Korean War. Other seminal works by Denis Stairs (The Diplomacy of Constraint) and 
Denis Smith (Diplomacy of Fear) remain valuable for their detailed analysis of Canadian 
diplomacy in the early postwar period.58 
 These works provide a strong contextual base for the thesis of this dissertation, especially 
when considering the value of science to the North Atlantic Alliance during the early postwar 
period. Canada made important military and material contributions to the Allied victory in the 
Second World War, and Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong devised the principle of functionalism, 
which stated that Canada’s position and voice should reflect its contributions to international 
                                                 
55 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
1970); Jon B. McLin, Canada’s Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963: The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967). 
56 Robert Bothwell, The Big Chill: Canada and the Cold War (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998); Alliance and 
Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007); Greg 
Donaghy, ed. Canada and the Early Cold War, 1943-1957 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, 1998). 
57 Isabel Campbell, Unlikely Diplomats: The Canadian Brigade in Germany, 1951-64 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2013); Ryan Touhey, Conflicting Visions: Canada and India in the Cold War World, 1946-
76 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015). 
58 Denis Smith, Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1988); Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1974). 
25 
 
 
 
security.59 This principle is key to understanding the history of defence research in the Canadian 
North during the early Cold War. As a political “middle power,” Canada had little choice but to 
rely on its Western partners to secure Canadian interests after the Second World War. The 
concept of a middle power emerged after the war as a way of explaining Canada’s international 
role or status in relation to other countries. “Canadians were of greater consequence than the 
Panamanians but could not take on the obligations of the Americans, or even the French,” John 
Holmes wrote upon reflection in 1984.60 Holmes was referring specifically to Canada’s postwar 
foreign policy, and to the pragmatic approach of senior Canadian diplomats who utilized 
international institutions—the United Nations, the Commonwealth, and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO)—to increase Canada’s “voice” and wield a level of influence in 
international affairs.61  
My use of the term middle power has more to do with Canada’s position relative to the 
United States and Britain, where Canadian defence policy included a scientific element to define 
and emphasize Canada’s useful and unique contribution to Western security. Aware of the 
centrality and importance of science to national defence in both the US and the UK, officials in 
the Department of National Defence created the Defence Research Board to strengthen Canada’s 
commitment to Western security. The primary mandate of the DRB was to provide scientific and 
technical assistance to the Canadian armed forces, but this could only be achieved through direct 
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cooperation with similar agencies in the US and the UK. In order to gain access to American and 
British resources and expertise, the DRB pursued defence research only in fields where Canada 
could make a unique contribution. The decision to invest heavily in Arctic defence research was 
a deliberate and functional approach, designed to leverage Canadian science, geography and 
environment. Canada not only improved its position in the Western security alliance, but also 
bolstered its national security while maintaining territorial sovereignty in the North. 
 The notion of security and sovereignty in the North is the focus of a large body of 
scholarship on continental air defence, which provides insight into the development of bilateral 
security relations between Canada and the United States during the early Cold War. Joseph 
Jockel’s two books on Canada’s involvement in North American Air/Aerospace Defence 
(NORAD) are a clear starting point, but Andrew Richter (Avoiding Armageddon), Sean Maloney 
(Learning to Love the Bomb), James Fergusson (Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence), and 
Randall Wakelam (Cold War Fighters) have also published on the topic.62 Although the core of 
this dissertation predates the technological threat posed to North America by ballistic missiles, 
the history of continental air defence includes detailed and relevant examination of the bomber 
threat and the role of radar in the defence of the Canadian North.  
 One of the original and more important contributions here is what the dissertation adds to 
our knowledge of Canadian defence relations in the postwar period. While a considerable 
                                                 
62 Joseph T. Jockel, No Boundaries Upstairs: Canada, the United States, and the Origins of North American Air 
Defence, 1945-1958 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987); Jockel, Canada in NORAD, 1957-
2007: A History (Montréal and Kingston: Published for Queen’s Centre for International Relations and the Queen’s 
Defence Management Program by McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007); Andrew Richter, Avoiding 
Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1963 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2002); Sean M. Maloney, Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the 
Cold War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007); James G. Fergusson, Canada and Ballistic Missile 
Defence, 1954-2009: Déjà Vu All Over Again (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011); Randall 
Wakelam, Cold War Fighters: Canadian Aircraft Procurement, 1945-54 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2011). 
27 
 
 
 
volume of works is available on bilateral security relations between Canada and the United 
States, much less discusses the changing relationship between Canada and the United Kingdom 
in the years following the Second World War. In the deliberations that led to the establishment of 
the Defence Research Board, senior officials in the Canadian government carefully considered 
pragmatic approaches to maintain close defence relations with the United Kingdom while 
increasing bilateral ties with the United States. Scientific information exchange and liaison was 
central to the entire process, and the dissertation documents the resolve of Canadian officials 
who utilized science as a means to define Canada’s security interests during the early Cold War.  
The dissertation also benefits from a number of important studies that explore the impact 
of the Cold War in Canada. Scholars such as Tarah Brookfield (Cold War Comforts), Andrew 
Burtch (Give Me Shelter), and Robert Teigrob (Warming Up to the Cold War) have contributed 
recent works that provide added context to some of the social and cultural themes first 
introduced by Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse in their watershed book Cold War Canada.63 
Sociocultural analyses are particularly important here to assess the role and function of the 
Canadian government in the North. Scientists funded by the Defence Research Board often 
interacted with members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and representatives 
from other government departments when they travelled north to conduct research. 
Interdepartmental relations reveal the DRB’s connection to Canada’s national security state. 
During the Cold War, for instance, the RCMP selectively screened foreign scientists who applied 
for grant monies from the DRB. Moreover, some of the specific Arctic defence research projects 
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(documented in chapters 4 and 5) supported by the DRB impacted military personnel and 
civilians in the North. Other scholars such as Kurt Jensen (Cautious Beginnings) and most 
recently David Zimmerman (Maritime Command Pacific) have traced the varied impact of the 
Cold War in Canada through in-depth examination of intelligence and maritime security.64 While 
rooted in a Canadian context, the diversity of subjects covered by these authors shows the 
complexity of circumstances imposed on Canada because of the new international climate 
resulting from the Cold War. 
 
The Canadian North 
Historical scholarship on the Canadian North is a growing field comprised of political, social, 
cultural, economic and environmental studies. Works most relevant to this dissertation include 
those concerned with policy development, government administration, and scientific and military 
activity. The starting point for this research is a 1966 collection titled The Arctic Frontier, which 
resulted from a three-year collaboration between the Arctic Institute of North America and the 
Canadian Institute of International Affairs.65 Edited by Ronald Macdonald and introduced by 
John Holmes, the collection discusses government administration, sovereignty, strategy, and 
international scientific relations in Canada, the United States and the Soviet Union. Moira 
Dunbar and Robert Sutherland, two of the foremost individuals tied to the Defence Research 
Board, both contributed articles that offer insight into their work. Dunbar’s contributions are 
particularly relevant in Chapter 2, which provides a geopolitical history of the Canadian North 
that explains the importance of defence research to decisions in Ottawa concerning sovereignty 
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and security in the North. She studied sea ice for the Defence Research Board, and her work on 
Arctic geography was important to developing Canadian strategy for the early postwar period. 
Sutherland also made an important contribution to Canadian defence and security, although his 
area of expertise was in operational research. Along with individuals such as George Lindsey, an 
aerospace physicist and strategic analyst for the DRB, Sutherland’s work in operational research 
influenced Canadian strategy during the development and implementation of the North American 
air defence network. 
Two years after the publication of The Arctic Frontier, the Department of Energy, Mines 
and Resources published a two-volume collection titled Science and the Hudson Bay to mark the 
centenary celebrations of Canada that had taken place the year prior.66 Over fifty authors 
contributed to the collection, including two of the more prolific Arctic commentators, Graham 
Rowley and Margaret Carroll. Rowley first traveled to the Eastern Canadian Arctic as an 
archaeologist in 1936.67 After serving in the Canadian Army during the war, he became secretary 
and coordinator of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development and later scientific 
adviser to the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Carroll was a member of 
the Department of National Defence and wrote about the history of Canadian military activity in 
the North. Her contribution to the collection, “Defence Forces Operations in Hudson Bay,” is 
relevant here for its thorough coverage of northern Manitoba and the Churchill area.68 She 
explains the history of joint Canada-United States military projects in the North during the 
                                                 
66 C.S. Beals and D.A. Shenstone, eds., Science, History and Hudson Bay, Volume One and Two (Ottawa: 
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Queen’s Printer, 1968). 
67 For a brief biography of Rowley, see John Bennett, “Graham Westbrook Rowley,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, 
accessed 25 April 2017, http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/en/article/graham-westbrook-rowley/. 
68 See Margaret A. Carroll, “Defence Forces Operations in Hudson Bay,” in Science, History and Hudson Bay, 
Volume Two, Beals and Shenstone, eds., 897-934. 
30 
 
 
 
Second World War, and contextualizes Defence Research Northern Laboratory within a detailed 
discussion of postwar military activity in the Hudson Bay area. 
Outside of major collaborations, one of the first contributors to the historiography of the 
Canadian North was Morris Zaslow. As a pioneer of northern studies, he produced two seminal 
books for the Canadian Centenary Series.69 The latter of his two books, The Northern Expansion 
of Canada, 1914-1967, provides an historical overview of northern industrialization through an 
examination of economic, social and political development in the Yukon and Northwest 
Territories. Although dated, Zaslow’s work remains relevant. His contribution to northern 
historiography is clear by the degree to which subsequent scholars have expanded on or 
challenged his work.  
A second generation of northern scholars emerged in the tradition of Zaslow and made 
significant contributions to the field throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Among them were Bruce 
Trigger (Natives and Newcomers), J.R. Miller (Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens) and Kerry Abel 
(Drum Songs).70 These scholars introduced ethno-historical and oral history analyses to research 
and write about Indigenous peoples, which brought attention to the importance of individual 
agency and voice with regard to Canadian history. Although they did not focus on the North as a 
primary area of study, their works had a significant influence on the field. The issue of 
Indigenous peoples’ agency and voice is especially relevant in Chapter 5, which explores the 
involvement of Inuit in a series of experiments designed to study cold-tolerance in the human 
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body. The Defence Research Board funded the research project with the intent to apply the 
findings to military and service work in the North.  
As studies that examined the historical treatment of Indigenous people in Canada’s North 
began to engage with sensitive debates that had long surrounded Indigenous-state relations in the 
public, historians such as Kenneth Coates, who had lived in the North, wrote and published 
academic literature in support of Indigenous rights. Collaborations such as The Modern North 
and Northern Visions, the former published more than a decade prior to the latter, show the 
evolution of the field over a relatively short period.71 As Canadians became increasingly aware 
of the contemporary situation of Indigenous peoples in the North, scholarship reflected the need 
to better place the North within Canadian history. Issues of geography, climate, human 
adaptation, and Indigenous-state relations coalesced and now histories of northern Canada 
broach a variety of topics that include and extend beyond assimilative narratives.  
Of particular importance to this dissertation are works by Shelagh Grant and Whitney 
Lackenbauer. Grant has produced two excellent historical studies (Sovereignty or Security? and 
Polar Imperative) that provide comprehensive coverage of government activity and interest in 
the Canadian North.72 Based on thorough archival research, both works provide an ideal 
contextual base to support a study of the Cold War sciences in northern Canada. Lackenbauer 
has also made two important historical contributions to the field, Battle Grounds and The 
Canadian Rangers, which provide contextual information pertinent to this dissertation.73 His 
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work illuminates relationships between government officials and Indigenous communities. With 
particular reference to military activity in the North, Lackenbauer’s research offers insight that 
builds on Grant’s extensive examination of Canadian sovereignty. In addition to his stand-alone 
publications, Lackenbauer is the series editor of a useful collection of Documents on Canadian 
Arctic Sovereignty and Security.74 He has also co-published on topics related to the 
militarization of the Canadian North.75 
Scholars Matthew Farish and Adam Lajeunesse have also published materials relevant to 
the study of Cold War science in the Canadian North. Although not focused on the Defence 
Research Board, Lajeunesse’s work provides valuable insight for this dissertation. His book 
Lock, Stock, and Icebergs provides a thorough history of Canada’s Arctic maritime sovereignty, 
which is important to a comprehensive understanding of Canadian defence policy in the early 
Cold War.76 Farish, on the other hand, is an historical geographer who researches knowledge 
production and militarization in the context of the Cold War American Arctic. He has written 
articles that explore the concept of “war on nature,” and his book The Contours of America’s 
Cold War documents the perception and use of geographical and environmental sciences by the 
United States government and military in the early postwar period.77 Farish’s book touches on 
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some of the Arctic research activities of the DRB and his work provides important details on 
Canada-United States Cold War Arctic relations. His analysis of the Arctic Aeromedical 
Laboratory at Fairbanks, Alaska is particularly useful when comparing the history of Arctic 
defence research in the United States with the activities that occurred at Fort Churchill. 
Furthermore, his approach to historical geography is useful when examining the production of 
Arctic knowledge in Canada. He argues that the Arctic frontier was engineered by military and 
scientific affiliations in the United States.78 This dissertation employs a similar argument to 
explain how and why the Defence Research Board leveraged Arctic knowledge and geography to 
secure and strengthen Canadian defence relations. During the early Cold War, senior military 
and defence officials conceptualized the Arctic as an ideal space for scientific exploitation. Only 
in this context was the Arctic a useful tool for a political agenda.   
 
Primary Sources 
 
This dissertation relies heavily on primary sources to analyze the Defence Research Board and 
the development of Canada’s Cold War Arctic policy. Government documents, newspaper 
clippings, scientific literature and oral interviews provide some evidence of wider societal 
responses to Canadian defence research and development in the period under examination. As a 
methodological approach, relying on primary evidence has both advantages and disadvantages. 
Public documents provide a lens through which to explore change and continuity in societal 
responses to the government’s defence research priorities, and are of particular importance to this 
study because the DRB deliberately used print media as a conduit to disseminate its scientific 
and technological “achievements,” both domestically and internationally. Arctic research 
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received considerable coverage in print media and much of the coverage resulted directly from 
public relations outreach by the DRB.  
The dissertation is cautious in its use of newspaper material. Similar to other government 
institutions, National Defence had its own Directorate of Public Relations that controlled the 
release of defence-related research information originating from DND branches, including the 
DRB. The nature of newspaper publishing also shapes content in particular ways, and often 
reflects editorial rather than governmental priorities. Nonetheless, official DRB press releases 
and print media coverage of defence research activities provide, in addition to unique insight into 
the institutional makeup of Canada’s DND, an unmatched and useful primary record of Canadian 
science during the Cold War.  
A history of the DRB must begin with an overview of its origins and establishment 
within the DND. The first scientists recruited to work for the DRB were Canadian veterans of the 
Second World War. Operational research (OR) analysts were among the first to systematically 
apply science to the study of war. A useful collection of documents pertaining to Canadian OR is 
available in the extensive archival records of the Department of National Defence at the 
Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH) in Ottawa. Of particular value to this study are the 
George Lindsey and Robert Sutherland fonds. Sutherland was Chief of the Operational Research 
and Analysis Establishment, a branch of the DRB that applied operational science to study 
vulnerabilities in Canadian defences during the 1950s and 1960s. In 1967, Lindsey replaced 
Sutherland. Lindsey was an aerospace physicist and Canadian veteran of the Second World War 
who worked in operational research during the war. DHH maintains declassified records related 
to both Sutherland and Lindsey, which provide a wealth of information pertaining to the Cold 
War defence activities of the DRB. Additionally, the Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and 
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Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS) holds the George Lindsey fonds, a second archival collection 
of work-related documents that Lindsey wrote and collected during his thirty-five year career at 
DND and in retirement as a Senior Research Fellow with the Canadian Institute of Strategic 
Studies between 1987 and 2005.  
In addition to documents held at DHH and LCMSDS, there are relevant records at 
Library and Archives Canada (LAC). All official DRB press releases issued by the Directorate of 
Public Relations can be found in RG 24 (Department of National Defence), vols. 10339 and 
10340. Also located in RG 24 are DRB headquarters records, reports, Chairman’s records, and 
graphic material. Other associated files on the DRB at LAC can be found in RG 25 (External 
Affairs) and RG 85 (Northern Affairs). Additionally, Documents on Canadian External 
Relations provide important contextual information on Canadian defence policy for the period 
1947 to 1963.  
Beyond Ontario, there are several archival collections pertinent to this dissertation. The 
Personal and Confidential Series and the Prime Minister’s Office Series in the Diefenbaker 
papers, located at the Diefenbaker Canada Centre of the University of Saskatchewan in 
Saskatoon hold the records of John Spinks, an important scientist sponsored by the DRB. Spinks’ 
records include information on entomology pertinent to the North as well as general documents 
on the DRB’s extramural research programme. Records from university scientists funded by the 
DRB also derive from the archives of Queen’s University, the University of Toronto, and 
Dalhousie University.  
The town of Churchill, Manitoba maintains a small archival collection in its Public 
Library. The records consist mainly of materials preserved by members of the Churchill Ladies 
Club, including now out-of-print town newspapers, public service announcements, town reports, 
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and photographs. Unfortunately for this dissertation, the oldest print newspaper in the Churchill 
Public Archives dates from 1959. Nonetheless, some of the available documents describe social 
and cultural aspects related to Fort Churchill and government activity on the shore of Hudson 
Bay around the Churchill area. In addition to this material, Lorraine Brandson, the Curator of the 
Itsanitaq (formerly Eskimo) Museum in Churchill, wrote a guide to the natural and cultural 
heritage of the region that provides a detailed chronological history of the town and some 
information on the local activities of the Defence Research Board.79 
As vital as the DRB was to tripartite defence activities and relations, it is important to 
examine records at archival institutions outside of Canada. Located at the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland are useful annual reports originally 
produced by the DRB and then sent from Ottawa to Washington, DC. The dissertation also uses 
relevant volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States series and declassified American 
documents available online through the National Security Archive of George Washington 
University.  
 
Historical Context on the DRB 
The Defence Research Board, responsible for scientific research and its application for defence 
purposes, emerged in 1947 as a division of the Department of National Defence. The DRB 
offered scientific advice to the Minister of National Defence as well as scientific and technical 
assistance to the Canadian Armed Forces. In addition to conducting scientific defence research at 
various research establishments throughout Canada, the DRB also had extensive involvement in 
international defence partnerships such as NATO.  
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Omond Solandt returned to Canada to become the first Chairman of the DRB upon its 
establishment in 1947. Solandt invited a number of scientists he had met during the war to enroll 
in various positions in the DRB. Primary research suggests the DRB recruitment process was an 
institutionalized government response to Cold War anxieties; defence researchers (scientists and 
engineers) helped National Defence pursue and manage what historians refer to as “big 
science.”80 Historians use the term “big science” to describe changes in science that occurred in 
industrial nations during and after the Second World War. During this period, governments 
increasingly influenced scientific progress by funding large-scale projects. In Canada, research 
facilities established under the patronage and direction of the DRB served the defence scientific 
interests of Canada as some of the most modern establishments of their kind. Accordingly, the 
DRB represents an institutionalized embodiment of Canadian innovation and modernity in the 
early Cold War.   
The recruitment process and scientific initiatives conducted by the DRB offer insight to 
clarify Cold War priorities in Canada at the intersection of science, politics and security. 
Determining the degree to which the DRB was representative of scientific priorities in the 
Canadian defence establishment is a challenging task, however. In 1957, C.A. Pope argued the 
DRB had become the “keystone of defence science in Canada,” which seems accurate 
considering the scope of the DRB’s activities.81 As a modern and sophisticated division of 
National Defence, the DRB conducted defence research in areas that included geophysics and the 
Arctic, maritime and space, electronics and telecommunications, medical and environmental 
protection, aeronautics, civil defence, operational research and guided missiles. This research 
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often garnered international recognition, as several of these scientific activities promised useful 
applications for civilian as well as national security interests.  
The Defence Research Board was very much a national, or at least in geographic terms, a 
Canada-wide research organization. It was impractical to conduct research on such a wide scale 
in one Canadian location, so the DRB established multiple research facilities in various regions 
of the country. Although the various DRB establishments outside of the Canadian North are 
generally beyond the scope of this dissertation, scientific information exchange is a consistent 
feature in the primary source records of the Board. Headquarters activities occurred at DND 
Headquarters in Ottawa, and just east and west of the city respectively were the Defence 
Research Telecommunications Establishment and the Chemical Laboratories. The DRB’s other 
Ontario-based facilities included a biological research program conducted at the Defence 
Research Kingston Laboratory and a medical activities program conducted at the Defence 
Research Medical Laboratories in Downsview, Toronto. Downsview scientists investigated the 
physical capabilities of military men, and some of their work had direct ties to the DRB’s Arctic 
program. 
The Defence Research Board operated establishments outside of the Province of Ontario, 
too. The DRB’s Naval Research Establishment had two locations, one at Dartmouth, Nova 
Scotia and another at Esquimalt, British Columbia. A weapons program existed at the Canadian 
Armament Research and Development Establishment in Valcartier and there was an animal 
disease protection facility in Grosse Ile on the St. Lawrence River near Québec City, Québec. 
Furthermore, at Suffield, located near Medicine Hat, Alberta, scientists conducted biological, 
chemical and flame warfare trials as part of an entomological program that resulted in the 
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development of offensive weapons techniques. These extensive activities took place concurrently 
with the program of Arctic research conducted at Fort Churchill and in the Canadian North. 
The dissertation begins in 1947 with the establishment of the Defence Research Board 
and ends in 1963 at the conclusion of the Royal Commission on Government Organization. The 
introduction of ballistic missiles in the late 1950s drastically altered the geostrategic role of the 
Canadian North in considerations of North American continental defence. Prior to the launch of 
Sputnik in October 1957, when long-range bombers posed a primary threat, the Canadian 
defence establishment pursued a program of scientific research to aid the military in preparing 
for the potential defence of the Canadian North. While the DRB was concerned with the 
maritime and air defence of the North, this dissertation focuses on some of the scientific research 
projects meant to improve the land element of Canada’s northern defences. It is within this 
context that the DRB’s Arctic initiatives provide insight pertinent to a direct investigation of 
Canadian defence priorities during the first decade after the Second World War.  
In assessing the significance of the Defence Research Board to both the Canadian 
government and wider public, economics must be considered. Between its inception in 1947 and 
its highpoint in the late 1950s, the annual budget of the DRB increased between $7 and $10 
million each year from an initial operating cost of roughly $4 million.82 As defence research 
expenditures grew, the DRB regularly provided grant monies to employ researchers at 
universities throughout Canada. Operational costs also covered liaison offices in London and 
Washington, which in turn helped foster and expand Western tripartite defence relations in the 
early postwar period. Federal financial support of the DRB suggests the Canadian government 
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valued defence research and made a strong commitment to apply science to its own strategic 
interests.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
Examining Canada’s experience with defence research in the North during the early Cold War is 
only possible because of the strong foundation of the existing historical scholarship. Historians 
have documented the policymaking process, debating extensively whether sovereignty or 
security was the primary driving force behind Canada’s federal policy for the North in the years 
following the Second World War. Historian Shelagh Grant posed this challenge by arguing that 
bilateral cooperation with the United States hindered and threatened Canadian sovereignty in the 
North.83 Her interpretation has been challenged by other scholars. David Bercuson and Elizabeth 
Elliot-Meisel, for instance, have stressed the benefits of bilateral cooperation when examining 
Canada’s early Cold War defence relations with the United States.84 At the other end of the 
spectrum, historian Jack Granatstein has claimed that the history of Canada’s northern 
policymaking process is marred by incoherence.85 “Regrettably,” Granatstein has observed, “the 
lack of concern for the North and the regular and almost automatic acquiescence in American 
requests since 1942 had eaten away some of Canada’s rights.”86 This argument runs contrary to 
the assessment of historians P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, who contend that the 
                                                 
83 Grant, Sovereignty or Security? 
84 David Bercuson, “Continental Defense and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-50: Solving the Canadian Dilemma,” in The 
Cold War and Defense, ed. Keith Neilson and Ronald G. Haycock (New York: Praeger, 1990); Elizabeth Elliot-
Meisel, Arctic Diplomacy: Canada and the United States in the Northwest Passage (New York: Peter Lang 
Publishing, 1998). 
85 J.L. Granatstein, “A Fit of Absence of Mind: Canada’s National Interest in the North to 1968,” in The Arctic in 
Question, ed. E.J. Dosman (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 13-33. 
86 Ibid., 30. 
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development of Canadian policy for the North was cautious, pragmatic, and ultimately 
successful.87 
Historian Adam Lajeunesse has argued that “the truth of the matter lies somewhere 
between these competing schools of thought.”88 He concedes that senior officials effectively 
developed and executed a policy to quietly strengthen Canada’s claim in the North, but asserts 
that public articulation of the cautious bureaucratic approach failed. The public, in his estimation, 
was confused and dissatisfied with the apparently ambivalent federal approach toward the North. 
While this discontent helps explain the diverse and contentious nature of scholarship in the field, 
a close analysis of the activities of the Defence Research Board shows the value of science to the 
development of policies for defence in the North during the early Cold War. 
Given the significance of the Defence Research Board to the development and 
implementation of Canada’s Cold War defence policy, scientific defence research received 
special attention in considerations and decisions about northern Canada. Science shaped federal 
priorities in Ottawa during the period under investigation here. The decision to involve scientists 
in policy discussions for science and defence in the North paid immediate dividends for the 
federal government. In the process of crafting and shaping effective northern policies to meet the 
evolving issues of the immediate postwar period, senior officials in the Canadian defence 
establishment championed science as a means to bolster Canada’s commitment to Western 
security. The primary vehicle to achieve this policy aim was the Defence Research Board, and 
the bureaucratic structures of the DRB enabled and supported  range of environmental sciences 
                                                 
87 P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert, “Sovereignty and Security: The Department of External Affairs, the 
United States, and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-68,” in Serving the National Interest: Canada’s Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009, eds., Greg Donaghy and Michael Carroll (Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 2011), 101-120. 
88 Lajeunesse, Lock, Stock, and Icebergs, 7. 
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pertinent to military operations in the North. This pragmatic approach of senior officials in 
National Defence strengthened Canadian claims in the North and secured beneficial 
arrangements with both the United States and the United Kingdom. Ultimately, the unique 
circumstances examined in this dissertation explain how and why the federal government 
employed scientific defence research to protect and promote national interests in the North 
during the early Cold War. 
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Chapter Outline 
 
 
1) The ABC’s of Defence: Tripartite Relations and Canadian Research 
 
This chapter explores the history of defence research in Canada and provides context for key 
developments that shaped the Canadian approach to northern defence research during the early 
Cold War. The North Atlantic partnership highly influenced Canada’s scientific and 
technological activity in this era, and the tripartite defence relationship with the United Kingdom 
and the United States played a key role in shaping Canadian Cold War Arctic policy. 
Interestingly, the history of defence research in Canada seems to contradict a school of thought 
deeply rooted in the historiography of Canadian Cold War foreign relations, which suggests the 
North American bilateral defence partnership gradually diminished the significance of the United 
Kingdom in Canadian defence policy. New findings presented in this chapter suggest DRB 
officials sought to secure for Canada the benefits of a strong and equal scientific relationship 
with both the United Kingdom and the United States. The Canadian Arctic represented an area in 
which Canada could make a unique contribution to Western security. Recognizing American and 
British interest in Arctic security, Canadian officials crafted a functional approach that saw 
Canada use science and the Arctic to its advantage. This research nuances the continentalist 
school of thought, or what Robert Teigrob has referred to as Canada’s “reorientation of national 
allegiances.”1  
 
2) Cold War Prelude: Science and Defence in Northern Canada 
 
Moira Dunbar became one of the world’s better-known Arctic scientists while working for the 
Defence Research Board between 1947 and 1978. Along with Keith Greenaway, Dunbar made 
                                                 
1 Robert Teigrob, Warming Up to the Cold War: Canada and the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from 
Hiroshima to Korea (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 5. 
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numerous flights over the Arctic to map Canada’s wide northern expanses. Through an analysis 
of the DRB’s mapping of the North, this chapter explores how officials with National Defence 
and External Affairs conceptualized the Arctic from a geostrategic perspective. In so doing, the 
information presented in this chapter brings to light new details on the strategic value of aerial 
photography to Canada’s Cold War Arctic defence in the era prior to the development of missile 
technology. When long-range nuclear bomb-carrying strategic bombers posed the primary threat 
to North America, Dunbar and Greenaway photographed and monitored large ice floes in the 
Canadian sector of the Arctic Ocean. This chapter documents high-level concerns in Canada over 
Soviet and American activity in waters north of Canada, and raises new questions about 
Canadian sovereignty and defence during the first decade of the postwar period. The information 
presented here is essential to understanding the scientific activities of the Defence Research 
Board in the Canadian North, because competition was an influential element of the Cold War. 
North American officials showed concern for Soviet scientific prowess in the Arctic during the 
early postwar period. In response, the Department of National Defence utilized the DRB to 
showcase Canada’s contribution to Western security. Leveraging science and geography gave the 
Canadian government a vested stake in discussions about North American defence in the Arctic 
while maintaining close relations with the United Kingdom.  
 
3) Funding Defence Research and Development 
 
This chapter explores institutional priorities of Canada’s postwar defence establishment through 
an examination of the Defence Research Board’s internal and extramural research programs. The 
large majority of DRB experts were university-educated males between twenty-five and forty-
five years of age, which suggests the Defence Research Board was a highly privileged 
establishment. To lure scientific recruits, DRB awarded in excess of $40,000,000 between 1947 
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and 1970 to Canadian universities and research institutions.2 This was particularly important for 
Arctic research during the early postwar period when academic scientists in Canada had only 
limited access to financing for Arctic fieldwork. “The main exception to the lack of government 
support of university field scientists was the Defence Research Board,” wrote Trevor Lloyd, a 
preeminent Arctic traveler, geographer and commentator from McGill University.3 “The Board,” 
he continued, “maintained a systematic program of arctic fieldwork that took scores of university 
scientists and graduate students to the Arctic, thus marking a major contribution to the high 
standing that Canada enjoys in arctic research today [1978].” Using important questions first 
developed in Cold War literature concerning British and American science in the postwar period, 
this chapter explores how and why the DRB established links between defence, industry and the 
academy in Canada. Because Arctic science was imperative to postwar Canadian defence 
interests, the DRB became Canada’s primary patron of Arctic research. This chapter 
demonstrates the importance of Arctic research to the Canadian defence agenda by situating the 
DRB’s support of Arctic research within a financial history of Canada’s defence budget during 
the early Cold War.   
 
4) Science and Human Performance in the North 
For a six year period between 1947 and 1953, scientists supported by the Defence Research 
Board administered physiological and psychological experiments on Canadian soldiers 
conducting indoctrination training for Arctic warfare. Designed in an attempt to determine the 
ideal characteristics of cold-weather military personnel, a series of studies conducted in the 
                                                 
2 LAC, RG 24-F-4, R 112-265-5-E, vol. 10340, file DRB 1970, “Statement by the Defence Research Board – DRB 
25-70,” 4 June 1970.   
3 Trevor Lloyd, “Canadian Universities and Arctic Research,” in Living Explorers of the Canadian Arctic, eds., 
Shirley Milligan and Walter Kupsch (Yellowknife, NWT: Outcrop, The Northern Publishers, 1986), 20-23; quote on 
p. 21. 
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Canadian North by a leading British scientist resulted in physical and mental injury to two 
participating soldiers. Although the army immediately questioned its participation in further 
DRB testing because of these injuries, ethical considerations for human testing did not deeply 
penetrate the military or defence discourse concerning the involvement of soldiers in 
acclimatization research and indoctrination training. This chapter, examining cold-weather 
human testing in the Canadian North, explores and explains scientific defence research and 
information exchange between Canada and the United Kingdom in particular.  
 
5) Acclimatization Research on Inuit 
 
Between 1947 and 1954, the Defence Research Board funded a research team from Queen’s 
University to study the effect of cold on the human body. Designed for and carried out on white 
medical students and Inuit, a series of physiological and biochemical experiments aimed to 
determine how much cold exposure was required to achieve acclimatization. A distinguished 
Canadian scientist with experience from the Second World War led a team of researchers who 
made six trips to northern Canada over the eight-year period. Five trips took the team to 
Southampton Island in the north of Hudson Bay and a sixth to both Southampton Island and 
Igloolik in the northeast corner of present-day Nunavut. Researchers took samples of blood, 
plasma, urine, skin, and liver from “Eskimo test subjects” and transported the “specimens” to 
university labs in southern Ontario for independent and comparative biochemical analyses with 
samples taken from white persons. This chapter situates these experiments in the context of 
defence research designed to assist military and service work in the Canadian North during the 
early Cold War. 
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6) Changing Priorities and the Closure of Defence Research Northern Laboratory 
Rearmament for the Korean War had immediate and lasting consequences for the Defence 
Research Board. When the Canadian military rearmed to assist the United Nations forces in 
Korea, the Department of National Defence received an influx of funds but also a new agenda. 
This marked part of a wider change to the institutional priorities of the DRB, and the 
organization shifted its primary focus from fundamental to applied research. The DRB sent 
operational research analysts to Korea to examine the fighting tactics and weapons effectiveness 
of the coalition forces. An international scientific presence strengthened Canada’s stature 
amongst allies and showed the Department of National Defence exactly where the DRB could 
continue to make a unique contribution to the Western cause. Korea also impacted the DRB at 
home. A number of key scientists made important strategic and technical contributions to the 
development of the North American air defence network. In the years immediately following the 
Korean War, changes in the strategic threat as a result of Soviet technological developments 
forced the DRB to reallocate significant portions of its operating budget away from laboratory 
research. The nature and scope of Arctic research changed because of these circumstances. 
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Note on Terms and Definitions 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the “Arctic” refers to the region north of the tree line (“Inuit 
Nunaat”), which includes the Arctic Archipelago as well as the islands and waters situated to the 
north of the Canadian mainland.1 The term “the North” is a more inclusive term and is employed 
here in reference to the regions commonly referred to as “North of 60,” including parts of 
Yukon, the Northwest Territories (NWT), and Nunavut. A significant portion of the dissertation 
concentrates on Churchill, Manitoba, which lies on the fifty-eighth parallel. Although technically 
below the sixtieth parallel, the dissertation includes the Churchill area in references to “the 
North”.  
There are differences between the terms “the North” and the “Canadian North,” but I 
decided to use the terms interchangeably because of the archival records employed here.2 In 
keeping with the context of the period, the dissertations adopts terms and definitions for the 
Canadian North from the evidentiary record of available government documentation. According 
to 1948 records from the Department of Indian Affairs, the NWT composed the land portion of 
the Dominion lying north of the sixtieth parallel between Hudson Bay on the east and Yukon 
Territory on the west.3 By extension, the NWT also included the islands between the Canadian 
mainland and the North Pole, including those in Hudson Bay, James Bay and the Hudson Strait. 
Under the Northwest Territories Act (Chapter 142 R.S.C. 1927), administration in the NWT was 
                                                 
1 The definitions described here are borrowed from circumpolar historian P. Whitney Lackenbauer; see “From Polar 
Race to Polar Saga: An Integrated Strategy for Canada and the Circumpolar World,” in Canada and the Changing 
Arctic: Sovereignty, Security, and Stewardship, Franklyn Griffiths, Rob Huebert, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, eds., 
(Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2011), 69-179; note on definitions provided on pp. 71-72. 
2 The “Canadian North” includes the territories and the northern regions of Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia; “the North” includes Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and 
Nunavut—commonly referred to as “North of 60”. 
3 The United States National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), College Park, MD, RG 319, vol. 2761, 
file Precis on Canada’s Arctic and Sub-Arctic North of the 60th Parallel, Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs, 
January 1948, p. 32.  
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the responsibility of a territorial government composed of a commissioner of the NWT, a deputy 
commissioner and five councillors appointed by the Governor General.4 The council functioned 
not only as a legislative body, but also in an advisory capacity to the Minister of Mines and 
Resources on matters pertaining to the administration of the NWT.  
In the context examined here, the terms “sovereignty” and “security” are not 
interchangeable. Internationally, the protection of sovereignty usually refers to state protection of 
boundaries from foreign interference. Conversely, security commonly describes the methods by 
which a state protects the well-being of its citizens from a foreign threat.5 According to these 
definitions, protection of Canadian Arctic sovereignty refers specifically to the protection of 
Canada’s northern boundaries, while the protection of Canadian Arctic security refers to the 
response taken by the federal government to protect the well-being of northern citizens from 
foreign threats.  
Other terms and definitions are in the notes of the dissertation where required to explain 
the context of the relevant chapter. 
                                                 
4 During the late 1940s and early 1950s (the period covered in the dissertation), the territorial government for the 
NWT included Hugh L. Keenleyside (Commissioner); Roy A. Gibson (Deputy Commissioner); John G. McNiven, 
Louis de la C. Audette, Harold B. Godwin, James G. Wright; Stuart T. Wood; and Robert A. Hoey (Members of 
Council). 
5 The dissertation borrows definitions for “sovereignty” and “security” from Canadian Arctic policy scholar Rob 
Huebert; see “Canadian Arctic Security: Shifting Challenges,” in International Relations and the Arctic: 
Understanding Policy and Governance, Robert W. Murray and Anita Dey Nuttall, eds., (Amherst, NY: Cambria 
Press, 2014), 131-163; explanation for definitions provided on p. 132. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The ABC’s of Defence: Tripartite Relations and Canadian Research 
 
 
This chapter traces key developments in the history of Canadian national research. While 
substantial government interest in the Arctic region developed during the Second World War, the 
next two decades saw more permanent and consequential attempts to alter and improve northern 
landscapes and lives. Yet the history of state-driven modernization in the Canadian North 
predates the onset of the Cold War period. The roots of defence science in Canada lay in a set of 
entangled wartime experiences. Both major conflicts of the twentieth century influenced the 
emergence, growth and evolution of Canadian national research. 
Tracing the impact of Canada’s wartime research experience is essential to discern 
developments in policymaking that created the circumstances for Canadian Cold War Arctic 
science. While military and defence officials shaped the foundation of Canada’s national 
research, we should not ignore the crucial role played by social scientists. The relationships 
established between representatives of the Canadian state and social scientists indicate an 
intricate web of ambitions and priorities. Moreover, diplomats, bureaucrats and scientists from 
the United Kingdom and the United States also influenced the structure and pattern of national 
research in Canada. The extent of that impact is the focus of this chapter. I draw attention to the 
history of an informal postwar connection among the Atlantic partners known as the tripartite 
ABC (American/British/Canadian) relationship.1 Each nation participated in areas of mutual 
                                                 
1 The basis of the tripartite relationship was a series of informal agreements between the three participating countries 
for postwar cooperation and information exchange in defence research and development. See Donald Avery, The 
Science of War: Canadian Scientists and Allied Military Technology During the Second World War (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1998), 248-251; Jason Sean Ridler, Maestro of Science: Omond Mckillop Solant and 
Government Science in War and Hostile Peace, 1939-1956 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 199-200. 
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strategic interest, cooperating in joint projects and, to a degree, exchanging vital information on 
research and development.  
For Canada, tripartite relations provided military and defence officials the opportunity to 
maintain close ties to the United Kingdom and build ties with the United States. Interestingly, the 
tripartite relationship seems to belie the idea that Canada’s early Cold War defence policy was 
entrenched in the North American bilateral partnership with the United States. Canadian 
officials, I argue, remained committed to the Commonwealth and pursued a flexible policy that 
assured Canadian participation in the tripartite system while enjoying the advantages of British 
and American resources. The tripartite ABC relationship represents a balancing act, and the 
cautious diplomacy of Canadian officials provides insight for contextualizing developments in 
Canada’s postwar science and defence policy.  
  
Origins of Defence Research 
 
The origins of defence research in Canada date to the First World War when the United States 
and the United Kingdom created government agencies devoted to research. Both countries 
supported research in a move to direct their national efforts, apply science and engineering to the 
wartime need for weapons development, and to strengthen the collective organization of defence. 
The British established the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) in 1915, 
while the Americans formed a National Research Council in anticipation of their entry into the 
war in 1916. That same year, Canada established an Honorary Research Council in response to a 
requirement of the British Empire that all colonial governments create corollary organizations 
similar to the DSIR.2  
                                                 
2 On the British Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and the connection to Canadian research, see Roy 
M. MacLeod and E. Kay Andrews “The Origins of the D.S.I.R.: Reflections on Ideas and Men, 1915-1916” Public 
Administration 48 (Spring 1970): 23-48; Wilfrid Eggleston, National Research in Canada: The NRC 1916-1966 
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Although established under the Imperial British umbrella, the structural model for 
Canada’s Honorary Research Council differed from its parent organization. The British DSIR 
emerged as a collection of research facilities administered by high-level advisors and 
policymakers. In contrast, the Canadian agency did not have research facilities and served 
government solely in an advisory role. A limited number of scientists and engineers in Canada 
found wartime employment with government agencies outside the Department of Militia and 
Defence, but war-related research and development in Canada was minimal because of the 
military’s reliance on British resources.3 
A significant period of organizational change began for the Honorary Research Council 
in 1917. As the First World War drew to a close, the Council decided to divert its focus from the 
military needs of the British government to the support of university and industrial research in 
Canada. At the time, Canadian universities relied heavily on scientists and engineers trained in 
the United Kingdom and the United States to fill faculties and teach undergraduate courses. The 
Council aimed to change the scope of national research in Canada through a renewed focus on 
financial support of academic and industrial research external to Ottawa.  
Despite its initial modest budget and size, the Honorary Research Council gained 
political support and grew in the decade following the end of First World War in 1918. The 
growth of the organization was slow but meaningful. By the mid-1920s, the Council had 
                                                 
(Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1978), 254-255; H.W. Melville, The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1962); W.E. Knowles Middleton, Physics at the National Research Council of Canada, 
1929-1952 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979); Middleton, Radar Development in Canada: The 
Radio Branch of the National Research Council of Canada, 1939-1946 (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University 
Press, 1981); Middleton, Mechanical Engineering at the National Research Council of Canada, 1929-1951 
(Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984); Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific 
Community in Modern America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
3 Some of the government departments that employed scientists during the war included Agriculture, Mines and 
Fisheries. Canada’s Department of National Defence emerged in June 1922 when the Parliament of Canada passed 
the National Defence Act, which merged the Department of Militia and Defence, the Department of Naval Services, 
and the Air Board. 
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awarded over 300 scholarships and fellowships to nearly 200 students across sixteen departments 
at twelve Canadian universities.4 Although statistics are not an accurate measure of quality, the 
Council had provided funding to support the post-graduate work of no fewer than 155 students 
by 1926. While 123 of the 155 funded students actively conducted research in Canada, the 
organization underwent a name change to reflect its renewed status and emerged rebranded as 
the National Research Council (NRC).5  
The NRC increased its annual allotment of research funding until 1931. The Depression 
began two years prior in October 1929 and although the Canadian government continued to fund 
external research, economic forces of the period capped the growing NRC budget and funds 
stayed internal to support the base salaries of its 300 employees who worked at a series of newly 
constructed laboratories in Ottawa.6 As external research funds dwindled, so too did any hope of 
expanding the existing internal infrastructure of the organization. Operational costs increased 
during the period, and both the external and internal growth of NRC activities came to a halt.  
The 1935 change in federal leadership from R.B. Bennett’s Conservative government to 
William Lyon Mackenzie King’s Liberal government did little to change the economic situation 
of national research in Canada. Prior to King’s electoral victory, Bennett had promised Major-
General Andrew McNaughton, who succeeded Henry Troy as President of the National Research 
Council, that an organizational budget increase was on the horizon. McNaughton assumed the 
Presidency of the NRC in 1935 in part because of Bennett’s promise, but upon taking office the 
Liberals cancelled these budgetary commitments and the budget of the NRC remained stagnant.7 
                                                 
4 Eggleston, National Research in Canada, 24. 
5 In his history of the National Research Council, Wilfrid Eggleston puts the official numbers at 344 combined 
scholarships and fellowships to 199 students. 
6 Avery, The Science of War, 44. 
7 According to Jonathan Turner, Bennett promised McNaughton an increase in NRC funds to support applied 
research in fields with a military interest. McNaughton had worked on an early version of radar known as Cathode 
Ray Direction Finders and his well-established military career made him an ideal choice to replace Troy at the helm 
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Science and the Second World War 
 
In the lead up to the Second World War, the scope and nature of national research in Canada 
changed in anticipation of another global conflict. Germany violated the Treaty of Versailles and 
remilitarized in 1935, while Italy defied the League of Nations the same year and invaded 
Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia). McNaughton replied to the escalation in global tension by 
concentrating NRC resources on applied science projects related to military fields. Under his 
tutelage, the National Research Council pursued and funded research on artillery, aviation, 
medicine, gas masks and radar. By the onset of mobilization for the war in 1939-40, the internal 
and external initiatives of the NRC had converted from peacetime to war-related research. 
McNaughton’s desire to support military research lacked federal funding. Although 
King’s Liberals established a Cabinet Defence Committee in 1935 to respond to the increasing 
tension in global affairs, Canada’s national defence budget grew only slightly each year prior to 
the war. The budget was $36,000,000 during the latter years of the Great Depression in 1937-
38.8 Nonetheless, McNaughton had positioned the NRC at the fore of Canada’s scientific and 
technical effort at the outset of war in September 1939. 
The extent of national research in Canada changed again in June 1940 after the fall of 
France. In support of the United Kingdom against the Axis powers, the Canadian government 
passed the National Resources Mobilization Act on 21 June, and the NRC immediately assumed 
full responsibility for the organization and implementation of scientific and technical research 
related to military applications. The possibility of military defeat at the hands of Nazi Germany 
                                                 
of NRC. See Jonathan Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” (The Institute for the 
History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto: PhD Dissertation, 2012), 16-17. 
8 A number of historians agree that King limited the growth of Canada’s national defence budget prior to the Second 
World War. See, for instance, Eggleston, National Research in Canada, 100; Robert Bothwell, Ian M. Drummond, 
and John English. Canada 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 295-296.  
55 
 
 
 
forced the British government to seek assistance from Canada and the United States. Defence 
science cooperation within the North Atlantic triangle increased as a result. Cooperation between 
Canada and the United States led to the Ogdensburg Agreement of August 1940 and the creation 
of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which formalized a shared commitment to defend the 
north half of the Western Hemisphere. Seven months later in March 1941, the British and 
Americans signed the ABC-1 defence agreement for military cooperation. In the following 
month, Roosevelt and Mackenzie King met at Hyde Park, New York and made a commitment to 
close cross-border cooperation in defence production.9 
Formalized wartime cooperation with the United Kingdom and the United States had a 
significant impact on the structure and performance of Canadian defence research. The National 
Research Council and the Department of National Defence received only limited access to top-
secret British information during the first year of the war, while military technology in the 
United States remained virtually closed to Canadian officials. The situation changed following 
the trans-Atlantic scientific missions led by Sir Henry Tizard for the United Kingdom and Dr. 
James Conant for the United States in 1940-41, after which Canadian scientists gained access to 
the world of sophisticated American military technology through collaborative work and 
information exchange with British counterparts.10 
As the wartime demand created a need for advanced weaponry, cooperation between the 
National Research Council and the Armed Forces became direct and formal. When McNaughton 
served from 1939 to 1944 as Commander of First Canadian Corps and later as Lieutenant-
                                                 
9 Avery, The Science of War, 41. 
10 For a more detailed discussion of the Tizard and Conant scientific missions, see Avery, The Science of War, 52-
62; Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 22-23; David Zimmerman, Top Secret 
Exchange: The Tizard Mission and the Scientific War (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1996). 
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General of First Canadian Army, C.J. Mackenzie took the helm as acting President of the NRC. 
The two men were likeminded in their commitment to defence research and with the support of 
the military, Mackenzie managed to build and maintain beneficial relationships with powerful 
Cabinet ministers such C.D. Howe (Munitions and Supply) and C.G. Power (Defence for Air).11 
Although he did not occupy a position comparable to that of Frederick Lindemann, the wartime 
science advisor to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Mackenzie’s connection to the 
inner circles of wartime government brought the NRC to the fore of Canada’s federal 
bureaucracy.12  
 
Scientific Cooperation and Exchange 
The security alliance between Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States that 
influenced Canada’s early Cold War experience with defence research derived from wartime 
scientific military cooperation. Historians seem to agree that the British Scientific and Technical 
Mission to North America under Sir Henry Tizard was a catalyst for cooperation among the three 
partner countries.13 An eminent defence scientist in the United Kingdom and Rector of the 
Imperial College of Science and Technology, Tizard visited Washington and Ottawa in August 
and September 1940 to explore methods of scientific information exchange and cooperation in 
defence research, development and production.14  
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 As evidence on this point, historian Andrew Godefroy points to the 1944-45 NRC annual report, which states 
explicitly that the organization, for the first time in its history, was to act as an advisor to government departments 
such as National Defence. See Godefroy, “Wartime Military Innovation and the Creation of Canada’s Defence 
Research Board,” in Canada and the Second World War: Essays in Honour of Terry Copp, Geoffrey Hayes, Mike 
Bechthold, and Matt Symes, eds., (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2012), 201. 
13 See, in order of publication date, Ronald W. Clark, Tizard (London, UK: Methuen, 1965), 259-262; C.P. Stacey, 
Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer for 
Canada, 1970), 507-514; Avery, The Science of War, 52-59. 
14 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, 507. 
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The Tizard mission was a response to Britain’s perilous situation following the fall of 
France in June 1940. The British recognized that there were not enough scientists and engineers 
in the United Kingdom to fill the escalating wartime requirement. Moreover, according to 
military historian C.P. Stacey, the vulnerability of Britain’s industrial base to air attack made 
decentralization desirable.15 North American scientists, engineers, land and resources offered a 
plausible and friendly solution to some of Britain’s most pressing wartime concerns. The 
situation proved fortuitous for Canadian research and development. As issues over patent rights 
and security dissipated after the Tizard mission, scientists, engineers and research agencies in 
Canada gained access to fields of information and technical development previously protected by 
the British. The National Research Council grew to meet the demand. The organization matured 
from a single laboratory in 1939 to twenty-two establishments by the end of the war in 1945, and 
simultaneously facilitated as many as 280 external projects at other laboratories across Canada. 
The Council also fortified its political power through the operation of thirty-three Associate 
Research Committees, nearly 100 subcommittees, and continued cooperation with university and 
industrial leaders. Equally significant, the NRC opened liaison offices in London and 
Washington to maintain close and continuous information exchange.16 
Although it is difficult to ascertain the full impact of Canada’s wartime research and 
development, Canadians made key contributions to expedite Allied victory. Important scientific 
advances occurred in such fields and technologies as radar, weapons and ammunition production, 
medicine, operational research, and chemical, biological and nuclear research.17 As the principal 
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 For a detailed first-hand perspective written by Canadian scientists and engineers who contributed to national 
research and development during the Second World War, both on the home front and overseas, see George Linsey, 
ed., No Day Long Enough: Canadian Science in World War II (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 
1997).  
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organizing body of wartime research and development, the National Research Council identified 
and recruited scientists and engineers from laboratories in universities, industry and government 
to fill required research needs. Canadians also contributed to the wartime effort with British or 
American organizations.18 Many scientists and engineers from Canada served in the United 
Kingdom during the early years of the war, while others joined American agencies after the 
United States entered the conflict in December 1941.  
 
Planning for Postwar Defence 
While the complete extent of Canada’s scientific effort during the Second World War is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation, the topic is essential to the history of Canadian defence research in 
the early Cold War. The scientific and technical advances of wartime weaponry created a global 
atmosphere of heightened awareness, in which postwar considerations in the United Kingdom, 
the United States and the Soviet Union included the potential of rearmament. Although another 
global conflict seemed unlikely at the end of the war in September 1945, the creation of the 
United Nations and the promise of postwar peace between the major wartime allies did not quell 
international tensions. Postwar defence thus required federal support of active research and 
development. 
With regard to the development of postwar defence policy, two important influences 
grew out of the Canadian experience with science in the Second World War. The first coincides 
with a decision made by Mackenzie in 1943, when, as acting President of the National Research 
Council, he became increasingly reluctant to accept new long-term projects that showed little 
                                                 
18 E.H. Dugeon, “The National Research Council’s Contributions in World War II,” in No Day Long Enough, ed., 
Lindsey, 16-22. 
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prospect of a rapid completion.19 Mackenzie’s decision was both logical and administratively 
sound. He insisted that Canada’s research philosophy remain pragmatic and thus he adopted a 
frugal approach when committing NRC resources. Consequently, federal funds for scientific 
research and development went solely to projects that promised some hope of early returns.   
Canada’s wartime scientific experience also underscored the need to consolidate 
advances made in research and development.20 In the final two years of the war, Canadian 
government officials, military leaders, scientists, engineers and industrialists pondered the 
feasibility of sustaining mutually beneficial cooperation and growth. The imperative for a clearly 
defined national research policy became increasingly apparent as pending postwar issues 
approached. Unless the federal government, the National Research Council, and the three 
services acted quickly, Canada’s wartime scientific and technical infrastructure might disperse, 
or so top Canadian officials feared.21 
Four basic principles guided Mackenzie’s vision for Canada’s postwar research policy, 
and each depended on explicit government support in the areas of policy and finance.22 The first 
was necessary to retain top Canadian scientists and engineers for Canadian research, which 
would ensure the consistency and advancement of science across the country. Secondly, federal 
financial support for scientific research must expand after the war. Both the United States and the 
United Kingdom spent more per capita on research than Canada. This fact did not sit well with 
Mackenzie. He thought remedial action was necessary to strengthen the scientific and technical 
                                                 
19 Interview with C.J. Mackenzie, conducted by Captain D.J. Goodspeed, 28 August 1958; cited in Captain D.J. 
Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958), 11. 
20 Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada, 12. 
21 Ibid., 12-13. 
22 Mackenzie’s four principle requirements for Canadian postwar research policy as listed here derive from Captain 
D.J. Goodspeed’s history of the Defence Research Board, in which Goodspeed references a paper presented by 
Mackenzie to the Engineering Institute of Canada in Quebec City on 11 February 1944. The referenced paper is 
titled “Industrial Research in Post-War Canada”; see Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of 
Canada, 12. 
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workforce, by improving the sponsorship of university support, and introducing liberal tax 
policies designed to encourage industrial research growth. National research in Canada required 
more than an influx of federal funds, however. To nurture the organic growth of national 
research and development, Mackenzie’s third principle called for greater cooperation between 
government and civilian branches of Canadian R&D. Successful collaboration between state and 
civilian agencies was necessary to facilitate his fourth and final principle of an effective postwar 
research policy, which was the transition of Canadian research facilities to peacetime operations. 
Mackenzie was not alone in his concern for Canada’s postwar research policy. Senior 
members of the Canadian Army also voiced concern for the need to maintain wartime research 
organizations in the transition to peace. Lieutenant-General K. Stuart, Chief of the General Staff 
between 1941 and 1943, and his successor, Lieutenant-General J.C. Murchie, were among those 
who initiated plans to develop a postwar defence structure. Both men had direct experience with 
the British system of research; Stuart, for instance, had served in London as Chief of Staff at 
Canadian Military Headquarters. The British armed forces had not only considered the problem 
of postwar defence research by 1944, but had forwarded a paper written by the First Lord of the 
Admiralty to the Canadian government.23 The memorandum recommended that Canada examine 
the requirements of establishing permanent organizations to conduct naval or inter-service 
research and development in collaboration with agencies in the United Kingdom.  
Canadian officials moved quickly on the formation of postwar defence plans. After 
having received the British memorandum in May, the Chiefs of Staff submitted a 
recommendation in July that resulted in Cabinet approval for the formation of a Committee on 
Research for Defence. The Canadian Cabinet approved the idea for the committee on the 
                                                 
23 Memorandum by the First Lord of the Admiralty, “Scientific and Technical Co-operation within the British 
Commonwealth,” May 1944; cited in Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada, 13. 
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understanding that it would make recommendations to the War Committee about the formation 
of postwar defence policies. In early January 1945, representatives of National Defence, the 
National Research council, and the Department of Munitions and Supply met to consider the 
composition of the Committee on Research for Defence.24 Those in attendance at the meeting 
agreed that C.D. Howe should become chair. As a cabinet minister closely associated with 
research and reconstruction, Howe had the respect and position thought necessary to lead the 
planning efforts for postwar defence. The other members of the committee included the chiefs of 
staff and senior technical officials of the three services, the head of the NRC, two representatives 
from industry, and two civilians. Defence Council agreed to these recommendations in March, 
and Cabinet gave the final approval to form the committee on 10 August 1945. 
While the Committee on Research for Defence controlled the direction of scientific 
defence work, actual research and development remained the responsibility of the three services 
and other government agencies. An institutionalized government body made little sense without 
an infrastructure to carry out policy, so the Committee considered how to alter the structure of 
postwar defence in Canada. Members of the Committee discussed a number of solutions prior to 
meeting formally. General Charles Foulkes, Chief of the General Staff, approached Mackenzie 
about transferring research activities from the three services to create a new military division of 
the National Research Council.25 Although the NRC directed military research during the war, 
Mackenzie was reluctant to oversee the development and implementation of defence research in 
the postwar period. He envisioned the return of his organization to applied research in non-
                                                 
24 According to Goodspeed, those in attendance at the meeting included General A.G.L. McNaughton, Minister of 
National Defence; Harry Carmichael, Department of Munitions and Supply; C.J. Mackenzie, President of the 
National Research Council; Air Vice-Marshal E.W. Stedman, Director-General of Air Research; and Major-General 
J.V. Young, Master General of Ordnance. See Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada, 14. 
25 Godefroy, “Wartime Military Innovation and the Creation of Canada’s Defence Research Board,” in Canada and 
the Second World War, eds. Hayes, Bechthold, and Symes, 203. 
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military fields and convinced Foulkes that the existing NRC infrastructure was inadequate to 
meet the anticipated substantial needs of Canadian defence research.  
With none the three services nor the NRC in a position to manage the requirements of 
Canada’s postwar defence research, Foulkes and Mackenzie searched for another viable option. 
Colonel W.W. Goforth, head of the army’s Directorate of Staff Duties at National Defence, 
proposed the creation of an internal division solely for defence research.26 Foulkes accepted the 
proposal, and his staff used Goforth’s ideas to write a list of recommendations for the Committee 
on Research for Defence.27 
The “Goforth Paper” laid the foundation for Canadian defence policy, research and 
development in the early Cold War: 
Adequate defence … requires an energetic and effective policy of preparation for the type 
of modern war which may break upon us with great suddenness in the future … Research 
and development of new weapons must, therefore, be one of the fundamental principles 
of our new defence policy.28  
 
While Canadians made scientific, technical, industrial, military and civilian contributions to 
victory in the Second World War, official support for postwar research and development derived 
in part from the perception of Canada’s limited international position as a middle power at the 
end of the war. As further reflected in Goforth’s recommendations, the promotion of R&D was a 
calculated diplomatic tactic: 
[Canada is] very interested in obtaining a greater degree of standardization between the 
United States of America and the United Kingdom in order to ameliorate her own 
immediate position. This she can only influence by sharing actively in research, 
development and design with both the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America.29 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), George Lindsey fonds (87/253), Box 15, 85/334 File 104, Defence 
Research Estimates & Supplementary Information, “To the Cabinet Committee on Research for Defence: Post-War 
Policy for Scientific Research for Defence,” 31 October 1945. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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The desire to facilitate scientific cooperation among the North Atlantic partners was an explicit 
goal of the Canadian defence establishment. While Prime Minister Mackenzie King publicly 
discussed the need for stronger bilateral ties with the United States, defence officials also 
remained committed to the Commonwealth.  
 
A New Direction for Defence Research 
The appointment of General Charles Foulkes as Chief of the General Staff in late August 1945 
changed the scope and direction of Canadian postwar defence planning. Foulkes had commanded 
the Second Canadian Division in Normandy and the First Canadian Corps in Italy during the 
war. His battlefield experience gave him a keen understanding of modern combat, and he was 
impressed with the tremendous influence of wartime science. Considerations for the application 
of military research in times of peace were at the forefront of his mind as the hostilities drew to a 
close. Heading into the postwar period, Foulkes thought Canada’s military scientific effort was 
too vital for the services to handle alone.30 The potential for duplication of effort and inter-
service rivalry gave cause for concern. 
Canadian wartime economics also influenced Foulkes’ determination to promote active 
research and development after the war, especially when he considered the potential implications 
of a reduced postwar defence budget. Between 1938 and 1945, federal expenditure on R&D 
increased from $4.9 million to $34.5 million.31 Foulkes recognized the impact of this major 
influx of wartime investment, which fundamentally altered the traditional relationship between 
science and government in Canada. He strongly believed that adequate and effective postwar 
                                                 
30 Godefroy, “Wartime Military Innovation and the Creation of Canada’s Defence Research Board,” in Canada and 
the Second World War, eds. Hayes, Bechthold, and Symes, 203. 
31 Ibid., 200. 
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defence required an active and financially strong research program facilitated by officials and 
prominent scientists. 
Foulkes made his thoughts well known when he presented Goforth’s recommendations to 
the Committee on Research for Defence. The committee reviewed the recommendations at its 
first and only meeting, which took place at C.D. Howe’s office on Parliament Hill on 4 
December 1945.32 The implications of the meeting were profound. The committee voted 
unanimously in favour of the recommendations and decided on infrastructure to support the plan. 
Moreover, the committee agreed to promote a civilian with scientific training to Director General 
for Defence Research, a new position whose responsibilities would include the coordination of 
postwar research for the three services. The plan was promising and simple because it did not 
require approval from Cabinet. Implementation required only some reorganization of the existing 
structure of the Department of National Defence and an order-in-council authorizing the 
appointment of a Director General for Defence Research. A subcommittee then agreed on a list 
of potential appointees for the new position, C.D. Howe adjourned the meeting, and a new 
direction for Canadian defence research was in place.  
By accepting the recommendations of the “Goforth Paper,” the Committee on Research 
for Defence laid the foundations of the structure of postwar research in Canada. The most 
sensitive information contained in the document pertained to resources and exchange. 
Recommendation sixteen discussed reliance on the United States for heavy-duty military 
equipment, while the eighteenth made a statement on Canada’s value to the tripartite alliance: 
Contributions may be made to special advantage in fields which present problems of 
particular interest to Canada, such as Winter Warfare and also in the fields in which our 
present establishments and manufacturing potential are particularly suited … Our 
contribution to these problems is likely to be a prerequisite to the free interchange of 
                                                 
32 Government of Canada, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Research and Defence, 4 
December, 1945. 
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defence technology between ourselves, the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America.33 
 
Science could be used to bolster mutually beneficial postwar cooperation, or so was the 
determination made by the Committee on Research for Defence. Supporters of the “Goforth 
Paper” thought defence research should be the responsibility of a single government agency. 
This idea denied the services their own research empires and subsequently made possible the 
creation of the Defence Research Board.34   
 
Creation of the Defence Research Board 
The creation of the Defence Research Board, the executive policymaking body on defence 
research for the services, dates to 27 March 1947, when an amendment to the National Defence 
Act received royal assent.35 Within one week of the amendment, Order-in-Council PC 1268 
stipulated the provisions of legislation for the DRB.36 As of 1 April, the DRB was in place to 
carry out defence-related duties as assigned by the minister of national defence, and to provide 
advice on scientific, technical and other research matters concerning the national defence and 
security of Canada. To carry out this mandate, the federal government empowered the DRB to 
operate research facilities and laboratories, enter into contracts with industrial partners, and 
establish scholarships to make extramural aid available for defence research.  
                                                 
33 In addition to winter warfare, the paragraph listed chemical warfare, radar, electronics, vehicle design and 
protective clothing as example fields of Canadian speciality. See DHH, George Lindsey fonds 87/253, Box 15, 
85/334 File 104, Defence Research Estimates & Supplementary Information, “To the Cabinet Committee on 
Research for Defence: Post-War Policy for Scientific Research for Defence,” 31 October 1945. 
34 Ridler, Maestro of Science, 116. 
35 The original proposal for the creation of the DRB dates to 28 September 1946 when Solandt drafted a 
memorandum for a “Defence Research Board”.  
36 DHH, George Lindsey fonds (87/253), Box 15, 85/334 File 106, “Defence Research Estimates Fiscal Year 1948-
49 Copy No. 13,” p. 4. 
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The DRB’s initial operating budget for 1947-48 was slightly more than $5.5 million, an 
amount that doubled the year after and continued to rise incrementally for the next decade.37 
Budgetary increases funded civil service wages, employee travel, property and construction, and 
the procurement of equipment and resources required to fulfill and expand the structure and 
activities of the organization. At the start of 1948, the headquarters of the Defence Research 
Board employed 136 personnel, consisting of thirty-eight professional staff, five consultants, 
eighty-nine non-professionals, and four seconded members of the armed services.38 The DRB 
also included several advisory committees and panels, on which members served without 
remuneration except for travel and transportation expenses.  
Organizationally, the Defence Research Board consisted of two components. Referred to 
commonly in DRB records as the “Board,” the first component was akin to a commercial board 
of directors. The Board included a chair, vice-chair and a secretary as its officers, as well as ex-
officio members.39 The Board met twice annually unless circumstances dictated otherwise. The 
second component of the DRB was its research organization, which consisted of a headquarters 
and research establishments. Headquarters directed and controlled DRB activity but also 
facilitated inter-service cooperation by interpreting the results of research to the army, navy, and 
air force. In support of the Board and its research organization, the DRB established a number of 
panels and committees designed to assist and advise the chair on specific fields of research. As 
advisory support for the DRB, the panel and committee structure provided essential assessments 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., p. 7. 
39 For details on the composition of the Board, see Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board, 65-68. For 
information on changes to the composition of the Board, see DHH, George Lindsey fonds (87/253), Box 15, 85/304 
File 18, “The Defence Research Board,” 8 April 1965, p. 2. 
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of scientific activities and the impact of research on the services.40 The DRB used this 
information to alter and expand its research programme in areas pertinent to the needs of 
Canadian defence. The Arctic Research Advisory Committee formed accordingly in 1948.  
Although intelligence was not the primary concern of the Defence Research Board, the 
organization developed intimate ties to Canadian postwar security. This is particularly evident 
when assessing tripartite relations. The United Kingdom played a pivotal role in the development 
of Canada’s postwar foreign intelligence, as political scientist Kurt Jensen has observed.41 In 
November 1945, the British Joint Intelligence Committee sent a proposal to the Canadian 
Department of External Affairs asking for the establishment of a joint intelligence bureau. 
Although the Canadian Joint Intelligence Committee (CJIC) had served as a coordinating body 
on intelligence for the Chiefs of Staff Committee since its formation in November 1942, 
members of the CJIC had neither the expertise nor the supporting infrastructure required to carry 
out postwar intelligence analysis. DEA officials made no immediate decision on the British 
proposal, but the topic dominated internal discussions on postwar intelligence until the next 
spring. Early in May 1946, Norman Robertson, the under-secretary of state for external affairs, 
presented the idea for a Canadian joint intelligence bureau to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
Recognizing the difficulty of military intelligence gathering, DND officials accepted the 
proposal and the Chiefs of Staff decided to put the proposal before Cabinet.42 The Cabinet 
                                                 
40 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA), RG 319, Box 856, “Defence 
Research Board, Department of National Defence, Canada: Second Semi-Annual Report, 1 October 1947-31 March 
1948,” Report No. DR 5, 5 June 1948, p. 1. 
41 Kurt F. Jensen, Cautious Beginnings: Canadian Foreign Intelligence, 1939-51 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2009), 139. 
42 Ibid., 140. 
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Defence Committee deferred a decision on three separate occasions, until approving the creation 
of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Bureau (CJIB) on 31 January 1947.43  
In Jensen’s assessment, Arctic security triggered the decision of the Cabinet Defence 
Committee to approve the establishment of a Canadian intelligence bureau.44 Information from 
the DEA suggested North American defence planning required topographical information on the 
Canadian North. After considering the dual need to defend Canadian territory against an attack 
by the Soviet Union and contribute to postwar security relations with the United States, the 
Cabinet Defence Committee had little recourse but to immediately approve the CJIB. Yet the 
establishment of a single intelligence body did not preclude pre-existing structures from 
continuing to collect information. Similar to research and development, successful intelligence 
depended on inter-service and inter-departmental cooperation and exchange.  
As science became increasingly important to Canada’s postwar security agenda, the 
Defence Research Board thrived in an environment that depended on the production and 
exchange of knowledge. DRB scientists and engineers were responsible for analyzing 
information available from universities, research foundations, industry, foreign countries, the 
three services of the armed forces, and internal research establishments. Using information 
obtained through multiple sources, DRB employees determined the influence of intelligence on 
Canada’s plan for a scientific defence against any possible aggression.45 Moreover, budgetary 
records of the DRB indicate an early organizational interest in Western intelligence. The DRB 
                                                 
43 The Cabinet Defence Committee deferred a decision on the formation of the Canadian Joint Intelligence Bureau 
on 16 July, 24 July, and 18 September 1946. 
44 According to Jensen, information from the DEA about North American plans to defend the North Pole against an 
attack by the Soviet Union prompted the final approval on 31 January 1947. See Jensen, Cautious Beginnings, 141-
142. 
45 DHH, George Lindsey fonds (87/253), Box 15, 85/334 File 104, Defence Research Estimates & Supplementary 
Information, “Director General of Defence Research: Progress Report for the use of the Minister of National 
Defence during the Presentation of the 1946-47 Estimates,” 18 April 1946. 
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administered the Joint Intelligence Bureau, which was responsible to the Joint Intelligence 
Committee of the Chiefs of Staff for the organization of economic, geographic and transportation 
intelligence related to Canadian defence and security.46 A significant portion of the DRB’s 
annual budget also contributed to Western intelligence internationally, specifically through 
liaison with the United Kingdom and the United States. The international connections of 
Canada’s defence research and scientific intelligence community owed much to Omond Solandt, 
the founding chairman of the Defence Research Board. 
 
Omond Solandt and the British Connection 
When assessing developments in Canada’s early Cold War national defence policy, Omond 
Solandt represents one of the most influential personalities of the period.47  A physiologist by 
training and protégé of Charles Best, the co-discoverer of insulin, Solandt worked on operational 
research for the British government during the Second World War. He managed a number of key 
scientific research establishments during the war and studied the effects of nuclear fallout as a 
colonel on the British Mission to Japan in the wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Following the 
war, Solandt returned to Canada and transformed federal science in both scale and influence.  
                                                 
46 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2425, file Speeches - Reporting etc 1947 - March 1953 Volume 1, “Annual Report of the 
Chairman, Defence Research Board: September, 1951,” p. 8. 
47 Historian Jason Ridler is the most prolific author on the topic of Omond Solandt. Based on his doctoral research at 
the Royal Military College of Canada, Ridler has published a number of articles and a full-length biography on 
Solandt. See, in order of date, Ridler, “Omond Solandt: Scientific Renaissance Man,” INFOR 46, no. 4 (2008): 221-
230; Ridler, State Scientist: Omond Mckillop Solant and Government Science in War and Hostile Peace, 1939-1956 
(Royal Military College of Canada, PhD Dissertation, 2009); Ridler, “From Nagasaki to Toronto: Omond Solandt 
and the Defence Research Board’s Early Vision of Atomic Warfare, 1945-1947,” Canadian Military History 18, no. 
2 (2009): 27-40; Ridler, “Dr. Omond Solandt and Canada’s Approach to Defence Research Diplomacy 1946-1956,” 
Diplomacy and Statecraft 21 (2010): 397-415; Ridler, “Leadership and Science at War: Colonel Omond Solandt and 
the British Army Operational Group, 1943-1945,” in Canada and the Second World War, eds., Hayes, Bechthold, 
and Symes, 173-198; and the 2015 biography Maestro of Science. There is also an extremely valuable collection of 
articles, gathered and edited by some of Solandt’s closest colleagues after original presentation at a symposium in 
his honour; see Law, Lindsey, and Grenville, eds., Perspectives in Science and Technology. 
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As Director General of Defence Research and Chairman of the Defence Research Board, 
Solandt occupied a position of significant power and responsibility. He worked under the 
minister of national defence as a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. His position was 
equal to the head of the army, navy and air force. In this role, Solandt was an influential member 
of the Canadian defence establishment. He communicated to high-ranking Canadian officials on 
matters related to defence, policy formation and national expenditure. He negotiated inter-service 
research and development with the three services and initiated international security information 
exchange and cooperation with the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. Simply 
put, Solandt wielded control and influence on the direction of Canada’s national postwar defence 
research effort.  
Solandt’s position and authority was put to paper on 13 February 1946 in a memorandum 
written by the minister of national defence Douglas Abbott.48 As the official template for the 
position of Director General of Defence Research, the memorandum described Solandt’s 
professional duties in full and listed a number of issues that required his immediate attention. Not 
the least of which was, according to Abbott: 
The review of all present and completed research projects with a view to recommending 
which should be continued and which should be abandoned … In this regard, the general 
policy to be followed is that Canada should pursue vigorously those projects to which the 
Nation can contribute special knowledge, ability, facilities and needs rather than those 
which can more adequately be carried out by other countries.  
 
Although the Arctic did not receive direct reference, the implication was obvious for Solandt. 
Canada is second only to Russia in Arctic landmass and the heightened importance of the 
Canadian North in postwar affairs required direct and immediate federal action.  
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Solandt considered international cooperation imperative to the success of Canadian 
defence research. He maintained an active and important relationship with Sir Henry Tizard, 
chairman of the Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC) for the British Ministry of 
Defence. The two had met during the war and shared a desire to harmonize alliance cooperation 
in defence research.49 Their correspondence was mutually advantageous for the Canadian and 
British defence establishments, and the DRB was a direct beneficiary. In fact, in May 1947, 
Solandt submitted a request asking the Canadian government to extend Tizard a formal invitation 
to visit the DRB after the Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science decided 
against holding a meeting in Canada.50 Mackenzie and McNaughton supported the idea and both 
agreed to participate in confidential discussions of civilian scientific problems related to 
Commonwealth security. Shortly thereafter, Solandt made the trip official and Tizard returned to 
Canada as the leader of a British Scientific Group in September 1947.51  
The two-week visit included extensive discussion of scientific cooperation between 
Canada and the United Kingdom at important locations for the National Research Council and 
Defence Research Board, including Ottawa, Toronto, Churchill, and Suffield, among others. 
Tizard arrived in Ottawa via New York, where the Canadian Consulate hosted a dinner in his 
honour the day prior to his departure for Canada. Ministers, deputy ministers and senior officials 
from Ottawa attended the dinner. Sir Ben Lockspeier, chief scientist for the British Ministry of 
Supply; Owen Haddon Wansbrough-Jones, scientific advisor to the Army Council of the British 
                                                 
49 Ridler, Maestro of Science, 201-202. 
50 LAC, RG 25 G2, vol. 2171, file 53-AVF-40C, “O.M. Solandt to L.B. Pearson,” 2 May 1947. 
51 For a complete record of the British Scientific Group, including the trip itinerary and related correspondence, see 
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War Office; and J.A. Carroll, deputy controller of Research and Development for the British 
Admiralty joined Tizard on the trip as distinguished guests of the DRB.  
Tizard’s trip to Canada involved the exchange of highly-secret information on tripartite 
security. During his stop in Ottawa, he gave an address to top Canadian officials from External 
Affairs and National Defence on “The Problems of Defence Research.” The address occurred as 
a continuation of the DRB’s lecture series on “Science and Defence,” which Soladnt initiated to 
apprise officials of the ongoing work and significance of the organization under his control. In an 
invitation sent to Lester Pearson, the undersecretary of state for external affairs, Solandt 
explained Tizard’s intent for “the lecture to refer specifically to some problems of 
Commonwealth interest.”52 Because the lecture included secret information, Solandt expressed 
the concern to Pearson that the event required appropriate security measures to safeguard 
scientific intelligence. Tizard’s speech went unrecorded, but the nature of the trip provides 
insight into British and Canadian priorities.   
Under Solandt’s leadership, the Defence Research Board considered the British defence 
establishment a source of both personnel and information. The first liaison officer in London was 
Colonel G. Milroy Carrie. 53 He moved to the Canadian Joint Staff building in the summer of 
1947 and led a staff that worked closely with British counterparts. Carrie’s experience was 
largely successful. Working closely with British military officials allowed his staff to gather 
information on technologies and resources developed in the United Kingdom, but also details on 
defence relations between British and American organizations. A.L. Wright, the DRB’s liaison 
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officer in Washington, had a contrasting experience. Unlike Carrie, Wright did not have direct 
access to key research officers, which made obtaining information on American defence research 
difficult.54 
Liaison was particularly important to the Defence Research Board because of the 
organization’s limited budget and operational structure. Solandt had a responsibility to provide 
accurate and current scientific and technical advice to the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister of 
National Defence, but the mandate of the DRB did not cover the full range of modern postwar 
research and development. Solandt and the DRB thus required tripartite assistance from both the 
United Kingdom and the United States to fulfill its duties to the Canadian defence establishment. 
Reliable and current information enabled the DRB to pursue only projects in which Canada had 
special capabilities and interests. Moreover, knowledge of British and American R&D provided 
the DRB with information on possible research areas to explore. Duplication of effort was 
detrimental to the tripartite alliance, so the DRB funded research and development in fields 
considered unique to Canada. 
The desire of the Canadian defence establishment to avoid duplication of work with the 
United Kingdom and the United States became evident in October 1945 when the Chiefs of Staff 
approved a document on planning for postwar scientific research.55 The document warned 
against pursuing a complete and independent program of applied military research, and instead 
proposed close collaboration with western partners. The impending requirements of postwar 
defence were considered too large for Canada to shoulder alone. Cooperation with international 
partners was a necessary obligation, but mutual defence came with economic benefits as well. 
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For the Defence Research Board, this ultimately meant allocating financial resources more to 
research than development. As is explored in Chapter 3, the DRB developed and financed 
fundamental scientific research projects to support the three services. Although the DRB funded 
notable Cold War development projects such as the Black Brant series of sounding rockets and 
the two Alouette satellites, actual development or creation of weapons, vehicles and related 
military equipment was not a primary focus of the organization as a whole.56 Canada could not 
match the development resources of either the United States or the United Kingdom, so senior 
Canadian officials designed the DRB as a research-first organization capable of finding and 
pursuing fields of military interest where Canada could make a unique contribution to Western 
security. The cold-weather sciences in the Canadian North thrived under this guiding principle of 
Canada’s postwar defence policy. 
While tripartite exchange often resulted in beneficial cooperation, frequent tensions in the 
relationship also offer telling details on the Canadian defence establishment in the early Cold 
War. By 1951, the number of DRB sponsored visitors to the United Kingdom had increased 
significantly because of successful liaison and research collaboration.57 A corresponding increase 
had occurred in the visits of British defence scientists to Canada, but the situation with the 
United States was different. Although Canadian and American scientists worked on exchange in 
their neighbouring countries, defence liaison between Canada and the United Kingdom raised the 
ire of defence officials in the United States. As historian Jonathan Turner pointedly notes, the 
Americans considered Canada to be “thoroughly enmeshed with the British to the point that the 
Defence Research Board was locked out of all the same information that the British were.”58 
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Whether this American view of Canadian defence research resulted in part from Solandt’s close 
personal connection to the British scientific community remains unclear, but the early history of 
the DRB reflects a growing relationship with the British defence establishment. Although the 
strengthening of bilateral defence with the United States was inexorable in contrast to defence 
ties between Canada and the United Kingdom, cooperation in defence research bolstered 
Canada’s contribution to the Commonwealth. This finding nuances the suggestion that closer 
continental integration with the United States eclipsed Canada’s defence partnership with the 
United Kingdom in the postwar period.59 
 
Postwar Defence and the Canadian Arctic 
Interest in the Arctic increased dramatically during the Second World War with the Japanese 
invasion of the Aleutian Islands, the establishment of British and Soviet east-west routes for the 
transport of aircraft, and the initiation of large construction projects by the United States. 
Infrastructure and facilities to serve the continental defence of North American emerged as 
Washington funded the construction of the Alaska Highway, airfields to support aircraft service 
to Alaska, over fifty weather stations, and an oil distribution system between Yukon and the 
Northwest Territories named the Canol Project. The creation of the Canada-United States 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD) at Ogdensburg, New York in August 1940 also 
shaped the role of the Arctic in the strategic defence of North America.60 By the end of the war 
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in 1945, the PJBD had become the principal forum for bilateral negotiations among senior 
defence officials from Ottawa and Washington.  
Among the more significant security concerns heading into the postwar period was 
continental air defence. The Canadian government countered the threat of the nuclear bomb-
carrying strategic bomber through cooperation with the United States in the construction of early 
warning radar systems. As early as 1946, the PJBD had initiated plans to construct a series of 
radar stations near the Canada-US border along the fiftieth parallel. Funding prevented the 
project until 1949 when the United States Congress agreed to co-finance radar construction with 
the Royal Canadian Air Force. Canada first agreed to co-construct thirty-three radar stations 
known as the Pinetree Line across the mid-north from Vancouver Island to Labrador in 1949.61 
Before construction finished, the Soviet Union had upgraded their bomber force and defence 
officials in Ottawa and Washington agreed to co-fund radar stations farther north. The United 
States also acquired a lease to an air base at Goose Bay, Labrador in December 1952 to serve as 
a location from which the air force could potentially bomb the Soviet Union and see its aircraft 
return.62 Circumstances worsened for Canada and the United States in August 1953 when the 
Soviet Union detonated its first hydrogen bomb. Within a year, defence analysts recommended 
the construction of the Mid-Canada Line, along the fifty-fifth parallel, paid for entirely by 
Canada. The number of northern radar stations increased for a third time by joint agreement in 
1955. On 5 May, both countries agreed in principle to construct and operate the DEW Line.63 
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The focus on the Arctic that occurred in the 1940s is perhaps most evident in the 
proliferation of maps oriented over the North Pole.64 Air-age globalism revealed the surprisingly 
close geographic proximity of the Soviet Union, and North American territory emerged 
expansive and vulnerable at the top. In the process, the Arctic became a frontier space of both 
strategic and scientific importance, an ideal laboratory for intellectual pursuit with implications 
of local and global significance. The American military embraced this logic and approached the 
North as a vital component of continental defence but also as one of many hostile environments 
to overcome. The circumstances of northern defence led to an expansive and highly entangled 
relationship between the American military and state-funded scientists, as historians of science 
and the Cold War have shown.65 As Matthew Farish explains in a detailed study of American 
knowledge production, “the Arctic frontier was engineered—not just in the sense of specific 
landscapes and bodies as sites for technical manipulation and control but also according to more 
general principles of development, order, and appropriation for scientific and strategic needs.”66 
Coupled with the growing tensions between the East and West, the Arctic, as both an idea and 
physical space, was ripe for a high-anxiety postwar “assault.”  
Although the terms sovereignty and defence may seem interchangeable, in the context of 
the postwar security environment Canada faced two distinct threats. As fears of a Soviet attack 
grew, research teams, administrators and soldiers pushed northward to study and occupy the 
largely “unknown” North American Arctic. Collectively, on behalf of the Canadian government, 
these individuals worked to defend the North against Soviet aggression while also promoting 
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territorial sovereignty in the midst of increasing encroachment from the United States. There was 
certainly mutual agreement in both Ottawa and Washington that precautions were necessary to 
protect the North American continent, but Canadian officials also showed concern for the rapid 
increase in American activity north of the border. Concerns deepened periodically in Canada 
when various American officials mused about the possibility of “taking control” of Canadian 
territory to prepare their own defences against the Soviet threat, as Rob Huebert notes.67 Yet 
Canada was not in a position to provide the necessary resources required of a modern and 
effective national defence. Despite emerging concerns about American encroachment, Canada 
had little choice but to collaborate closely with its southern neighbour in defence of the North 
American continent. 
While the nuances of early Cold War defence relations between Canada and the United 
States require further attention, the current body of literature seems to agree that the Americans 
respected Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty in the North. Rather than annex parts of the 
seemingly remote and ignored Canadian Arctic, Washington desired to work in collaboration 
with Ottawa to establish the defence system that officials in both capitals deemed necessary. In 
many ways, the situation proved quite advantageous for Canada. The government gained access 
to the physical and financial resources of the United States and simultaneously bolstered its 
defensive position against the Soviet Union. Scholars debate whether Canada sacrificed its 
sovereignty in the process, but diplomatic negotiations resulted in bilateral arrangements with 
real and lasting benefits to both Canada and the United States.68  
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Canada’s Postwar Military Policy 
 
Canada was a middle power during the early Cold War and senior officials in Ottawa sought to 
secure Canadian sovereignty at home and abroad through involvement in international 
partnerships such as the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Under the 
umbrella of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, cooperation with the United States in 
continental defence was significant. Multilateral and, increasingly, bilateral agreements provided 
the backbone of Canadian defence. The military underwent a drastic reduction as a result, and 
the Mackenzie King government reallocated federal finances toward other national priorities that 
included veterans’ benefits, family allowances and other social-welfare programs.69 Within two 
years of the end of the Second World War, the army reduced in personnel strength from 478,090 
to only 15,852.70  
Postwar demobilization affected the other two service branches as well. The Royal 
Canadian Navy (RCN) emerged from the war as a “fleet-in-being,” and according to historian 
Peter Haydon, the innovative concept of naval aviation “became the lightning rod for much of 
the political scepticism concerning and opposition to the postwar navy.”71 Firmly convinced that 
the RCN did not need carriers, Mackenzie King and the Liberals opposed expanding Canada’s 
peacetime navy. Demobilization drastically reduced the navy’s strength from approximately 
93,000 personnel at the end of the war in September 1945 to only 6,600 by April 1946.72 In place 
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of a strong naval presence, the Liberals envisioned increasing the role and capabilities of the 
Royal Canadian Air Force. But as Bertram Frandsen has shown, the fiscal restraint of the 
immediate postwar years constrained Canada’s existing forces and limited the modernization of 
air power.73 With the full technological impact of nuclear weapons, jet fighters, and ballistic 
missiles unknown, military planners in Ottawa had little reason to embrace the financial costs 
associated with these potential “game changers.”74 Despite the arrival of the Cold War in the late 
1940s, Canada’s defence budget restricted the three services until rearmament for the Korean 
War in 1950. 
As an instrument of national power, the Canadian military suffered from a lack of 
coherent and durable political guidance and became both fragmented and disjointed.75 While 
American and Canadian scientific and defensive interests largely coincided in the period, 
government officials in Ottawa supported research of a non-strategic orientation. Hugh 
Keenleyside, for instance, shared with Minister of External Affairs Lester Pearson the view that 
Canada should support resource development and research over strategy and politics.76 As 
deputy minister of mines and resources, commissioner of the Northwest Territories, and 
chairman of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee of the DRB, Keenleyside was a high-
ranking civil servant with a significant level of influence on northern affairs and budget 
                                                 
postwar numbers, see Haydon, “Sailors, Admirals, and Politicians: The Search for Identity after the War,” 224, note 
7. 
73 Bertram C. Frandsen, “The Rise and Fall of Canada’s Cold War Air Force, 1948-1968,” (Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid 
Laurier University, Department of History, PhD Dissertation, 2015), 57. On the RCAF and the early Cold War 
period, also see Randall Wakelam, Cold War Fighters: Canadian Aircraft Procurement, 1945-54 (Vancouver: 
Univeristy of British Columbia Press, 2011). 
74 Ibid.  
75 Howard G. Coombs and Richard Goette, “Supporting the Pax Americana: Canada’s Military and the Cold War,” 
in The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest, Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006), 
265-296.  
76 Hugh L. Keenleyside, Memoirs of Hugh L. Keenleyside, Volume 2: On the Bridge of Time (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1982), 308. 
81 
 
 
 
allocation. He received an informal education on the Canadian North and its indigenous 
populations from Arctic geographers such as Vilhjalmur Stefansson, Erling Porslid and Trevor 
Lloyd, and used his position in government to promote the spread of “industrial civilization” 
northward.77 Defence considerations in the North were lower on his agenda than the work of 
scientists, explorers, administrators, educators, doctors, and social workers.  
Despite Keenleyside’s relative ambivalence towards northern defence, he supported the 
Defence Research Board as a modern scientific research establishment. He participated in the 
creation and subsequent activities of the Arctic Institute of North America and helped develop 
strong ties between AINA and the DRB. In this sense, Keenleyside saw value in the DRB as a 
federal and financial scientific resource. The research-first mandate of the Defence Research 
Board seems to have fit his vision of northern modernization particularly well: “The awakening 
general interest in the Arctic was in part the result of political and defence considerations that 
marked the period of the Cold War,” Keenleyside wrote in his memoirs. “But additional 
recognition of its importance,” he continued, “came also from a new appreciation of the 
economic possibilities of that region.”78 From Keenleyside’s perspective, Canadians living in the 
southern regions of the country had a growing social responsibility to the North and the people 
living there. He accepted scientific defence research as a means to support this goal. 
While the air threat to North America dominated strategic considerations in Ottawa 
during the early postwar period, senior defence officials remained cognisant of the vulnerability 
of the Canadian North by sea and land. In advance of a potential Soviet attack, the military 
turned to science to find and prepare men for the potential cold-weather battlefield. Defence 
planners deemed cold climate training important to the development of troop indoctrination and 
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preparation, and intelligence confirmed the need to prepare a defence against the shortest and 
most direct route over the North Pole. As Canadian troops learned how to survive and use their 
weapons under Arctic conditions, the DRB provided scientific and technical assistance to 
facilitate service needs in the high latitude environment of Canada’s North. 
The history of scientific activity in the Canadian North provides an ideal case study to 
examine the development of Canada’s early Cold War defence policy. Records of the Defence 
Research Board document extensive interest and activity in Arctic science. Canada’s defence 
establishment considered research on winter warfare vital to tripartite security participation with 
the United Kingdom and the United States, and the DRB thrived on the opportunity created by 
the political and economic resources made available for Arctic science. 
 
Conclusion 
 
During the Second World War, Canada’s senior military officials recognized the increasing 
significance of science on the battlefield and decided to implement the mechanisms required to 
create and sustain a defence research establishment in the postwar period. As a leading agency 
for military science during the early Cold War, the Defence Research Board played a crucial role 
in shaping the direction and scope of Canada’s postwar defence effort. Concurrently, the 
informal nature of the ABC tripartite relationship worked to the benefit of the DRB.  
As the remaining chapters of this dissertation show, the Defence Research Board pursued 
and financed a range of scientific activities, some of which only had loose connections to the 
immediate needs of Canada’s postwar security and defence. Cold War anxieties that resulted 
from the fear of another global conflict perpetuated a set of unique circumstances that 
accelerated the pace and intensity of science. This is perhaps most evident in the DRB’s 
scientific activities pertaining to the Canadian North. While the DRB made meaningful and 
83 
 
 
 
lasting contributions to Arctic research, the “frontier” sciences often lacked responsible or 
adequate oversight. Delving into the circumstances and processes that enabled the rapid growth 
of Canadian defence research provides an avenue to understand the implications of Cold War 
Arctic research in Canada. 
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Chapter 2 
Cold War Prelude: Science and Defence in Northern Canada 
 
In October 1978, the Ontario Science Centre hosted a three-day event in celebration of 
significant contributions to Arctic exploration in Canada. Titled “Living Explorers of the 
Canadian Arctic,” the symposium featured a respected group of forty speakers that included 
Denis Coolican, president of the Royal Geographical Society, and Thomas Manning, who 
“claimed” Arctic territory for Canada by placing a flag on Prince Charles Island in 1949.1 
Among the group also stood Moira Dunbar, noted Arctic geographer and the sole female 
participant in a collection of individuals renowned for their contributions to Canada. Gender had 
no bearing on Dunbar’s inclusion in the symposium. By 1978, her contributions to Arctic science 
had earned international recognition and an appointment to the Order of Canada. She thus stood 
out amongst her peers not as the sole female participant, but rather as one of the world’s most 
influential Arctic geographers of a generation. As a leading expert in Arctic research for the 
Canadian defence establishment, Dunbar furthered our knowledge of geography and northern 
Canada. She also represented Canada in a unique diplomatic role, helping foster relations with 
Arctic scientists in the Soviet Union at the height of international Cold War security concerns. 
Despite Dunbar’s many accomplishments in Arctic science and the Canadian civil 
service, she has received little attention from scholars of Cold War Canada.  Likewise, although 
her career grabbed the attention of contemporary journalists, historians have paid scant attention 
to the significance of her work with the Canadian defence establishment. This chapter highlights 
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Dunbar’s work with the Defence Research Board to introduce and examine key geostrategic 
considerations that influenced Canada’s early Cold War Arctic defence policy. Dunbar’s 
research on glaciology and Arctic sea ice played a central role in considerations of sovereignty 
and security after the Second World War. Although she was not a leading official of the 
Canadian defence establishment, her research influenced Canada’s Arctic defence policy and her 
contributions to Arctic geography spanned important developments in the relationship between 
science policy and international diplomacy in Cold War Canada.   
 
Moira Dunbar 
Born in Edinburgh, Scotland on 2 February 1918, Isobel Moira Dunbar became independent at a 
young age. She grew up without her father, William, a lawyer who died when she was a young 
girl.2 As a student, Dunbar attended local schools in Edinburgh before graduating from Oxford 
University with an honours degree in geography in 1939. She spent the war years acting and 
stage managing in touring stock companies and in shows for the British armed forces. The 
British government supported theatre as a way to boost morale on the home front, and Dunbar 
performed small comedic roles until the war ended. She toured England and Wales but never her 
native Scotland, mostly in comedic roles as a home cleaner. At one of her performances, Diana 
Rowley, a friend and fellow graduate in geography from Oxford, recommended she consider 
Canada for postwar work: “Geographers are like gold in Canada,” Rowley told her.3 The thought 
piqued Dunbar’s interest, and she decided to move to Canada in 1947. Upon her arrival, she 
stayed with her brother and his newlywed wife. While searching for work, Dunbar made a call to 
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Ottawa that produced the gold Rowley had promised.4 She managed to find and secure a job in 
the federal government with the Joint Intelligence Bureau of Canada, gathering data on ice 
movement in the North.5 The position suited Dunbar’s research interests, because she had 
developed a fascination for the Arctic while horseback riding on a holiday in Iceland in 1939. 
Dunbar transferred to the Arctic section of the Defence Research Board in 1952 and 
studied the physical geography of the Canadian Arctic by observing the distribution and 
behaviour of sea ice.6 One of the purposes of the work was to reduce the severe hazard of sea ice 
to shipping, and thus she tracked the movement of large ice floes under the influence of both 
winter and summer conditions. Her work became vital to Canada’s sovereignty and security in 
the Arctic because both the United States and the Soviet Union had begun using large masses of 
Arctic sea ice north of Canada. 
 
The Arctic: A Cold War Border Zone 
Tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States dominated geostrategic realities during 
the Cold War. The two superpowers competed to demonstrate environmental authority and the 
Arctic represented an ideal stage to display dominance over nature.7 While the two sides 
regularly differed in approach to Arctic science, the shared pursuit of high modernism often 
resulted in similar social and environmental consequences.8 Rapid militarization affected 
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Indigenous peoples in both capitalist and communist regions of the Arctic, while the scale and 
extent of modernization on both sides of the ideological divide left a deep environmental legacy 
in the wake of the Cold War. 
As a border zone between the Soviet Union and the United States, the geographic 
location of the Arctic helps explain why the North Polar Region witnessed an unprecedented 
military buildup during the Cold War. The Arctic represented the front line between the 
superpowers and neither side was willing to concede the spoils that might result from a scientific 
or technical victory in the region.9 While the notion of a friendly Arctic clashed with the realities 
of a hostile environment, planners in the United States and the Soviet Union viewed the Arctic as 
a stage to show that their political system was better than the alternative.10  
A major push for science and exploration occurred in the Soviet Arctic during the 1930s. 
One of the central figures of the era was Otto Schmidt, a scientist and adventurer who became 
known widely as the “Commissar of Ice.”11 Schmidt published extensively on his scientific 
exploits and used publicity to climb the ranks of the Communist Party. He became head of the 
Glavsevmorput, a bureaucratic institution that oversaw Arctic affairs in the Soviet Union. The 
Glavsevmorput focused on economic development in the Soviet Arctic and promoted 
meteorology, oceanography, geology and other physical sciences to meet its goal. Practical 
benefits in weather forecasting and cartography resulted from this investment in scientific 
research, but science in the Soviet Arctic doubled as a means to demonstrate the superiority of 
the communist system.  
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Soviet Arctic research served geopolitical goals as well. On two separate occasions 
during the interwar period, representatives of the Soviet Union demonstrated sovereignty in the 
Arctic through political acts of territorial occupation.12 The first instance occurred in 1926 when 
a group of Russian explorers brought Wrangel Island under Soviet rule. The second occurred in 
connection with the International Polar Year of 1932-33, when Russian scientists asserted 
sovereignty over Victoria Island, east of Spitsbergen (modern-day Svalbard) on the Norwegian 
archipelago in the Arctic Ocean. In both instances, science and exploration helped to realize the 
territorial conquests and wider aspirations of the Soviet Union.  
Soviet Arctic policy during the interwar period aimed primarily to create a viable route 
for commercial shipping. To help achieve this goal, the Soviet Union added a number of modern 
icebreakers to its existing Arctic fleet. In 1932, Schmidt boarded the icebreaker Sibiryakov and 
led the first yearlong expedition to navigate the Northern Sea Route north of Siberia.13 The 
expedition cemented Schmidt’s reputation among Russian observers and provided the Soviet 
Union with photographs that illustrated a distinct communist attitude toward dominance over 
nature. The expedition brought practical benefits, too. Researchers learned about Arctic 
meteorology and sea ice, and gained knowledge in both areas that helped keep Russia supplied 
with Allied goods delivered through its northern ports during the Second World War.  
Interwar ice research in the Soviet Arctic had important implications for scientific 
developments in the early Cold War period. In the late 1930s, scientists from the Soviet Union 
instituted a series of North Pole “Ice-Stations” by constructing research camps on floating sea 
ice.14 Known as Severny Polus (SP) meaning North Pole, Soviet scientists used SP stations to 
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collect meteorological and oceanographic data on the Arctic environment. Utilized for shipping 
and submarines, this type of information also became important for questions of sovereignty in 
the postwar period. Consider the Russian interpretation of the Lomonosov Ridge, for instance. 
First discovered by Soviet high-latitude expeditions in 1948, the Lomonosov Ridge is an 
underwater continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean that stretches eighteen hundred kilometres from 
islands off Siberia to Ellesmere Island in the Canadian Arctic archipelago.15 In a move that had 
immediate implications for Canada, the Soviet Union claimed sovereignty over the area upon its 
discovery and expanded their scientific efforts in the Arctic Ocean. Russia’s Arctic presence 
continued to grow into the Cold War and by the start of the 1970s, Soviet scientists had 
conducted research on no fewer than twenty-two SP stations.16 
 
Wartime Defence in the North and Activity at Churchill 
During the Second World War, the United States Air Force produced a plan that called for the 
construction of a network of airfields to facilitate the transportation of planes and forces to 
Greenland and Iceland should the need arise.17 In preparation for adverse weather conditions, the 
plan outlined various routes to enable flying in the North regardless of meteorological factors. As 
presented to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the plan included three transport routes with 
a series of airfields placed four hundred to five hundred miles apart.18 The Pas, Churchill, 
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Southampton Island, and Frobisher Bay were to be important air bases. Each location was to be 
equipped with two major runways, housing for a garrison of five hundred men, and supporting 
facilities for the storage of fuel and other supplies. The CRIMSON Route—“Crimson” being a 
United States code name for “Canadian”—received approval from the PJBD on 28 May 1942.  
The United States and Canada agreed to share construction of nine air bases in Canada 
and Greenland. Each country was responsible for the costs of the airfields it undertook to 
construct, but all the facilities in Canada were to become Canadian property six months after the 
end of the war. The plan underwent modifications before construction began, but considerable 
progress occurred relatively quickly. Canada agreed only to undertake the completion of 
facilities already underway at Goose Bay and the construction of an airfield and support facilities 
at The Pas. The United States accepted responsibility for the construction of the remaining 
proposed airfields, including Churchill, and for the provision of necessary defences that Canada 
was not in a position to provide.19 Construction went ahead accordingly. 
By the end of 1942, a civilian contractor under the Canadian Department of Transport 
had constructed a usable four hundred foot runway at The Pas and housing for the facility was 
eighty per cent complete. Farther north in Manitoba, an American civilian contractor engaged by 
the United States Army Corps of Engineers undertook construction of a much larger runway 
equipped with serving facilities at Churchill. Progress was much slower at Fort Chimo, 
Southampton Island, and Frobisher Bay, where there was no rail service. Nonetheless, by early 
1943, American civilian contractors had constructed unpaved but usable runways at each of the 
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three sites along with housing facilities required to support 50 per cent of the proposed personnel 
strength.20 
Despite its large grain elevator and port facilities, Churchill was little more than a modest 
trading post in 1942. Situated near the mouth of the Churchill River, the town dock could 
accommodate four ships and the harbour had enough space to hold three more at anchor. 
Including the Indigenous families who lived on the river flats near the shore of Hudson Bay, the 
population was approximately 150 at this time. Because of security measures agreed to as part of 
the Crimson Project, the local population at Churchill was uninformed prior to the arrival of the 
foreign soldiers into their community. According to Margaret Carroll, the local hotel proprietor 
had some indication of the impending influx. He had received forewarning from his Winnipeg 
beverage supplier that a number of tourists were travelling via train from Winnipeg to Churchill 
along with a carload of beer. The number of arrivals was much larger than had been 
anticipated.21  
Townspeople at Churchill welcomed the United States service members as a potential 
defence force. Rumours of submarine sightings had circulated during the summer of 1942 and 
Churchill was unequipped with weapons, ammunition, or plans for action in the event of an 
attempted enemy landing. Feeling ill prepared, the local population was enthusiastic about the 
arrival of the American soldiers. The town did not have large stockpiles of food, but the local 
population contributed enough resources to help acclimate the soldiers to their new surroundings. 
Construction of the airfield commenced on August 2, shortly after the first arrivals came in late 
July. 
                                                 
20 Dziuban, United States Army in World War II, 187. 
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The construction plan for Churchill was ambitious. The airfield and military base were to 
include two permanent concrete runways and one temporary runway, a 10,000 square foot steel 
hanger, one maintenance shop, one twenty-five bed hospital, seventy-seven standard frame 
buildings, a gasoline storage system, and a system for the supply and distribution of water and 
electricity.22 Military personnel representing Canada and the United States had chosen the actual 
site in early July. It was approximately five miles southeast of the town in the shelter of an esker 
previously worked to provide concrete aggregate for local projects.  
Construction of the Churchill airfield and military base proceeded relatively quickly. By 
the end of 1943, the site included housing to accommodate more than four hundred officers and 
nearly nine hundred enlisted men, two runways, the hospital, a prefabricated steel hanger, and 
three mess halls with a capacity to serve 1,300 men at one sitting.23 The site also included a radio 
transmitter and receiver station, as well as various buildings for laundry, storage, and garage 
space. In September 1943, Canada agreed that the United States would assume responsibility for 
the base.24 During the winter of 1943-44, the United States Army used the hospital, barrack 
buildings, and harbour facilities while conducting cold-weather ordnance tests. Responsibility for 
the base transferred back to the Canadian Department of Transport before the Canadian Army 
arrived in October 1946.25 
Despite the construction commitment to Churchill and other locations in the Canadian 
North, the Allies never used the Crimson Route.26 Containment of the U-boat threat in the 
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Atlantic and the delivery of many new merchant vessels from Canadian and American builders 
enabled the transportation of aircraft by sea during the war.27 Increased airport facilities at Goose 
Bay and Gander also permitted a greater flow of aircraft and supplies on the established routes 
south of the Crimson Route, while advancements in meteorology and the range and reliability of 
aircraft made these routes serviceable for short-range planes. Furthermore, successful landings in 
North Africa opened new terminal bases for flights over the southern Atlantic. The Crimson 
project was impracticable because of limited resources and environmental challenges. Personnel 
strength was low for a permanent operational air route, supplies of fuel were limited and difficult 
to replenish, and the long winter meant few hours of daylight and severe cold temperatures.  
 
Fort Churchill and the Transition to Postwar Defence Research 
The interdependence of Canada and the United States was clear at the end of the Second World 
War. Both countries showed concern for possible Soviet ambitions and worried about foreign 
activity in the high North. Across Canada’s Arctic lay air routes vital to Western Europe and 
wartime developments in aviation had opened northern routes to commercial interests, but 
technology had also opened the door for unwelcomed and potentially hostile activity. The 
Permanent Joint Board on Defence discussed the value of the Canadian North to continental 
defence at its fiftieth meeting in June 1945.28 The consensus recognized the need for joint 
military action to ensure the security of the North American continent, and those present at the 
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meeting agreed to a series of plans designed to test the combined manoeuvres and equipment of 
the armed forces of Canada and the United States in high latitudes.  
Recognizing the importance of the wartime infrastructure constructed at Churchill, the 
Canadian services established a Joint Experimental Testing Station (JSES) on the location in 
October 1946.29 Situated on the former Crimson Route base, military officials named the 
location Fort Churchill to distinguish it from the town of Churchill. The base offered sufficient 
shelter, amenities and access to transportation services required to facilitate a fully functional 
year-round northern experimental military station. There was ready access to rail through the 
Hudson Bay terminal and the nearby Port of Churchill offered access to sea transportation 
through the Hudson Strait from approximately late July to mid-October each year. The site also 
offered a functional aerodrome as well as access to radio and meteorological services provided 
by the Department of Transport.  
In a move to strengthen Canada’s defence presence in the postwar North, the Department 
of National Defence created a short-term construction plan for Fort Churchill in August 1946 and 
the Army assumed responsibility to repair the existing facilities. The base did not have running 
water or an adequate sewage system. Individual huts relied on oil for heat, but delivery of oil by 
truck from the town was inefficient and frustrating. New construction at Fort Churchill began to 
alleviate some of these problems in 1947-48. The Army built permanent married quarters and 
barrack accommodations for single officers, men and civilians working on the base.30 As 
operations expanded, so too did construction to meet the growing military and social needs of the 
base and its personnel (there were as many as 800 civilian workers on the site at the peak of 
                                                 
29 For a detailed account of the establishment of the JSES at Fort Churchill, see Iarocci, “Opening the North,” 
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construction). By the time the Army withdrew in May 1964, Fort Churchill was an independent 
community equipped with necessary utilities and amenities that included a school, library, 
chapels, theatre, radio station, bowling alleys, ice arena, post office and an extensive vehicle 
workshop.31 
 
 
Canada’s Treeline, accessed 20 January 2017, http://courses.washington.edu/polarnor/images/canadatreeline.jpg. 
 
The base at Fort Churchill provided the Defence Research Board with an excellent 
opportunity to expand its Arctic research program. With National Defence and the Department of 
Mines and Resources both keen to maintain northern air bases and photographic mapping in the 
North, a permanent scientific research laboratory at Churchill meant the possibility of further 
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integration among federal departments operating in northern Canada. For the Defence Research 
Board, interdepartmental cooperation meant a sustained budget and the possibility of expansion. 
Fort Churchill was an ideal location. The base enabled the integration of laboratory work and 
military testing in a natural environment that offered limitless ice in winter and swarms of 
mosquitoes, biting flies and spongy tundra in the summer. As former Superintendent of Defence 
Research Northern Laboratory, Archie Pennie once wrote, “[Churchill was] virtually the 
crossroads to the Arctic.”32 
The establishment of a permanent research laboratory at Fort Churchill was an arduous 
process for the scientists involved. James Croal was the first employee of Defence Research 
Northern Laboratory, although the laboratory did not exist when he arrived at Churchill in late 
August 1947.33 A veteran of the Royal Canadian Navy, Croal arrived at Churchill with a BB X-
ray diamond drill and commenced a drilling program to record temperature of the frozen ground 
in an effort to learn about permafrost.34 He worked alone on an old searchlight platform made of 
skids before joining Captain Bill Crumlin of the United States Corps of Engineers.35 Crumlin 
was also interested in conducting permafrost tests, and the two researchers made daily trips to 
various drill sites near the Fort Churchill base.  
                                                 
32 A.M. Pennie, “Defence Research Northern Laboratory,” Canadian Army Journal (January 1956): 1-8. 
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By the end of 1947, the Defence Research Board had a permanent staff of four scientists 
and one clerk stationed at Churchill.36 As the research activities increased on site, the Canadian 
Army provided two small huts for the storage of scientific equipment. Warmed by unreliable oil 
heaters borrowed from the United States Army, the two huts made scientific work extremely 
difficult during the harsh winter of 1947-48. Nonetheless, the small DRB staff maintained an 
effective permafrost program and initiated a series of studies to measure human performance 
under cold duress. In June 1948, A.C. Jones arrived and took his post as the first Superintendent 
of Defence Research Northern Laboratory.37 Construction of the laboratory began during the 
summer of 1947 but the facility was not ready for use until May 1949. Upon his arrival, Jones 
made arrangements to transport a hut from the Rideau Military Hospital in Ottawa.38 Delivered 
to Churchill and rebuilt on the base, the hut provided sufficient accommodation for the DRB 
scientists already on site and the additional staff who arrived with Jones. The facility served the 
DRNL team until construction of the laboratory was complete.  
With a permanent residence and working space, the team at DRNL initiated scientific 
work on environmental protection of the human body, nutritional medical problems, design and 
development of Arctic clothing and equipment, the performance of mechanical parts and 
supplies in severe cold, and entomology relating to mosquitoes and biting flies in warm 
weather.39 The official function of DRNL was two-fold: 
a) [T]o undertake such research on problems of Arctic warfare as can most effectively 
be carried out in the Churchill area and in areas directly accessible from Churchill. 
The problems include those of clothing, equipment and shelter, pest control and 
protective measures, acclimatization and nutrition, measurement of environmental 
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factors, trafficability and properties of terrain, use of fuels and lubricants, and the 
behaviour of materials under Arctic conditions. 
b) [T]o provide laboratory facilities, transportation, equipment, clothing, food, supplies, 
and communication of scientific workers, test team and observers from other stations 
of the [Defence Research] Board or its associated agencies, to enable them to carry 
out research in the Arctic, using the Defence Research Northern Laboratory as a base 
for their operations.40  
 
The central scientific and administrative organization of the Defence Research Board provided 
all resources and funding for DRNL. The total number of personnel employed at the laboratory 
in late November 1948 increased slightly to fifteen, which included only two professional 
scientists as well as six non-professionals and seven casual staff members.41 Their approved 
operating budget for the first full year was approximately $315,000.42 
Although the likelihood of a land invasion or establishment of enemy lodgment in the 
Arctic was remote, Canada participated in pre-emptive measures with both the United States and 
United Kingdom that aimed to counter the postwar threat in the North. The Defence Research 
Northern Laboratory was vital to the scientific and military work carried out at Fort Churchill 
during the early postwar years. Between 1947 and 1965, DRNL functioned as a multi-purpose 
facility for research, training, and education on winter and summer issues specific to the 
Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic climate. Canadian, American, and British forces trained and 
developed methods and equipment specifically designed to function under the extremes of 
climate and terrain encountered in northern latitudes. This scientific research became important 
to Canadian military interests in the North. According to Pennie, the former superintendent of 
DRNL, “joint military and scientific work was required to define the problems which faced man 
                                                 
40 DHH, George Lindsey fonds (87/253), Box 15, 85/334 File 107, “Copy No. 12 Department of National Defence 
Estimates 1949-50: Defence Research and Development,” p. 194. 
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in the Arctic environment ― his clothing, feeding, tactical deployment, navigation, re-supply 
and a host of associated problems.”43  
Of particular concern for researchers at DRNL was the efficiency of northern military 
operations conducted by the Mobile Striking Force (MSF) while under the peculiar stresses of 
the Arctic environment.44 The Mobile Reserve—renamed the MSF in 1948—resulted from the 
1946 Canada-United States Basic Security Plan, which required Canada to provide one airborne 
or air transportable brigade group for service in the Arctic. Comprised of three infantry battalions 
with combat support and service support units, officials designed the MSF as a preventative land 
element to deter the Soviets from establishing forward operating bases in the Canadian North.45 
At the time, technology restricted long-range bombers from making roundtrip flights over the 
North Pole and continental defence depended on the ability of the MSF to prevent the Soviets 
from establishing re-fueling stations on North American territory. The MSF also served to 
promote Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty by facilitating operational cooperation with 
United States forces. 
Scientific research at Churchill was not restricted to military affairs, however. Winter 
scientific work at Churchill concentrated on permafrost, problems of clothing and equipment, 
fuels and lubricants, and nutrition. During the summer months, scientists turned their attention to 
entomology and devised solutions to improve military operations in areas of intense blackfly 
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population. Research at DRNL constituted a variety of scientific disciplines, because problems 
“dealing with any phase of military operations in the Arctic had to have an input from the 
operational, the human resources, the biochemical [and] as well as from the engineering side.”46 
Fort Churchill served many of the joint scientific and military research needs of Canada’s 
defence establishment, but the federal government also extended its reach in the Arctic by 
provisioning financial and technical support for northern research elsewhere. 
In addition to their own work at Churchill, scientists at the Defence Research Northern 
Laboratory played a role in the air photography and mapping activities of the Royal Canadian 
Air Force. The RCAF first operated out of Churchill in October 1946. Part of its function was the 
provision of aircraft and aircrew to facilitate air requirements for the Canadian and American 
forces stationed at the base. Search and rescue operations were an important function of the 
RCAF at Fort Churchill as well. Pilot records make repeated references to mercy flights on 
behalf of individual citizens and communities, as noted by Margaret Carroll.47 RCAF personnel 
were on watch each day throughout the week and rescue units stood ready and equipped with 
specially fitted aircraft and highly trained aircrews. Researchers at DRNL frequently questioned 
survivors who received medical treatment on site at Fort Churchill. According to former 
laboratory employee M.F. Coffey, DRNL scientists spoke with survivors to collect information 
that was vital to the modification and improvement of Arctic survival kits issued by the Army 
and Air Force.48 
As Fort Churchill became a gateway to the North, the RCAF used the base to gain access 
to more remote locations such as Baker Lake in the Northwest Territories and Coral Harbour on 
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Southampton Island. As early as 1947, for instance, the RCAF Canso made Fort Churchill an 
important stop on its annual magnetic research flight into the Arctic for the Division of 
Terrestrial Magnetism of the Dominion Observatory.49 By 1951-52, the RCAF had operated 
polar navigation training flights out of the base and Air Transport Command had used the 
airfield as a major staging stop for the increasing northern traffic.  
Air photography and mapping in the Arctic also represented an important and unique 
Canadian contribution to the tripartite security alliance. During the early stages of the Second 
World War, the United Kingdom appealed to Canada for assistance with scientific research in air 
photography. The geostrategic position of Canada allowed for a greater contribution than had 
been anticipated. By the end of the war, the RCAF had become an authority on scientific 
photographic research and survey processing.50 As applied to tripartite security, one of the more 
significant RCAF commitments was the photography of all unmapped areas of the Canadian 
North. The airfields at Churchill and Coral Harbour were essential to mapping Hudson Bay and 
the surrounding northern regions, which officials considered imperative to wartime defence. 
Photographic and mapping commitments continued into the postwar period, of course. 
Canada and the United States agreed to a joint military “Mapping, Charting and Air Photography 
Plan” in 1946.51 The plan outlined a program for the complete air mapping of Canada by 1967, 
and the Army Survey Establishment provided ground control and produced maps from aerial 
photography in the area west of Hudson Bay. Concurrently, the Surveys and Mapping Branch of 
the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys produced maps for the area to the east. The 
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Royal Canadian Air Force provided the aircraft, crews, and the transportation of personnel for 
the ground control of these operations. By 1949, photographic commitments in the North 
required three RCAF squadrons totalling approximately 550 personnel and thirty-three aircraft. 
With an aircraft base at Resolute, air photography had mapped nearly the whole of Canada by 
the end of 1953. The program continued for the next decade until 1964 when a final party 
mapped an area from the Melville Peninsula to Arviat (formerly “Eskimo Point”) on the western 
shore of Hudson Bay in the modern-day Kivalliq Region of Nunavut.52 
 
Continental Defence and the Canadian North, 1945-1950 
Mapping in the Arctic had military applications for the Canadian defence establishment at the 
dawn of the Cold War. While the Mobile Striking Force prevented land-based incursions, 
military officials worried that large ice floes could facilitate unwelcomed activity.53 Senior 
officials in Ottawa and Washington believed that adequate northern defence meant preventing 
the Soviet Union from establishing a presence in the North, whether on land or floating sea ice. 
Joint RCAF-USAF flights over Canada’s Arctic tracked ice floes that might serve as landing 
strips and refuelling stations for Soviet bombers, which lacked the range for the round trip from 
the Soviet mainland to the cities of North America. Prior to the December 1941 Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor, continental North America had been protected by the isolation provided by the 
Atlantic, Pacific, and Arctic Oceans. Any attack was defendable by sea, but the development of 
aeronautic technologies altered the balance of global security. From the 1940s onward, North 
America has been a single geostrategic entity and continental defence has evolved within this 
context. 
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As advancements in aviation increased the technological threat against Canada and the 
United States, senior officials in Ottawa and Washington paid close attention to Soviet activity in 
the Arctic. In May 1937, Valerii Chkalov became the first pilot to land at the North Pole.54 Otto 
Schmidt was among the crew who landed with Chkalov. Schmidt helped foster close 
collaboration between Soviet aviators and research teams on floating ice stations. Scientists 
received necessary supplies and relief while aviators gained extensive experience in trans-Arctic 
flight. These advancements in sea ice research and polar aviation continued throughout the war 
and into the postwar period, while North American polar experts watched from afar with a 
mixture of appreciation and fear. 
By the end of the Second World War, the development of long-range nuclear bomb-
carrying bombers had exacerbated the potential postwar threat of the Soviet Union. No longer 
isolated from technological danger, the United States proposed to Canada a unified defence plan 
in May 1946, and the newly created bilateral Military Cooperation Committee approved the Joint 
Canada-United States Basic Security Plan.55 The plan stated clearly that neither the oceans nor 
the vast territoriality of the Arctic was anymore an adequate barrier to protect the northern half of 
the North American continent against long-range weapons or invading armies. This reality posed 
a significant foreign policy issue for the Liberal government of Mackenzie King. In the transition 
to peace, the government had to reconcile the concerns of a war-wary public while protecting 
Canadian interests.  
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The Arctic represented a dual-concern for senior officials in Ottawa who pondered how 
to protect against the Soviet threat while managing encroachment upon or challenges to 
Canada’s Arctic sovereignty by the United States. Despite repeated assurances from Washington 
that American plans to undermine Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago did not 
exist, the United States refused to formally acknowledge Canada’s sector claims until January 
1947.56 After months of careful negotiations, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the senior 
bilateral defence agency between the North American partners, agreed on Recommendation 36, 
which recognized Canada’s legal sovereignty in the North.57 Yet senior officials in Ottawa, 
according to Peter Kikkert and Whitney Lackenbauer, believed that “paper guarantees were 
useless unless the government could actually control activities in its jurisdiction.”58  
The issue of control is a particularly divisive topic in scholarship on Arctic sovereignty 
and Canadian-American relations during the early postwar period. Historian Shelagh Grant has 
alleged that Canada sacrificed sovereignty in the North by cooperating with the United States in 
continental defence.59 The opposing view emphasizes mutual respect and open dialogue between 
the North American partners. Historians David Bercuson and Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel, for 
instance, maintain that senior civil servants in Ottawa crafted a foreign policy to simultaneously 
protect Canadian sovereignty and support Western security.60 Kikkert and Lackenbauer fall into 
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this camp as well. The Canadian government, they put forward, “did not hand the Americans the 
keys to the Arctic and simply turn a blind eye to events on the ground … [it] crafted agreements 
on individual defence projects and continued to monitor all American activities in the region to 
ensure an appropriate level of control.”61 
Either way, continental defence negotiations and bilateral security agreements between 
Canada and the United States had immediate and lasting implications for the Canadian services. 
As policy planner for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) from 1940 to 1943, and Secretary to the 
Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London during 1944-45, Lt. Commander G.F. Todd proposed 
that the RCN cooperate with the RCAF to protect the coastal waters of Canada, Newfoundland, 
and Labrador after the Second World War.62 In his 1944 report on postwar strategy planning, 
Todd suggested that Canada’s contribution to continental defence required adequate naval and 
air forces capable of defending Canada by an air or sea attack from the North.63 While Todd’s 
assessment held strategic relevance, his view for the RCN clashed with Mackenzie King’s 
priorities for postwar Canada. In the transition to peace, the federal government demobilized the 
Canadian services and thereby limited the ability of the RCN to defend Canada at sea. Budget 
cuts restricted the resources and personnel of the RCN, and the future of Canada’s naval 
presence in the Arctic was unclear.64  
Facing a reduced role in defence of Canadian waters, the Royal Canadian Navy looked 
north to make a case for its significance to postwar security and continental defence. As Richard 
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Mayne has explained, “the Navy gave the Arctic a high priority and stretched its extremely 
limited resources as much as possible to establish a presence there in spite of the challenges 
posed by the great distances and extreme environment.”65 This presence was most significant in 
1948 when the RCN undertook a northern cruise, which departed from Churchill and sailed north 
beyond Hudson Bay. Over twenty-seven days, an expedition of 300 RCN sailors navigated 
northern waters with onboard observers from the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada. Among the Canadian observers were Lieutenant William Bailey of the Defence 
Research Board, three representatives of the Canadian Army, and three servicemen of the 
RCAF.66 The expedition sailed around icebergs and travelled through fog and snow conditions, 
eventually reaching 62 degrees N, a latitude that marked the farthest north any RCN ship had 
reached. The RCN ensured the press published photos and statements from the commanding 
officers, but the cruise, although successful and highly publicized, did not alter the postwar 
trajectory of the RCN. 
As the high point of the navy’s activity in Arctic waters during the early postwar period, 
the 1948 northern cruise represented the type of presence the Royal Canadian Navy wanted to 
maintain in order to secure Canadian interests in the Arctic.67 These ambitious were short-lived. 
As Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel has argued, “the Arctic provided the navy with an important theatre 
and function in the postwar era, one that was instrumental to not only Canadian but also 
continental defence … But the RCN was unable to sustain its case.”68 While Canada’s maritime 
strategy considered the significance of the Arctic’s geostrategic location, the range of 
                                                 
65 Richard O. Mayne, ““An unusual voyage in far northern waters”: The Royal Canadian Navy’s first postwar forays 
into the Arctic, 1946-1950,” Canadian Military History 22, no. 4 (Autumn 2013): 33-44; quote on p. 35. 
66 Elliot-Meisel, “Arctic Focus: The Royal Canadian Navy in Arctic Waters, 1946-1949,” 32. 
67 Mayne, “An unusual voyage in far northern waters,” 43. 
68 Elliot-Meisel, “Arctic Focus: The Royal Canadian Navy in Arctic Waters, 1946-1949,” 26. 
107 
 
 
 
commitments needed to participate effectively in continental defence strained the already limited 
resources of the RCN. Since the PJBD had endorsed military cooperation and collaboration 
between Canada and the United States, the Canadian government reallocated funds away from 
the RCN to support other financial requirements of continental defence. The creation of NATO 
in 1949 further cemented Canada’s commitment to the allied cause, and the RCN had to abandon 
the dream of providing an independent defence of Canadian waters in the Arctic.  
Despite the difficult reality of demobilization, cost cutting, and continental defence 
commitments, the Royal Canadian Navy adapted to its new postwar role and embraced the 
opportunity to contribute to NATO. Setting aside unilateral Arctic patrols for allied NATO 
responsibilities, the RCN decided to move away from asserting sovereignty against perceived 
threats in the North and committed its resources to help secure international waters. With no 
clear naval threat to continental security in the Arctic, the RCN made the correct decision.69 The 
change provided the RCN with a stable strategic direction, while supporting the Liberal’s foreign 
policy and strengthening Canada’s commitment to Western security. 
Although not the focus of this dissertation, the Defence Research Board conducted a 
small but important naval research program. On 1 January 1948, the Naval Research 
Establishment at Dartmouth, Nova Scotia transferred to the DRB. Its facilities included two 
floating laboratories, an Alergine-class mine-sweeper operated by the RCN on behalf of the 
Defence Scientific Service (DSS), and a converted infantry landing ship owned by the DSS.70 
Much of Canada’s early postwar naval research along the East Coast and in the Atlantic 
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stemmed from these ships. Scientific work at NRE concentrated primarily on anti-submarine 
warfare, but researchers also investigated methods to reduce ship corrosion and studied the 
oceanography of the Eastern Canadian seabed.71  
The Defence Research Board also operated a Pacific Naval Laboratory across the country 
at Esquimalt, British Columbia (BC). Opened in 1948, by agreement with the Royal Canadian 
Navy, the research establishment gave the DRB year-round access to the deep inlets and 
sheltered waters of the BC coast. Scientists conducted oceanographic and hydrographic work on 
the West Coast but also travelled as far north as the Arctic. The DRB acquired the HMCS 
Cancolim II in the early 1950s, and researchers used the vessel to obtain and test the salinity of 
water from the Beaufort Sea.72 Yet the bulk of naval research conducted by the Defence 
Research Board, including Arctic-related studies, occurred after 1952. For the period covered in 
this study, the scientific focus of the DRB in the North related primarily to on-land investigation 
of environment, terrain, and the human experience in both summer and winter conditions. 
 
Ice Islands and the Arctic Ocean 
The geopolitical significance of Soviet experience in the Arctic increased drastically in August 
1949 when the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear bomb. The superpower arms race 
between the Soviet Union and the United States created a highly militarized Arctic. 
Approximately one-fifth of all Russian nuclear tests occurred in the Polar Region on the island of 
Novaya Zemlya, and the Soviet Union positioned nuclear weapons as well as nuclear-powered 
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ships and submarines in the far North.73 In a policy of mutually assured destruction, the United 
States responded to the nuclear weapons buildup in the Soviet Arctic by fortifying its own 
nuclear presence in the high North. The reason for placing nuclear weapons in the Polar Region 
was identical on both sides of the ideological divide: weapons close to the Pole would be most 
effective in the event of a nuclear conflict.   
The logic of mutually assured destruction altered the perception of the Arctic for 
policymakers in Ottawa, and the Canadian defence establishment began to view the Arctic as a 
potential geographic weak point rather than the top of a “fireproof house.”74 As tensions grew 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, both superpowers began to establish semi-
permanent stations on ice islands floating north of Canada.75 This increase in activity concerned 
senior Canadian officials, and the Department of National Defence began to perceive and prepare 
for imminent dangers stemming from the vast northern expanse in the early postwar period. 
Although officials in Ottawa considered the Arctic Ocean north of Canada to be in the Canadian 
sector of the Arctic, Canada had no legal claim to international waters and the close proximity of 
the foreign expeditions posed a real threat to Canadian security in the North.  
An ice island is a floating mass of densely packed multiyear sea ice that drifts slowly 
according to the wind and currents of the Arctic Ocean.76 Appearing as flat-shaped boxes that 
can rise to forty feet above sea level, most ice islands are large and solid enough for semi-
permanent occupation.77 They usually form by splitting apart from a large mass of shelf or shore 
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ice attached to the northern coast of Ellesmere Island and drift in a clockwise circle at a slow 
pace of seven kilometres per day. From their starting position, they pass through the Beaufort 
Sea and drift by the northern coasts of Alaska and Siberia, moving northward along the margins 
of the Arctic Archipelago towards the Pole.78  
 
 
        Canadian Arctic Archipelago, Map Resources, Geology.com, accessed 20 January 2017, 
http://geology.com/articles/northwest-passage.shtml. 
 
The study of ice islands grew increasingly significant during the early Cold War. In fact, 
both the United States and the Soviet Union established temporary bases on polar pack ice north 
of Siberia and Alaska in 1950.79 In conjunction with reconnaissance weather flights, the United 
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States launched a project to discover and track ice islands drifting in the Arctic Ocean.80 
Moreover, the Americans established an ice base in three subsequent years from 1950 to 1953 as 
part of Operation Ski Jump, which aimed to test and improve techniques for landing heavy 
aircraft on Arctic ice. For their part, the Soviets established a station called North Pole-2 in April 
1950. The establishment of both facilities initiated a long period of the Cold War that witnessed 
the existence of many polar stations drifting in the Arctic Ocean. 
American and Russian activity on ice floating north of Canada concerned officials in 
Ottawa. For the first time, foreign powers had essentially occupied a sector of the Arctic Ocean 
that Canadian policymakers considered autonomous to Canada. International law stated 
otherwise, however. Most states considered the Arctic Ocean an international body of water, so 
neither the Americans nor the Soviets could actually “occupy” waters thought to be within the 
Canadian sector.81 Understandably, bureaucrats in the Canadian defence establishment worried 
about Canada’s inability to claim or exercise autonomy over Arctic waters, especially in areas 
considered imperative to northern defence.  
The Soviet presence north of Canada concerned officials in Ottawa the most. Not only 
did Soviet stations pose a dual threat to Canadian sovereignty and security, but Russian scientists 
had also gained extensive experience in Arctic research by the start of the Cold War. Between 
1935 and 1941, the Soviet Union executed no fewer than four drift expeditions on ships or ice 
floes and conducted a series of aircraft landings on sea ice north of Siberia.82 In one isolated 
attempt at polar research, Russian scientists established a semi-permanent station on an ice floe 
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in 1937-38. Dubbed North Pole-1, the station came close to the northern-most fringes of the 
Canadian sector before drifting to the northeast coast of Greenland.  
Soviet expeditions in the Arctic Ocean resumed after the Second World War and the 
Canadian defence establishment took notice. The Soviet Union occupied four separate ice islands 
or floes from 1950 to 1955.83 Scientists operated three of the four stations concurrently and 
conducted research studies on Arctic meteorology and oceanography, and on the structure, 
distribution and movement of pack ice. While the islands occupied by Soviet scientists generally 
drifted outside of the Canadian sector, the Department of National Defence maintained a close 
watch on the ice-related activities of the Soviet Union. This was the case in May 1954, when a 
Soviet aircraft flew over an American station on an ice island known as T-3 or Fletcher’s Island. 
The flyover occurred while T-3 was in the Canadian Arctic sector and some officials in National 
Defence voiced concern for Canada’s sovereignty, but External Affairs was unable to confirm 
that a violation had taken place.84 The issue was a matter of interpretation and the legal status of 
the ice island was unclear under international maritime law.  
Of more immediate concern for the defence establishment was a discovery made in 
August of the same year. With the assistance of the RCAF, the Defence Research Board charted 
an ice island with a Soviet research team that DRB scientists believed would drift into the 
Canadian sector. Trevor Harwood of the DRB published a report that called for an immediate 
diplomatic response to the Soviet “intruders” and the Americans, who were allegedly planning to 
monitor Soviet activity with scheduled flyovers.85 Harwood also called for a stronger presence of 
Canadian military in the Arctic Ocean and recommended that the RCAF patrol and occupy ice 
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islands such as the abandoned American T-3. Chairman of the DRB, Omond Solandt, also wrote 
a report that explained the significance of Russian science conducted on the Canadian side of the 
Pole. Fearing scientific and possibly military domination by the Soviet Union over Arctic ice 
beyond the north coast of Canada: “[the] presence of the polar station manned by the USSR in 
this period of tension should invite profound concern in their activities.”86 The ice island 
ultimately drifted away from Canada and into Danish waters north of Greenland, but the incident 
raised concerns over the possible military uses of Arctic sea ice.87  
In the wake of the Soviet scare, the Canadian defence establishment considered a host of 
theories about the militarization of ice islands. Some strategic analysts believed that floating 
stations might enable the collection of magnetic data to support guided missiles, while others 
warned against more imminent concerns. Perhaps most significantly, the DRB cautioned that 
research conducted on ice islands might yield sea floor data to support Soviet submarines, and 
that drifting sea ice could facilitate forward operating bases for Soviet aircraft. According to 
Adam Lajeunesse, the RCAF dispelled many of these concerns through surveillance.88 A series 
of RCAF flights reported that Russian ice research concentrated on meteorological, 
oceanographic, and zoological studies.89 This information confirmed that Soviet activity on ice 
islands north of Canada was primarily scientific. Although eventually considered non-
threatening, the extent of ice-related Soviet activity in the Arctic Ocean caused alarm in the 
Canadian defence establishment and instigated a full study of ice islands and the sector theory.  
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International Maritime Law and Canadian Security 
The federal study that followed the ice island incident determined that no violation of Canada’s 
sovereignty had occurred.90 International maritime law did not stipulate state ownership over ice 
islands and, therefore, the Soviet flyover of T-3 did not constitute a direct violation of Canadian 
sovereignty. Although not surprising, this revelation revealed Canada’s weak legal position 
relative to the Arctic Ocean and prompted a more thorough examination of Canada’s sovereignty 
in the North. External Affairs conducted a study in the summer of 1954 to understand Canada’s 
legal position.91 The study sought to determine if, according to international maritime law, states 
could make sovereign claim to ice islands or sections of the Arctic Ocean through occupation or 
use of the sector theory.92 
Two important conclusions emerged from the External Affairs study of 1954. First, the 
sector theory alone was an insufficient legal route to claim sovereignty over areas of water in the 
Arctic Ocean. Second, and perhaps more important, the study confirmed that international 
maritime law did not recognize the right of a state to establish sovereignty over an ice island by 
means of occupation. As noted by Arctic maritime scholar Adam Lajeunesse, both of these 
conclusions derived from the work of the United Nations’ International Law Commission that 
recognized the right of a state to operate installations required to extract natural resources from 
its continental shelf.93 According to the commission’s final report, installations did not constitute 
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sovereign territory. Nevertheless, the commission permitted installations under the coastal 
jurisdiction of a state if the installation adhered to the civil requirements of that state.94 In other 
words, under the interpretation of the United Nations, neither the United States nor the Soviet 
Union violated Canadian sovereignty by operating scientific research stations on floating ice 
islands in the Arctic Ocean north of Canada. 
With Canada unable to assert legal jurisdiction over ice islands floating into Canadian 
Arctic waters, officials in National Defence turned to surveillance for security. The Defence 
Research Board suggested Canada occupy the abandoned T-3 and issue a public declaration 
stating the government’s intent to appropriate and claim sovereignty over any present or future 
territories available within the Canadian sector.95 The federal government never issued the 
proposed statement, which resulted in an ambiguous political stance. While officials wanted to 
assert control over foreign activity in the Canadian Arctic, the federal government was unwilling 
to upset international relations in an attempt to achieve this goal. After all, the United States 
operated far more ships in the region than did Canada and was likely to reject any clear statement 
from Ottawa on ownership over ice islands. Thus, the Canadian position remained cautiously 
pragmatic and the defence establishment maintained close surveillance of Arctic waters north of 
Canada.   
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Dunbar and the Military Use of Arctic Sea Ice 
Moira Dunbar’s extensive interest in Arctic glaciology and sea ice served a specific scientific 
research need of Canada’s early Cold War defence policy. As one of the DRB’s most notable 
contributors to Arctic research, she studied, advised and wrote about Canada’s strategic Arctic 
interests for over twenty years. Dunbar pointed out in an interview with Stephen Franklin of The 
Ottawa Journal that the “Russians landed on the polar pack ice in 1937 three four-engined 
aircraft with 16 tons of supplies aboard and without bothering to look for an ice island.”96 
Together with RCAF Wing Commander Keith Greenaway, Dunbar flew numerous aerial 
reconnaissance missions over Arctic North America, collecting intelligence for the Canadian 
defence establishment. She made multiple trips with Greenaway, flying over the Arctic to 
photograph topography and ice floes. Greenaway was an ideal pilot to work with Dunbar on 
mapping the Canadian North. His experience dated to the Second World War when he was a 
radio man for the RCAF. 97 With a basic knowledge of electronics and an interest in geometry 
and geography, he spent most of the war instructing in radio navigation.98 Following the war, he 
graduated as a navigator and began flying in the Arctic in 1946.99 He joined the Arctic section of 
the Defence Research Board in 1948 and quickly earned accolades for his work on polar 
navigation. In 1951, Greenaway received the Colonel Thomas Thurlow Award, a merit prize 
awarded annually by the United States Institute of Navigation to an individual who makes an 
outstanding contribution to the science of navigation.100 He earned the award for co-inventing a 
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navigational instrument for pilots that plotted the path of aircraft in relation to both the sun and 
the stars. The North magnetic pole could disrupt standard aerial navigation tools, so 
Greenaway’s invention made Arctic flight safer from an operational perspective.  
Dunbar’s work with Greenaway culminated in Canada’s largest collection of cartographic 
and glacial aerial photos of the mountainous expanses of the Arctic, many of which were first 
presented to the public in a publication titled Arctic Canada from the Air.101 The co-written 
publication provided an aid to scientists working on polar geography as well as members of the 
RCAF flying in the Arctic. Dunbar spent three years writing and editing the 541-page text, while 
Greenaway contributed technical data obtained from his extensive hours of polar flying.102 “[The 
book] will be very useful with high-flying radar equipment,” Greenaway said in a book release 
interview with The Globe and Mail.103 “One of the prime requisites of a good global navigator,” 
he added, “is the ability to interpret what he sees on the radar scope and anticipate what’s coming 
up. Anticipation is a must in high speed aircraft. A navigator must have a good knowledge of 
both climatology and geography.” 
Dubbed “the bible on the North American Arctic,” Arctic Canada from the Air was 
extremely successful as soon as it left the press.104 Illustrated extensively with foldout maps and 
504 pictures, the book offered an aerial view of prominent geographic features unique to 
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Canada’s Arctic landscape and waters up to the North Pole. Although designed specifically for 
use by the RCAF, the Defence Research Board considered the book valuable to both military and 
civilian operations in the Arctic. Upon its release, the DRB issued a statement that urged the 
“RAF, the USAF, [and] over-the-Pole commercial airlines and independent air operators in the 
north” to consider purchasing the text for everyday use.105 Airlines, academics, and air forces did 
indeed order the book. In fact, the United States Strategic Air Command (SAC), an integral 
component of the North American air defence network, ordered 360 copies and used the book as 
a primary reference text for Arctic geography.106  
 
Dunbar’s Contribution to Canadian Defence 
Dunbar’s work with Greenaway contributed to a large body of scientific research that supported 
Canada’s independent and collaborative military needs. Although her research was non-military 
in nature, Dunbar’s work on Arctic sea ice had important implications for northern defence 
during the early Cold War. By charting the movement of large ice floes, she helped maintain 
watch for Soviet activity in the Canadian North at a time when scientists from the Soviet Union 
had gained international recognition for Arctic science and scholarship. In an interview with the 
Toronto Daily Star, Dunbar referred to Soviet scientists as leading experts in the structure, 
distribution, and behaviour of sea ice research in the early 1950s.107 Since her work relied 
heavily on materials written by Russian scholars, Dunbar spent a year learning Russian at the 
United States Army Language School in Monterey, California.108 In a paper presented to a Royal 
Society of Canada symposium, she used her knowledge of Soviet Arctic activity to speak about 
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the importance of aerial reconnaissance to the development of maps showing winter and summer 
ice conditions throughout areas considered remote by the contemporary science community.109  
Understanding the structure and distribution of ice provided an opportunity for Dunbar to 
further her standing in the Canadian defence establishment. In October 1951, she became one of 
only two women to fly across the North Pole. Along with American air-navigation specialist 
Virginia Washington, Dunbar made the trip as part of a joint Canada-United States mission to 
study cold-weather military aerial reconnaissance equipment.110 While Dunbar specialized in the 
climatological aspects of sea ice research, she also served Canada as an Arctic scientific 
representative. In 1964, only two years removed from the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, 
she visited Finland and the Soviet Union to examine icebreaking practices. For her contributions 
to the Canadian defence establishment and her commitment to Arctic research and the 
development of Canada’s science and technology policies during the Cold War, Dunbar received 
the Massey Medal in 1972. She later became a fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. Dunbar 
retired from government service in 1978. 
 
Conclusion 
First occupied by Canadian and United States forces during the Second World War, Fort 
Churchill became important to the continental defence of North America in the early Cold War 
period. The Defence Research Board was heavily involved in the elaborate plan to photograph 
the Canadian North, as is perhaps best shown by the extensive work of Moira Dunbar and Keith 
Greenaway. But defending the vast territory of the Canadian North was a matter of importance 
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beyond geostrategic considerations of mapping and photography. The Canadian defence 
establishment recognized that soldiers and civil servants required the training and confidence to 
operate effectively and safely in the high latitude regions of Arctic and sub-Arctic Canada.111 
As Fort Churchill grew increasingly significant to the Canadian military and defence 
establishment, the location served as a base for tripartite science and Arctic studies. Researchers 
from the United Kingdom and the United States travelled to Churchill to participate in Arctic 
studies at the Defence Research Northern Laboratory, while teams of scientists, engineers, and 
medical practitioners from the National Research Council and Canadian universities also used 
the base and scientific facilities to conduct northern research.112 Fort Churchill provided an 
opportunity for Canada to make a unique contribution to Western security, and Canada’s policy 
for the North worked on an international political level. Officials in Ottawa successfully 
leveraged Canada’s geography and limited military resources to strengthen the Canadian position 
in the tripartite security alliance. Science was the key component, and as documented in the next 
chapter, the Defence Research Board was Canada’s single largest patron of Arctic scientific 
research during the early Cold War.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Funding Defence Research and Development 
 
 
On 16 February 1952, The Financial Post printed a cover story that questioned the military 
contribution of Canada’s scientists in government, university and industry. Referring to science 
as the $35 million fourth arm of the armed services, Cyril Bassett, the author of the article, 
asked, “Are we [the Canadian taxpayer] getting our money’s worth?”1 To answer this question, 
Bassett examined the Defence Research Board and highlighted Canada’s unique contribution to 
military research and development: 
All told, there are currently some 170 separate projects being carried out for DRB in 15 
universities; probably another 100 or so will shortly get under way. And it needs little 
imagination to see that this sort of work can pay off big dividends, not only in supplying 
essential research information, but in producing the scientists Canada will need in 
increasing numbers in her ever-enlarging industrial economy.2    
 
Bassett’s conclusion on defence research reflects wider attitudes of the early Cold War period. A 
strong belief in the power of scientific knowledge emerged during the Second World War when 
technological innovations such as radar, penicillin, and the atomic bomb helped the Allies secure 
victory over Nazi Germany.3 Entering the postwar period, civilians in the West looked to 
scientific experts to deliver social and economic benefits through the development of new 
technologies and the accumulation of theoretical and empirical knowledge. Stephen Bocking has 
explored the evolution and grip of “scientific authority” in a detailed survey that examines the 
impact of science on environmental politics. “In environmental affairs,” Bocking argues, “the 
                                                 
1 LAC, RG24, vol. 10341, file Clippings March 1947 to November 1952, Cyril Bassett, “Science: Our Armed 
Forces $35 Million Fourth Arm,” The Financial Post (Toronto), 16 February 1952. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Stephen Bocking, Nature’s Experts: Science, Politics, and the Environment (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
2004), 17. 
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postwar authority of science was epitomized by confidence that the same strategies that had won 
the war could be applied to defeating “enemies” in nature, such as insects or fire.”4  
This theme of war on nature has attracted considerable attention from recent studies that 
explore the Cold War sciences through the lens of historical geography. Matthew Farish, for 
instance, has traced the history of scientific activity in Cold War Alaska to highlight the social, 
economic, and political implications of northern militarization.5 The United States military 
funded extensive scientific projects related to cold-weather operations, including research and 
development to improve the design and efficiency of mechanical and human movement in 
northern latitudes. In an attempt to overcome the Arctic environment, the military facilitated 
research projects across a variety of disciplines with the aim of inventing technologies and 
techniques to help soldiers survive and operate in severe cold. Supported by organizations that 
included the US Air Force, the US Army, and the National Academy of Sciences, scientists 
received extensive funding to investigate chemical methods to increase cold tolerance in the 
human body. Research included work to develop cold-fighting pills as well as clothes and 
equipment designed to keep soldiers warm, and on the physiological response to cold in persons 
indigenous to Alaska.   
The Cold War sciences thrived in Alaska largely because of the “military-industrial-
academic complex.”6 Immediately following the Second World War, American military 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Matthew Farish, “The Lab and the Land: Overcoming the Arctic in Cold War Alaska,” Isis 104.1 (2013): 1-29. 
6 On the “military-industrial-academic complex” in the United States, see by date of publication, Peter Galison and 
Bruce William Hevly, eds., Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1992); Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT 
and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold 
War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon Valley (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Audra J. 
Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets: Science, Technology, and the State in Cold War America (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2013); Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens, Cold War Social Science: Knowledge 
Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature (New York: Springer, 2012); Solovey, Shaky Foundations: The 
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personnel either returned to or belatedly entered colleges and universities in large numbers. 
Between 1945 and 1950, approximately 2.3 million American veterans attended post-secondary 
institutions and accounted for one-half of the total student population in that period.7 The influx 
of military personnel into academia resulted from the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944. 
Known more commonly as the G.I. Bill of Rights, this legislation guaranteed veterans access to 
education and housing. The subsidies provided to veterans fueled the North American consumer 
economy and helped avoid another depression, although wartime savings in the United States 
and Canada were crucial as well.  
Scale was the significant difference between the defence economies of Canada and the 
United States, of course. During the Cold War, Canada’s population and gross national product 
(GNP) were ten to fifteen times smaller than those of the United States. On a per capita basis, 
moreover, the United States government spent as much as ten times more on national defence 
than did the Canadian government.8 In the early 1960s, at the peak of spending on research and 
development in North America, the United States committed more annually to defence than 
Canada’s entire GNP. By a similar token, the number of people directly or indirectly employed 
by the US Department of Defense equaled the entire Canadian labour force. Perhaps most 
revealing is the total defence R&D commitment. In the United States, the government spent 
nearly 90 per cent of the federal research and development budget on defence.9 By comparison, 
                                                 
Politics-Patronage-Social Science Nexus in Cold War America (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 
2013); Joy Rohde, Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research during the  
Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).  
7 Jonathan Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” (Toronto: Institute for the History and 
Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, PhD Dissertation, 2012), 122. 
8 Captain D.J. Goodspeed, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1958), 
109; Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 122-123. 
9 For economic figures on the United States’ commitment to defence-related R&D, see Daniel J. Kevles, “K1S2: 
Korea, Science, and the State,” in Big Science, Galison and Hevly eds., 312-333; Leslie, The Cold War and 
American Science, 6-9. 
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the United Kingdom spent approximately 73 per cent of its R&D budget on defence, while in 
Canada the amount was 33 per cent during the same period.10  
The circumstances that enabled Cold War defence research to thrive in North America 
also created new hierarchies of political influence and competition among scientific experts for 
access to government capital.11 Geostrategic considerations of the early Cold War period 
prompted new political attention to science, and weapons-related research expanded along with 
fundamental or basic research of the kind undertaken in universities. In Canada, civilian 
scientists and engineers became key political players in Ottawa and significant portions of the 
federal defence budget began to flow to research laboratories and universities. While not to the 
scale of the financial resources expended in the United States, Cold War politics in Canada 
shaped the nature of university and industrial research during the early postwar years. National 
political priorities furthered the pursuit of “big science and technology” and gave an increasingly 
governmental and public voice to segments of the scientific community that had a history of 
independence. These circumstances also reinforced long-standing hierarchies of scientific 
authority and technical excellence, where favouritism towards academics and elite institutions 
deepened already strong research budgets. 
Cold War politics in Canada privileged a select group of thinkers, institutions, and places. 
This chapter focuses on the strategic and economic reasons behind the circumstances that 
enabled access to, and influence of, the political and financial system established to secure and 
promote the defence interests of the country. Jonathan Turner argues that “the contribution of the 
                                                 
10 The financial records amassed in the official history of the DRB cover the period 1947-57; see Goodspeed, A 
History of the Defence Research Board, 108-110. For the Canadian figures discussed here, which extend into the 
1960s, see Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 122-123. For a detailed analysis of 
postwar research and development in the United Kingdom, see Robert Bud and Philip Gummett, Cold War, Hot 
Science: Applied Research in Britain’s Defence Laboratories, 1945-1990 (London, UK: Science Museum, 2002). 
11 O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge, 5.  
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Defence Research Board to the transformation of postwar Canadian education was far less 
pervasive than in the UK or the US, because the DRB was just one among several funding 
agencies.”12 While this contention has merit, we should keep in mind the key principle behind 
the postwar research and development structure of the Canadian defence establishment: the 
pragmatic decision of senior policymakers that Canada would avoid duplication and competition 
in its defence research effort with the United States and the United Kingdom. This guiding 
principle of “specialization” applied holistically to Canada’s entire defence economy, whether 
the National Research Council or the Defence Research Board distributed the federal funds.13 
Moreover, as Turner correctly asserts, the paper trail for grants awarded by the DRB is sporadic 
at national and university archives.14 The history of research and development in postwar Canada 
is a puzzle with missing pieces. Nevertheless, available records describe the existence of a 
carefully planned and executed funding program meant to support the political agenda of the 
national security state.  
 
Fundamental vs. Applied Research 
 
The Defence Research Board recognized two categories of research, fundamental and applied. 
The former involved investigations of basic phenomena and materials, while the latter involved 
investigations to determine the feasibility of applying particular scientific knowledge to find 
solutions to specific military problems.15 Under these two categories, the DRB applied several 
                                                 
12 Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 123. 
13 Solandt reiterated Canada’s basic policy of “specialization” for research and development at a number of private 
and public speaking engagements during his tenure as chairman of the Defence Research Board. See, for instance, 
LAC, RG24, vol. 2425, file O.M. Solandt Speeches and Reports, Dr. O.M. Solandt, “Address to the Engineering 
Institute of Canada, Ottawa Branch,” 24 February 1949, p. 3. 
14 Ibid. 
15 LAC, RG24, vol. 2529, file 800-100-M91 vol. 3, “Proceeding of a Conference between the United States Air 
Force and Defence Research Board, 4 and  November, 1957,” Report No. DR 122, (Ottawa: Defence Research 
Board, Department of National Defence), January 1958, p. 3. 
126 
 
 
 
criteria in selecting fields of research. First, the DRB selected fields of research in support of its 
mandate to provide well-integrated scientific consulting services to the minister of national 
defence, the Chiefs of Staff and the armed services. Second, DRB research tested equipment and 
materials for the armed services prior to development and production. Third, a wide information-
gathering effort allowed the DRB to keep the Canadian defence establishment aware of relevant 
research in the United States and in the United Kingdom. Fourth and lastly, the DRB aimed to 
encourage scientific research and the training of scientists in Canadian universities.   
Funding provided by the Defence Research Board supported projects conducted 
internally at one of its eleven establishments or externally at university and industrial locations. 
Projects conducted at DRB facilities generally dealt with investigations involving applied 
research, while extramural projects generally focused on investigations related to fundamental 
research.16 DRB’s policy on research paralleled the R&D policy of National Defence. The policy 
outlined provisions for the development in Canada of equipment and materials to meet particular 
needs of Canadian defence. It also outlined provisions to assist where possible the development 
of equipment and materials by the United States and the United Kingdom, including the 
provision of facilities for tests and trials under Canadian conditions of climate and topography.17  
The Defence Research Board established a Standing Committee on Extramural Research 
to act as an advisory body to the Board on all matters concerning proposals for grants-in-aid 
research made by educational or independent agencies. The committee determined the objectives 
and procedural rules for the extramural research program. According to meeting minutes of the 
committee, the primary aim of the granting program was to sponsor fundamental research in 
fields of special interest to defence: 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., p. 4. 
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This is essential if basic principles leading to significant advances in defence science are 
to be discovered; in particular it is sought to encourage research in fields for which 
Canada has a natural advantage over the UK or US. These may include problems 
concerned with climate, terrain, and the geophysical extremes of high magnetic latitude, 
high geographic latitude and the auroral zone.18 
 
To achieve this goal, senior advisors with the DRB designed the extramural granting program as 
an economic base to initiate the construction of laboratory facilities for the specialized fields of 
defence research. The support of extramural research ensured a constant flow of well-trained 
scientists and engineers, which in turn strengthened ties between the DRB and the wider 
scientific community in Canada. Attracting academic and private institutions to defence science 
also served the DRB’s internal research establishments. In fields such as armament, radio 
propagation, and medical research the community of scientists established by the extramural 
granting program served as a forum for DRB experts to strengthen and expand their knowledge 
and resource capacity. 
Based on experience with fundamental and applied research, advisors of the Standing 
Committee on Extramural Research decided the Defence Research Board should concentrate 
work in a particular field to one or two university laboratories. Concentrating research on 
specific projects allowed the DRB to direct financial support towards the maintenance of 
effective studies undertaken at universities in fields considered imperative to its own objectives. 
In other words, while the extramural granting program aimed to create a wide network of 
defence scientists, grants-in-aid went primarily to research projects directly related to the specific 
interests of the DRB. 
                                                 
18 LAC, RG24, vol. 2529, file 800-100-M91 vol. 2, DRBS 170-80/S6, “Defence Research Board Standing 
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When reviewing applications for grants, the Defence Research Board assessed the 
scientific worth of the proposed research and its possible application to a specific aspect of 
Canadian defence. As a general principle of the extramural program, the DRB made a 
determination on the applicability of a project to defence before awarding a research grant.19 The 
Standing Committee on Extramural Research held a significant amount of power in this regard. 
While other advisory committees and panels of the DRB were responsible for determining the 
division of grant funds within their own operating budgets, the Standing Committee on 
Extramural Research made the final decision to approve a research project for funding. The large 
size of the granting program effectively reduced the influence of the committee, however. Unless 
extenuating circumstances dictated otherwise, the committee met only once annually as a 
collective group.  
To expedite the approval of grants, the DRB mandated other advisory committees and 
panels to indicate the relative order of importance of each of the applications recommended for 
approval by the Standing Committee on Extramural Research.20 Panels were also required to 
prepare a supplementary list of applications for grants. Arranged in order of priority, each 
supplementary list included applications deemed worthy of support if provided additional funds 
outside the independent budget of the granting panel. The DRB implemented this procedure to 
enable the Standing Committee on Extramural Research to screen out applications loosely 
related to the defence research requirements of the armed forces and reallocate funds to reinforce 
work in specific fields of research. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 3. 
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Extramural University Research 
 
With its inception in 1947, one of the DRB’s primary mandates was to establish a strong 
program of research in Canadian universities. Omond Solandt wanted to support the growth of 
the academic sciences in Canada, and the DRB allocated an initial annual expenditure of nearly 
$500,000 per year.21 The program consisted mainly of extramural grants-in-aid for research 
conducted by senior members of university staff across a variety of institutions in Canada, but 
according to former secretary of the DRB William Barton, the program also supported research 
contracts for “special projects and the provision of assistance in acquiring certain types of 
equipment not normally obtainable by universities.”22 
Upon further examination, it becomes clear that the DRB established its extramural 
program for three primary reasons.23 First, as an agency concerned with the application of 
scientific knowledge, the Board decided it was good policy to set aside a definite proportion of 
its annual budget for the support of fundamental research. DRB officials considered the support 
of fundamental research imperative, especially considering the role of the organization during 
defence preparations in peacetime. Second, the Board saw its extramural funding program as a 
means to meet its obligations to the institutions responsible for carrying out the training of future 
employees and proceeded on the assumption that a program of research was essential to direct 
the training of graduate students. By funding scientists and a wide variety of research initiatives 
across Canada, the DRB made an annual investment in future talent and reaped the rewards by 
attracting graduates to government science. Third, contact with university scientists created a 
                                                 
21 For details on Canada’s early Cold War financial commitment to defence research and development, see Solandt’s 
annual report for the DRB for 1948: LAC, RG24, vol. 4116, file 1-0-140, “1948 Annual Report of the Chairman, 
Defence Research Board”. 
22 W.H. Barton, “Defence research in the universities,” reprinted from Chemistry in Canada (March 1951), article 
found in LAC, RG24, vol. 4133, file 4-901-43-2 vol. 1. 
23 Ibid. 
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unique scientific community of researchers with a shared interest in the problems of defence. 
Maintenance of close relations between university scientists and those working in the 
laboratories of the DRB was mutually stimulating and a community of likeminded researchers 
theoretically meant ready access to scientific expertise in the event of war. 
While the DRB respected the intellectual freedom of university researchers and attempted 
to avoid external control, the extramural grants-in-aid program assumed that university research 
was most effective when concerned with the investigation of fundamental principles rather than 
the application of those principles to immediate defence problems. In other words, officials 
designed the extramural research program as a wide net. University scientists applied for funding 
to conduct research in areas with potential applicability for defence, but the implementation of 
the results at the federal level was the prerogative of the DRB.  
In a conscious effort to maintain its responsibilities to the federal government and the 
universities under its funding structure, the DRB established safeguards to govern the procedures 
of its grants program.24 First, a number of senior university representatives sat on the Board and 
were encouraged to voice proposals for research that came directly from university professors 
who had received funding. Second, in supporting fundamental research to reduce potential 
problems associated with security restrictions, the Board reserved the right to examine the results 
of research prior to publication. This ensured that information considered important to the 
national security of Canada remained out of the public eye. Third, the DRB made an effort to 
maintain a continuous research program by placing grants in a trust fund and vesting title to 
research equipment in the institution that used grant monies to make the purchase. Under this 
third policy, the DRB eliminated the need to maintain elaborate inventories and depreciation 
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records while supplying necessary and modern equipment to university researchers and 
laboratories. Fourth, grantees did not receive payment for services and institutions did not charge 
for operating costs. In this respect, the DRB made a concerted effort to remove monetary 
incentives from the grants-in-aid research program. 
Despite the effort to remove the prospect of lucrative gains from its grants system, the 
DRB openly provided direct financial support for university research projects considered directly 
applicable to Canadian defence. In such cases where university research could directly benefit 
National Defence, the DRB provided contracts on an actual costs basis. Each contract came with 
provisions to control and regulate the allocation of monies exclusively to research and operating 
costs. Otherwise, the DRB provided flexibility to scientists operating under contract. Although 
the idea of secrecy and censorship of scientific information aligns closely with our understanding 
of Western governments during the Cold War, the DRB rarely implemented its second safeguard 
for restricting the publication of sensitive material.25 As documented in the notes to Chapter 4 
and 5, for instance, the northern research projects of Norman Mackworth and Malcolm Brown 
were published in various academic and medical research journals.  
The Defence Research Board first appointed a Public Relations officer in 1952, when 
C.A. Pope assumed the new position and began reporting directly to top members of the Board.26 
Prior to Pope’s appointment, the bureaucracy of the DRB was such that leading scientists had the 
autonomy to determine the sensitivity of defence-related information prior to any publication. 
The federal government allocated money to the DRB solely for the organization to provide the 
                                                 
25 I arrived at this conclusion after careful review of available primary sources and secondary literature. The Defence 
Research Board closely monitored and vetted the results of funded research prior to any publication, however. For 
details on the DRB’s Directorate of Scientific Information, see LAC, RG24, vol. 4168, file 225-1-53-1 vol. 3, 
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best possible research program that would meet the needs of the Canadian defense establishment, 
within the limits of its budget. Inclined to ensure that the Department of National Defence 
received good value for money spent, the DRB’s extramural grants program was less restrictive 
than one might expect. 
This is not to suggest that DRB scientists openly published sensitive information. On the 
contrary, DRB scientists who published results of research were extremely cautious in 
documenting projects funded by the Canadian defence establishment. DRB scientists swore an 
oath of secrecy and avoided mention of national defence and security when publishing research. 
As a guiding principle of information control, secrecy about defence research extended to 
communication with media and public audiences. Scientists employed by the DRB were 
precluded from communicating research, unless first having received permission from the DRB’s 
directorates of scientific information or public relations. Indeed, the Defence Research Board 
was explicitly clear about communication with the public. Chapter VIII of the DRB’s 
Administrative Reference Manual outlined in writing the official policy on public relations.27 
This policy covered all scientists, research assistants, technicians, engineers, administrative 
employees, military personnel, and federal civil servants working with or for the Defence 
Research Board.  
The Defence Research Board sponsored research directly and indirectly related to its own 
program. When universities undertook research on certain problems as part of the DRB’s own 
program, the work focused on fundamental research considered more profitable when conducted 
within a university where special skills or facilities already existed. On the other hand, the DRB 
                                                 
27 The public relations policy of the Defence Research Board was also tied to government intelligence. In fact, the 
Chief of Administration for the DRB also administered the Joint Intelligence Bureau of the Chiefs of Staff. On the 
DRB’s policy on public relations published in Chapter VIII of the Administrative Reference Manual, see LAC, RG 
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awarded grants in certain cases where the research appeared valuable to Canada’s present or 
future defence effort. Generally, expenditure under the grants program tended to be greater in 
fields where the existing university infrastructure and expertise was strong.28 In other words, 
DRB grants usually supported fundamental defence research with no direct connection to 
Canadian security. 
 
The Scope and Consequences of Defence Research 
 
The Defence Research Board first considered a policy for extramural research in March 1948 
when Omond Solandt discussed the topic during an informal meeting with Charles Best and 
James Collip.29 Best and Collip had previously collaborated on the discovery of insulin with 
Frederick Banting and John Macleod in 1921, and had working relationships with Solandt that 
dated to the interwar period. In fact, Solandt had been a protégé of Best, and Collip was the 
Director of the Medical Research Division of the National Research Council. Six months after 
their informal meeting, the three scientists met again in September 1948, when Best and Collip 
attended the first meeting of the DRB’s newly formed Medical Research Advisory Committee.30 
Included on the committee were representatives from the three Services, National Health and 
Welfare, and the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. The committee also included the Directing 
Consultant from the Royal Canadian Air Force’s Institute of Aviation Medicine (IAM) and five 
academic members from the universities of Laval, McGill, Manitoba, Queen’s, and Toronto.31  
                                                 
28 LAC, RG24, vol. 4168, file 225-1-53-1 vol. 3, “Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence: 
Programme of Scientific Work for the Fiscal Year 1955-1956 – Prepared for the Advisory Panel of Scientific Policy 
of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research,” 15. 
29 Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 96. 
30 LAC, RG24 S F1, vol. 11995, file DRBS 1-0-43-1 Vol 2, “Agenda No 5.6 (Medical Research Advisory 
Committee), Defence Research Board from MacNeill,” 22 September 1948. 
31 For a detailed list of names and affiliations for members of the Medical Research Advisory Committee, see 
Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 96. 
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The September meeting marked an important milestone in the history of the Defence 
Research Board, because the members of the Medical Research Advisory Committee collectively 
formulated the DRB’s policy for defence medical research.32 At the meeting, the committee 
discussed the transfer of responsibility for medical research from the three Services to the DRB. 
Representatives of the IAM and the Chief of Air Staff allegedly resisted the transfer to protect 
the interests of the RCAF.33 The circumstances of the transfer took another two years to resolve. 
In the end, the DRB absorbed a large portion of the responsibility for research for the Services, 
while the RCAF maintained control over its internal development and aviation medicine. Morley 
Whillans of the DRB moved from Ottawa to Toronto in 1950 and became the first 
superintendent of the Defence Research Medical Laboratories.  
The transfer of research responsibilities to the Defence Research Board was not the only 
concern of the Medical Research Advisory Committee. Members of the committee also had to 
formulate a policy to determine fields of interest for the DRB and decide what work to leave for 
researchers at hospitals and universities. Because the primary concern of the DRB was problems 
affecting the armed forces, the committee decided against supporting research into the diagnosis 
and treatment of illness. The DRB would instead support research on the unique occupational 
problems encountered by Service personnel, including training and indoctrination, environment 
and terrain, military kit and equipment, protective clothing, and food and supplies.  
While the Defence Research Board made a concerted effort to distinguish its priorities 
from those of outside institutions, medical research undertaken at hospitals and universities 
received grant funding when the work related to the Service problems identified by the Medical 
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Research Advisory Committee. Some of the problems identified by the committee overlapped 
with the research agenda of the Defence Research Northern Laboratory, which partly accounts 
for the DRB’s heavy interest in the medical study of cold-weather human physiology. In addition 
to Malcolm Brown’s research on Inuit biology (Chapter 5), Louis-Paul Dugal received financial 
support from the DRB to study physiology in relation to cold environments and Wilfred Bigelow 
for research into hypothermia and resuscitation from cold-induced injury. Bigelow’s research 
ultimately had little application to Arctic warfare, but it made an important contribution to 
medical science by helping establish techniques for open-heart surgery and the development of 
the pacemaker.34     
The medical benefits of Bigelow’s work represent one of the many positive results 
stemming from the funding system of the Defence Research Board, but the widespread support 
of scientific research had negative consequences as well. As Jonathan Turner has detailed, there 
were DRB funded scientists whose research later resulted in legal action.35 Ewen Cameron of 
McGill University, a UK scientist from Glasgow, collaborated with James Tyhurst and Donald 
Hebb of the DRB to study behavioural responses of the human mind. Hebb served on the 
Psychological Research Panel of the DRB, and the research study conducted by the three men 
focused on a form of mind control known as “depatterning,” otherwise known as brainwashing.36 
Forty years after the study began in the early 1950s, former patients at the Allan Memorial 
Institute filed a class-action lawsuit against the United States Central Intelligence Agency (a co-
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financier of the research) over the issues of human treatment and informed consent. The CIA 
settled the lawsuit by test subjects, and the Canadian government ordered a judicial report into 
Cameron’s experiments.37 In 1994, the Government of Canada awarded $100,000 to seventy-
seven former Canadian patients who suffered “total depatterning,” meaning they were rendered 
to a childlike state when they received psychiatric treatment at the Institute.38 More than 250 
others were denied compensation at the time of the court ruling. 
The role of the Defence Research Board in the research conducted by Cameron, Tyhurst 
and Hebb remains controversial. Cameron received financial support from the DRB to conduct a 
series of tests on the behavioural responses of white men to cold-weather adaptation, which had 
the endorsement of the DRB’s Psychological Research Panel. His research also received 
approval from Omond Solandt, but the former chairman of the DRB condemned Cameron’s 
work during the court investigation. “It was my view at the time and continues to be that 
Cameron was not possessed of the necessary humanity to be regarded as a good doctor,” Solandt 
said in a statement supporting the victims who had brought their case to court.39 In questioning 
the support for Cameron’s research, Canada’s Justice Department assigned former federal 
Member of Parliament George Cooper to determine whether Ottawa had any legal or moral 
obligation to the victims. Cooper ultimately decided the Canadian government was not 
responsible.40 
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January 2017, http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/montreal-woman-seeks-compensation-in-50s-brainwashing-
case-1.670151. 
38 Dene Moore, “Brainwashed ‘guinea pig’ seeks more damages,” Canadian Press, 8 January 2007, accessed 18 
January 2017,  https://www.thestar.com/news/2007/01/08/brainwashed_guinea_pig_seeks_more_damages.html. 
39 Omond Solandt, quoted by unknown author, “The legacy of Dr. Cameron”; see University of Toronto Archives 
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Defence Research Board support for scientific research extended beyond medical work to 
encompass the whole of its research program. The model for federal support of research in 
Canada dated to the First World War when the National Research Council began to award grants 
and scholarships for projects initiated by scientists and engineers outside of government. The 
DRB continued this tradition, which as model for research was not unique to Canada. Indeed, the 
NRC had copied the policies and procedural example first conceived by the Department of 
Scientific and Industrial Research in the United Kingdom. The DSIR funded research to develop 
a trained workforce and extend its support for empirical science.41 Both of these key principles 
find extensive documentation in the histories of the NRC and the DRB.  
 
DRB’s Financial Commitment to Extramural Research 
 
During a speech to staff members and visiting officials in Ottawa on 30 March 1951, Omond 
Solandt marked the fourth anniversary of the Defence Research Board by providing a detailed 
overview of the policies, research establishments, budgetary commitments, and working 
accomplishments of the organization as a whole.42 The chairman of the DRB gave special 
attention to extramural research, which, in his opinion, had “produced a considerable volume of 
research, and, equally important, [had ensured] the training of scientists with the special skills 
required for defence research.” At the time of Solandt’s address, approximately 150 grants were 
active in fifteen universities across Canada and more than 500 professors, graduate students, and 
technicians had worked on various projects in either a part or full time capacity. Over the first 
four years that the DRB was operational, monetary support for extramural defence research in 
                                                 
41 Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 98; H.W. Melville, The Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (London: Allen & Unwin, 1962), 62. 
42 LAC, RG24, vol. 2425, file Speeches – Reporting etc. 1947 – March 1953 Volume 1, Dr. O.M. Solandt, The 
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universities increased fivefold to a payout exceeding $650,000 annually. By 1950, extramural 
research grants accounted for approximately 5 to 6 per cent of the total annual expenditure of the 
Defence Research Board.43  
While the financial commitment made by the DRB to extramural research may seem 
small, there are important factors to consider when contextualizing the grants system in relation 
to the organization as a whole. It is worth noting that the budgetary details presented by Solandt 
were slightly inaccurate. According to National Defence financial records for the fiscal year 
ending on 31 March 1950, extramural research grants funded by the Defence Research Board in 
1949-50 accounted for nearly $700,000 of a total approximate budget of $8.5 million.44 The 
DND records raise the payout for extramural research to 8 per cent of total DRB budget. 
Although two or three percentage points represent a small increase, the total allotment to 
extramural research is proportionally significant when we consider the high operating costs of 
the Defence Research Board. By 1950, the DRB had constructed and staffed nine independent 
research facilities across Canada that operated year-round in addition to a central scientific and 
administrative establishment in Ottawa. The cumulative operating costs of all ten locations 
amounted to approximately $5.7 million in 1949-50, which means the DRB allocated 49 per cent 
of its total capital investment (budgetary funds less operating costs) to extramural grants that 
year.45  
Extramural research grants and contracts with Canadian universities expanded annually 
until the mid-1950s. During 1954-55, the Defence Research Board awarded seventy-nine 
                                                 
43 According to the record of Solandt’s speech, the estimated total DRB expenditure for defence research in 1950-51 
was between $11 and $12 million.   
44 The exact figures listed are $8,498,085 (total budget) and $667,022.08 (extramural research grants); see NARA, 
RG319, Box 854, Annual Report of the Defence Research Board, 1 April 1949 – 31 March 950, Report No. DR 22, 
“Department of National Defence, Defence Research Board Statement of Allotments, Expenditures and Unexpended 
Balances for fiscal year ending 31 March 1950,” Ottawa, 26 May 1950. 
45 Calculated using the total recorded capital of $1,353,459.46 (see ibid.), the exact number is 49.28 per cent.  
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extramural research grants to support fieldwork in areas related to aviation medicine, blood 
transfusion and preservation, food technology, infection and immunity, psychiatric research, and 
radiation and toxicology.46 The scale of expenditure in most fields began to level off by the end 
of 1955 and the DRB decided to cap expenditures on grants to approximately $1 million and 
expenditures on contracts to $1 million as well. The $2 million spent on grants and contracts 
amounted to 11 per cent of the DRB’s total annual budget of $22 million, which members of the 
Board apparently considered sufficient to maintain support for “selected research workers with 
particular competence and interest in defence fields.”47 Of the $1 million expended annually on a 
contractual basis, only $200,000 went to universities while the remaining amount funded 
industrial research and development.48 But universities received the whole of the $1 million 
made available for research grants, meaning the DRB distributed approximately $1.2 million 
annually for university research and $800,000 for industrial R&D. During the life of the 
extramural research program in the 1940s and 1950s, over 80 per cent of expended funds 
supported research rather than development.   
A significant portion of the extramural granting program supported research related to 
military problems in the North. During the early 1950s, the DRB expended approximately 40 per 
cent of the whole extramural grants-in-aid program on research conducted in the field of 
medicine to complement its internal medical program of “keeping the healthy man healthy.”49 
The remaining 60 per cent of the program supported a variety of fundamental research projects 
                                                 
46 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4168, file 225-1-53-1 vol. 3, “Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence: 
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47 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4168, file 225-1-53-1 vol. 2, “Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence: 
Programme of Scientific Work for the Fiscal Year 1954-1955 – Prepared for the Advisory Panel of Scientific Policy 
of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research,” 9. 
48 Ibid. 
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that had the potential to serve the needs of Canadian defence. In addition to the medical research 
intended for service personnel, some of the fundamental research sponsored for the Arctic 
included entomological work on mosquitoes and biting flies, studies of chemical regulation 
against cold in animals, and meteorological examination of the wind chill factor.  
 
Intergovernmental and Industrial Defence Spending 
 
The total investment in research made by the Defence Research Board is even more significant 
when we consider partnerships with industrial agencies and other government departments. An 
analysis of the DRB’s wider connection to external interests allows us to appreciate the scale of 
defence research in Canada during the early Cold War period. Indeed, the DRB created close ties 
with other agencies of the federal government to expand its scientific and technical capabilities. 
DRB experts made extensive use of the facilities of the National Research Council to conduct 
research and development for the armed services. According to DRB records prepared for the 
Privy Council, the Electrical Engineering Division of the NRC carried a major part of the 
responsibility for radar R&D while the Flight Research Section of the NRC’s National 
Aeronautical Establishment directed a significant effort toward solving problems directly related 
to Canada’s defence.50  
The Defence Research Board supported intergovernmental relations with agencies 
outside of Canada as well, and the facilities at Fort Churchill hosted visiting scientists and 
researchers. Scientific activity at Defence Research Northern Laboratory was particularly notable 
during 1955-56. For instance, the DRB provided laboratory space and equipment to personnel of 
the United States Environmental Health Laboratory who travelled to Churchill to study general 
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sanitation problems in the North.51 In addition to serving as a facility for research teams and 
individual scientists and engineers, DRNL enabled information and intelligence exchange among 
the tripartite partners. Laboratory researchers compiled and analyzed statistical data on clothing 
and equipment from various trials conducted at Churchill by the Directorate of Interservice 
Development. In cooperation with units from the armed forces, researchers at DRNL shared this 
information by lecturing on Arctic indoctrination to visiting military and civilian groups from 
Canada, the United States and Britain.  
The extent to which the Defence Research Board mobilized partners for scientific R&D 
is also evident in the postwar history of the Canadian Industrial Preparedness Association 
(CIPA). On 22 October 1953, a large assembly of nationally prominent figures from Cabinet, the 
three Services and government departments convened in Ottawa with representatives from 
independent agencies at the annual CIPA meeting.52 Among the government attendees were 
Omond Solandt, the Minister of Defence Production C.D. Howe, the Minister of National 
Defence Brooke Claxton, and the Minister of Finance Douglas Abbott. As an “organization 
encouraging active participation in industrial preparedness for the common defence of Canada,” 
CIPA had a direct interest in the ongoing activities of the Defence Research Board.  
The 1953 annual meeting was particularly full for members of CIPA. The afternoon 
included a visit to government facilities and the opportunity to hear senior government officials 
speak at the reception dinner. Solandt arranged two separate tours for the CIPA participants. One 
group visited the DRB while another visited the National Research Council. The DRB group 
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visited the National Aeronautical Establishment to see wind tunnels and related scientific 
equipment and laboratories. Participants with the DRB tour group also visited the Central 
Experimental and Proof Establishment of the RCAF at Rockcliffe to see equipment and methods 
used in the testing of aircraft and equipment. The NRC group visited an electronics laboratory as 
well as the establishment for Canadian Signals Research and Development.  
A wide and diverse audience attended the CIPA meeting, including senior government 
officials and defence scientists as well as participants from large corporations such as General 
Electric and Canadian Arsenals Limited. The meeting also drew the participation of executives 
from the United States who represented the National Security Industrial Association from New 
York City. The day culminated with the annual CIPA reception, which featured Solandt and 
Abbott as keynote speakers. As a closing function, the dinner attracted 292 members and 
guests.53 C.D. Howe and Brooke Claxton both spoke briefly following Abbott’s address. Howe 
paid tribute to CIPA, without which, in his estimation, “[Canada’s] defence industry would be 
feeble.”54 Claxton’s approach was more direct. The minister of defence espoused Cold War 
rhetoric to caution the audience against any feeling of security from the notion that Soviet 
Russia’s behaviour had allegedly changed following the Korean War: 
If there is a change in the behaviour of Russia and her satellites, there is no change in 
their design. Any change in Red behaviour was because the free people had shown 
themselves ready to take action. You don’t cut off your insurance because you haven’t 
had a fire … Defence payments are our premium on insurance for peace. 
 
Claxton’s comments struck a chord with CIPA. In a bulletin summarizing the events of the 
annual meeting, the organization published a statement proclaiming Canada’s responsibility to 
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contribute to the military and industrial capacity of the NATO alliance.55 The statement referred 
to defence as “a collective project” and suggested that each nation of the free world work 
together to withstand Soviet aggression.  
Calling on government and industry to recognize Canada’s inability to defend its own 
interests without support, the CIPA bulletin paints a vivid picture of prevailing attitudes toward 
research and development in Canada during the early Cold War. While CIPA represents only one 
voice from the period, the strong presence of government and industrial parties present at the 
meeting speaks to a distinctive sociocultural response to anxieties over western security. Total 
preparation for defence in peacetime was the remedy, or so the CIPA bulletin suggests. The 
statement on collective defence referred specifically to the “crystal clear” necessity that Canada 
reach its maximum industrial output to support its allies in defence of the free world:  
Thus it becomes increasingly important that our capability to produce war material be not 
impaired by permitting those facilities we now have to lapse into a state of uselessness or 
obsolescence, and the technical staffs now employed in them to be dissipated. If we were 
to reach such a state, we would be failing not only in our obligations to our partners in the 
free community of nations, but in our own defence measures, since, if we do not do our 
part in full, how can we expect others to give us the help we may need so vitally. [sic] 
 
The key was an unwavering belief in the need to prepare for conflict during peacetime. 
Accordingly, the principle of “all for one and one for all” applied not only to the armed forces 
but also to the provision of collective industrial support. 
The bulletin from the 1953 annual meeting of the Canadian Industrial Preparedness 
Association is also valuable for what it tells us about ties between the Defence Research Board 
and industrial partners during the period. CIPA recorded Solandt’s keynote address and 
published the text in full. In his address, Solandt briefly outlined the pattern of the scientific 
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community in Canada and the role of the DRB in operating laboratories to fulfill the research 
needs of defence. He then discussed the relationship of the DRB to the armed services and 
industry. Solandt praised a strong and growing relationship between industry and the Canadian 
defence establishment, but warned industrialists against inflated expectations for government-
oriented research and development: 
Industrial people often accuse scientists of over-selling their wares. I feel in this case 
there is far more danger of industry over-buying the wares of the scientist. If we are to 
have healthy industrial research and development in Canada the same criteria must be 
applied to expenditure for research and development as to any other industry 
expenditure.56 
 
In Solandt’s view, industrial work was most effective as a supplement to research. His vision for 
Canada’s defence economy was a ready industrial base equipped with the capacity to develop 
tangible materials according to the requirements identified by scientists and engineers in 
government and academia. 
Solandt’s emphasis on government and university research may be a reflection of his 
personal background. Trained in medicine prior to the Second World War, Solandt showed 
throughout his government career a desire to engage like-minded individuals. He had a strong 
belief in the education of scientists and showed no hesitation in recruiting university researchers 
to sit on committees and panels for the Defence Research Board. In so doing, he created levels of 
bureaucracy that enabled the elevation of a select group of civilian researchers to positions in the 
Canadian government. The result was a network of researchers who accessed and distributed 
large quantities of funding made available by the increased R&D investment of the postwar 
Canadian defence establishment. 
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The Arctic Institute of North America and RCMP Surveillance 
 
While Solandt’s efforts brought considerations for science to the fore of policymaking in the 
Canadian defence establishment, the DRB’s investment in university research exposed civilian 
researchers to Canada’s Cold War national security apparatus. Extramural research grants from 
the Defence Research Board usually supported unclassified projects, but grants went only to 
recipients who had received a security clearance.57 Furthermore, all grants recipients and 
research assistants were required to take an oath of secrecy. 
The extent to which security policies permeated into the extramural grant system of the 
DRB is evident in records on the Arctic Institute of North America (AINA). In June 1950, 
AINA’s executive director A.L. Washburn wrote to Omond Solandt requesting security 
clearance for AINA staff and project workers to undertake classified research. Arctic Institute 
research projects had been of a strictly non-classified nature when Washburn made his request, 
but the geostrategic importance of the Arctic and the corresponding increased value of scientific 
research to military intelligence urged him to reconsider AINA’s approach to potentially 
sensitive security information. The motivation behind Washburn’s request was multi-layered. He 
suggested AINA personnel should be in a position to undertake classified work to “serve the 
interests of the Canadian and United States governments,” but stated openly that his organization 
was unequipped with the “investigation facilities or means adequately to protect itself against the 
dangers of Communist infiltration or employment of poor security risks.”58 
AINA was also determined not to jeopardize government financial support. The Institute 
was a non-profit organization founded in 1945 to study scientific problems common to Alaska, 
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northern Canada, and Greenland. The organization established a headquarters at McGill 
University in Montréal and worked in close liaison with government agencies, other universities, 
scientific societies, and independent groups in Canada and the United States to co-ordinate 
research pertaining to the North American Arctic and sub-Arctic. Incorporated in Canada by an 
Act of Parliament and in the United States under the laws of the State of New York, AINA 
developed especially strong ties to government research divisions such as the Defence Research 
Board and the National Research Council. In fact, the NRC was one of three supporting 
institutions that paid for the creation of AINA, and the Institute relied heavily on funding from 
the DRB to continue its research activities.59  
AINA’s ties to Canadian government ran deeper than financial support. Hugh 
Keenleyside, the Deputy Minister of Resources and Devolvement and Commissioner of the 
Northwest Territories, served as vice-chairman on the AINA board of governors. As a senior 
Canadian official, Keenleyside brought experience and political connections to the leadership 
group of AINA. He had a close working relationship with Solandt, and researchers under 
contract with the Defence Research Board often served with AINA in related capacities. For 
instance, Trevor Lloyd and T.H. Manning both received grant funding to pursue Arctic-related 
research for the DRB while serving on AINA’s board of governors. With the top-down board, 
committee, panel and staff organization of the DRB, the Canadian defence establishment 
contributed to the creation and maintenance of an Arctic research community where university 
researchers not only gained access to but also shaped the nature and quality of government 
research. 
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The relationship between the Defence Research Board and the Arctic Institute of North 
America concerned some representatives of the Canadian government. In particular, the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) voiced concern over the possibility of awarding Arctic research 
grants to scientists from the Soviet Union and Finland: 
The Committee realized that it would be embarrassing to the Arctic Institute to have to 
discontinue Grants-in-Aid to scientists wishing to work in Northern Canada, but felt that 
such embarrassment might have to be accepted as there was no form of quid pro quo by 
which Canadian scientists were permitted to work in Russia and possibly Finland. It was 
agreed to recommend to you [Omond Solandt] that the giving of Grants-in-Aid to 
scientists from Soviet Russia and Finland for work in the Canadian Arctic was 
undesirable and should be discouraged.60  
 
How firm the Canadian government was on this stance is unclear. Records indicate that the 
RCMP examined scientists who AINA nominated to receive grant monies from the DRB for 
work in the Canadian North, but in one particular case the RCMP identified and cleared a 
Finnish scientist: “There is nothing in the report on this man to indicate any subversive 
tendencies.”61 While the details of the investigation are unclear, this case seems indicative of a 
larger pattern. Earlier that year in January 1949, Graham Rowley of the DRB’s Arctic Research 
Advisory Committee requested that P.D. Baird of AINA forward copies of grant applications and 
referee comments. Rowley requested copies and comments only for research projects conducted 
by foreign nationals in Canada, excluding citizens of the United States and Commonwealth 
countries. Baird fulfilled Rowley’s request, with the hope of obtaining “speedier clearance from 
the security authorities.”62 
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Rowley apparently acted in response to a decision made by the Joint Intelligence 
Committee. According to records of the Privy Council Office, the JIC agreed in late 1948 that 
Assistant Commissioner L.H. Nicholson of the RCMP would co-operate with the Defence 
Research Board to investigate scientists recommended for funding.63 ANIA forwarded the names 
of sixty-one grant applicants to the DRB that year; approximately one third were Finnish 
nationals expecting to work in the Canadian North.64 The DRB then supplied the applicants’ 
information to the RCMP along with a memorandum detailing the advertisement of, and review 
process for, research grants made available through the Arctic Institute.65 
 
Research and Development Priorities 
 
In February 1952, the Defence Research Board devised a priority system for research and 
development projects undertaken or supported by DND.66 The DRB produced the system to 
standardize assessment of all R&D projects under the umbrella of Canadian defence. Prior to its 
establishment, each branch of DND employed a separate model to regulate R&D, so the newly 
created system implemented a single and cohesive framework for the whole of National Defence. 
The DRB was not only the originator of the priority system but also acted as the “Project Co-
ordination Centre” for all R&D projects supported by the defence establishment. The system 
mandated that each division of DND allot a priority for R&D projects in accordance with the 
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outlined plan and inform DRB on a continuing basis. Internally, each member of the scientific 
staff at DRB followed the same structure and allotted a priority to each extramural or industrial 
grant and contract awarded to support external research and development. 
Two key criteria defined the Defence Research Board’s priority system for R&D: the 
importance of operational research and analysis, and the critical need for the creation of new or 
improvement of existing weapons, equipment and techniques for warfare.67 Both criteria derived 
in part from the Canadian experience in Korea, the focus of Chapter 6. In short, senior military 
officials recognized a philosophical issue with the existing R&D mandate of the Canadian 
defence establishment. Canada was unable to undertake research and development on all items 
required by the armed forces and military officials were uncomfortable with the idea of relying 
too heavily on technical assistance from the United States and United Kingdom, but officials also 
thought that a selective R&D policy was inadequate.68 According to the line of thought, the 
inadequacy of the existing R&D structure stemmed from a concentration on fields in which 
Canada showed a unique scientific and engineering capacity. “Specialization” was questioned as 
the key principle of Canada’s postwar R&D structure. The modern problems of the armed forces 
simply required additional support, or so was the military impetus that led the DRB to create a 
priority system for research and development. Theoretically, the priority system could reduce the 
possibility of “serious gaps” from occurring in the existing R&D structure of DND.69  
The priority system gave precedence to projects of immediate importance to the defence 
of Canada and the immediate needs of the armed forces. From a practical point of view, the 
system ensured vital R&D projects received adequate financial support as well as the scientific 
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and technical expertise required for rapid completion. The system itself consisted of a letter and a 
digit; the letter denoting the strategic importance and operational category supported by the 
project, and the digit denoting the need to develop new or improved weapons and equipment to 
support the technical objectives of the operational category.70 The Chiefs of Staff Committee 
determined the value of operational categories and assigned a ranking system according to four 
sets of criteria. Priority A was for R&D projects in support of operations considered essential to 
the defence of Canada, while priorities B and C covered projects to support operations that 
included a major (B) and minor (C) degree of participation by the armed forces. The remaining 
category was priority X, which covered projects initiated by Canada only at the request of Britain 
or the United States. The digit portion of the priority system assigned the numbers 1, 2, and 3 to 
determine the need for new or improved weapons, equipment and techniques. In descending 
order from 1 to 3, the numbers denoted the need for items “greatly superior,” “markedly 
superior,” and “marginally superior” to the existing supply available to the armed forces.  
Of the sixteen focus categories outlined by the priority system, Arctic warfare did not 
make the cut. The top three priorities, in order, included air defence, anti-submarine, and land 
combat operations. The priority list also included atomic, bacteriological, and chemical warfare, 
amongst others.71 That Arctic warfare did not make the list may be indicative of a change in 
institutional priorities, but it may also simply reflect the precise phrasing of the priority 
categories. Rather than focus on geographical areas of importance to the armed forces, the list 
defined categories based on information requirements or the need for improved equipment and 
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resources. Furthermore, some of the listed categories overlapped with Arctic research and 
development. Operations including land combat, personnel, supply and maintenance, intelligence 
and planning, and airborne landing all held relevance for military training and research 
conducted at Fort Churchill and Defence Research Northern Laboratory.  
One of the more intriguing areas of research and development outlined by the DRB 
priority system was “Psychological Warfare and Cold War Operations,” which the original 
document defined as “the employment of any nonlethal or clandestine means to affect morale 
and behavior for a specific military purpose.”72 The technical objectives of research in this area 
stipulated the need to develop methods for determining the feasibility and potential uses of 
psychological warfare. Potential research subjects included military and government personnel, 
with the aim of developing techniques to protect Canadians from “enemy propaganda, sabotage, 
and the psychological threat of material warfare.”73 The technical objectives of the research also 
emphasized the need to develop techniques to demilitarize government and military personnel of 
defeated enemy nations. Although the approved document listed Canadian interest in this 
research area as “very slight,” the preparatory thought highlights the extent to which Cold War 
anxieties permeated defence planning at the highest levels of Canadian government.74  
 
Conclusion: The Glassco Commission 
 
The Defence Research Board was not the only granting agency of the federal government to 
distribute grant monies in the postwar period. By the 1970s, the National Research Council 
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distributed $34.4 million annually to scientists, engineers, and industry leaders.75 During the first 
three decades of the Cold War, the number of scientists and engineers in Canada rose from 
30,000 to 115,000 and the number of graduate students in science and engineering from 1,500 to 
9,000.76 The total annual federal expenditure on R&D over this period increased from under 
$100 million to $319 million, which is the equivalent of an annual payout of approximately $2.4 
billion when adjusted for inflation.77 While not the only government agency to fund university 
and industrial scientists and engineers in the early Cold War, the DRB distributed a significant 
portion of the federal R&D pie. According to the personal records of Solandt, the DRB’s annual 
budget for research and development increased from $13 million in 1947-48 to $52 million in 
1955-56.78 Over that same period, the professional staff of the DRB grew from under one 
hundred personnel to 612, and its total staff grew from around 600 personnel to 2,507.79 
Although not the only source of federal funding available to university scientists in 
Canada during the early Cold War, the large sums of annual money funnelled through the 
Defence Research Board’s extramural grants program did influence university graduate schools 
and the character of their research.80 Similar to its older sibling the NRC, the DRB controlled the 
intramural research of a handful of establishments spread across the country, and an extramural 
                                                 
75 Eggleston, National Research in Canada, 444.  
76 Ibid. 
77 Eggleston’s numbers on scientists, engineers, graduate students, and federal expenditure did not originate from 
archival sources. Rather, he cited an article written by Omond Solandt, the founding Chairman of the DRB, which 
reads O.M. Solandt, Science Forum 1, No. 2: 3-5. 
78 The exact figures stated are $13,031,834 in 1947-48 and $52,578,000 in 1955-56; see University of Toronto 
Archives and Records Management Services, Omond McKillop Solandt fonds, vol. B93-0041-033, file B93-0041-
033-03, DRBS 400-1 (DGS), 30 December 1955. 
79 University of Toronto Archives and Records Management Services, Omond McKillop Solandt fonds, vol. B93-
0041-033, file B93-0041-033-03, “DRB Personnel Strength (Including JIB [Joint Intelligence Board]),” 29 
December 1955. 
80 See W.H. Barton, “Defence research in the universities,” reprinted from Chemistry in Canada (March 1951), 
article found in LAC, RG24, vol. 4133, file 4-901-43-2 vol. 1. 
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research budget for grants and contracts with universities and industries. Secretary of the DRB, 
William Barton, wrote about the peculiar circumstances facing prospective researchers in 1951: 
[Grant recipients] must satisfy themselves that the prospects of immediate financial 
benefits are not permitted to obscure the vital necessity for safeguarding their traditional 
intellectual freedoms … This is particularly important in the case of a defence agency, 
which may require military security restrictions.81 
 
Through its board, council, committee and panel structure, the DRB facilitated relationships 
between government researchers, university scientists, military clients and industry leaders to 
share advice and make decisions concerning Canada’s national security. In the process, the 
creation and implementation of science policy and its administration was the responsibility of 
scientists and stakeholders, as was the distribution and use of federal funds allocated to defence 
research and development. This style of managing science—created during the First World War 
and implemented successfully during the Second World War under the leadership of C.J. 
Mackenzie and C.D. Howe—remained largely unchanged until the 1962-63 when the reports of 
the Royal Commission on Government Organization called into question the impartiality of 
personnel who simultaneously advised upon and administered policy.82   
On the advice of businessperson J. Grant Glassco and the other Royal Commissioners, 
governmental divisions such as the Defence Research Board underwent significant philosophical 
and organizational restructuring. Glassco chaired the Royal Commission on Government 
Organization, which formed in 1960 and published the results of its investigations between 1962 
and 1963.83 Glassco was a chartered accountant from Toronto who had first gained experience in 
government affairs during the Second Word War when he investigated the business practices of 
                                                 
81 Ibid. 
82 Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 210-215. 
83 Government of Canada, The Royal Commission on Government Organization. Vol. 1: Management of the Public 
Service (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1962), accessed 25 November 2016, 
http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/471934/publication.html. 
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Eldorado, Canada’s national uranium company.84 As chair of the Royal Commission on 
Government Organization, he led an investigation into the practices of government departments, 
the armed forces, statutory boards and independent corporations. The twenty-three departments 
investigated included the National Research Council and the Defence Research Board, both of 
which received detailed coverage for policies and practices in support of scientific research.  
The Glassco Commission questioned the efficiency of management structures at the 
federal level in Canada. The final report comprised five volumes and the Defence Research 
Board received direct attention for its connection to the Department of National Defence and 
Canadian science policy. The first volume referenced the DRB to contest the allegedly special 
treatment that National Defence received under the Civil Service Act. Unlike similar research 
divisions in other government departments, the DRB was exempt from the Act.85 Other 
questionable regulations and policies stemming from the whole structure of National Defence 
further opened the Defence Research Board to criticism. The second volume of the report, for 
instance, highlighted inefficiency resulting from National Defence duplications in military and 
non-military procurement.86  
The Defence Research Board received direct attention in volume four of the report, which 
questioned the role and impact of scientific research and development in Canada. In a scathing 
report on the DRB, the commissioners claimed that financial support for the organization had 
                                                 
84 For full details on the history of Eldorado, see Robert Bothwell, Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984). 
85 Canada, The Royal Commission on Government Organization. Vol. 1; Turner, “The Defence Research Board of 
Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 211. 
86 Canada, The Royal Commission on Government Organization. Vol. 2: Supporting Services for Government 
(Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1962), accessed 25 November 2016, 
http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/9.699799/publication.html. 
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declined by approximately one-third during the period 1947 to 1957.87 This claim runs contrary 
to the financial records of the Defence Research Board, which document growth in the annual 
budget of the DRB during the same period. The annual budget of the DRB had increased to 
nearly $79 million in 1958, but the financial growth of the organization was stagnant when 
proportionally assessed in relation to the full federal defence budget. Moreover, both the United 
Kingdom and the United States spent significantly more on defence than Canada.88 These 
reasons might account for the contradiction between the Glassco Commission and the financial 
records of the DRB. 
The Glassco Commission also criticized the Defence Research Board for inadequate 
policy advice to the Minister of National Defence and for allowing the armed services too much 
autonomy in matters concerning procurement for defence. Such issues stemmed in part from the 
DRB’s organizational structure, which allegedly gave senior personnel overlapping 
responsibilities. But the commissioners were more concerned about the possibility of duplication 
and waste in the whole of Canada’s federal R&D effort:  
At present five government agencies have an initiating role in development  
programmes—the Defence Research Board, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian 
Army, the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Department of Defence Production … It 
therefore appears advisable, in the interests of economy and effectiveness alike, to co-
ordinate all defence programmes for applied research and development, including the 
new “development-sharing” programme, and to provide an effective environment for the 
conduct.89  
 
The commissioners noted the ability of the DRB to produce results despite a limited budget, but 
their report made five recommendations that had lasting implications for defence research and 
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development in Canada. The first four recommendations discussed the creation of a single 
organization for defence research and development so as to remove the possibility of duplication. 
Under this plan, as stated in the fifth recommendation, the existing research establishments of the 
DRB would become “National Defence Laboratories” operated on behalf of the three services 
under the direction of the new “Defence Research and Development Board.”90 While the 
commissioners determined the DRB’s budget was far too small for what was expected of the 
organization, their reports put pressure on the federal government to address the alleged 
inefficiencies in defence spending.  
Released too late for the Diefenbaker government to take remedial action, the Royal 
Commission on Government Organization became a precursor to some of the sweeping changes 
that occurred with the integration and unification of the armed services under the Pearson 
government during the period 1964 to 1968. Another group of business experts drew similar 
conclusions to the Glassco Commission in 1974 with regard to R&D spending, and the Canadian 
government responded to the extreme pressure on the federal budget by reallocating funds away 
from defence.91 For the next three years, the Defence Research Board experienced drastic 
changes to its internal structure and large-scale reductions to its operating budget. Despite the 
efforts of Board members and employees, the circumstances surrounding Canada’s federal 
budget were too strong to stem the tide against the withdrawal of funds from defence-related 
programs.92  
                                                 
90 Ibid., 211. 
91 Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 213. 
92 For full details on the Glassco Commission and the Defence Research Board, see Turner, “The Defence Research 
Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 210-215. 
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Because the Glassco Commission initiated a long and arduous process that reduced the 
power and influence of the scientific defence community in Canada, the remaining chapters of 
this dissertation focus on the early Cold War period. Between 1947 and 1960, civilian scientists 
not only obtained high-level positions in the Canadian government but also created and 
administered policies to promote their self-interests while simultaneously shaping the scope and 
direction of Canada’s national defence effort. The political ascendance of scientific experts 
strengthened Canada’s commitment to Western security and deepened alliance partnerships with 
the United Kingdom and the United States. This is particularly apparent in the history of defence 
research in northern Canada, and Defence Research Northern Laboratory is a useful tool to 
examine the influence of science in government. The remaining chapters of the dissertation thus 
provide a fair and accurate historical assessment of the Canadian experience with Cold War 
defence research in the North, using DRNL as a lens through which to interpret the types of 
defence research considered important to assist the Canadian armed forces. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Science and Human Performance in the North 
 
 
“Great physical and mental effort is required under conditions of extreme cold and high 
windchill to remain aggressive. The cold and unusual conditions of life can, if allowed, impose a 
heavy strain on morale. Every opportunity must be taken to seek out and destroy the enemy in 
order to increase the strain on the enemy, to deprive him of rest and time to prepare food, and 
eventually destroy him.”1 
 
    Final Report, Sun Dog One 
 
 
Between 1947 and 1953, scientists with the Defence Research Board administered physiological 
and psychological experiments on soldiers conducting indoctrination training for Arctic warfare. 
Designed in an attempt to determine the ideal characteristics of cold-weather soldiery, one 
experiment resulted in physical and mental injury to two of the participating soldiers. Although 
the army immediately questioned its participation in further DRB testing because of the injuries 
sustained, ethical considerations for human testing did not deeply penetrate military and defence 
discourse concerning the involvement of soldiers in acclimatization research and indoctrination 
training. This chapter examines cold-weather human testing and argues that the development of 
Cold War soldiery in Canada conformed to superficial gender ideals about virile masculinity in 
the early postwar period.  
When the Canadian Arctic became a training ground for Western forces during the early 
Cold War, troops from Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom took part in a series 
of military exercises, designed to prepare both men and equipment for cold-weather warfare.2 
                                                 
1 As quoted in the final report of Sun Dog One, prepared under the direction of the Chief of General Staff and 
published by the Directorate of Military Training; see LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise 
“Sun Dog One,” p. 12. 
2 The Canadian military participated in no fewer than twenty-two northern operations in the first decade of the Cold 
War, including exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar Bear,” and “Lemming” (1945); “Musk Ox” (1946); “Moccasin” (1947-
1948); “Sigloo” (1948-1949); “Cross Country,” “Sweetbriar,” “Sun Dog One,” and “Shoo Fly One” (1950); “Sun 
Dog Two,” “Shoo Fly Two,” “Measureall,” and “Pole Star One, Two and Three” (1951-1952); “Sun Dog Three,” 
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Each exercise aimed specifically to determine infantry requirements as well as the tactical 
techniques and coordination methods required for military operations in extremely cold winter 
conditions. The most well-known exercise remains the three-month northern excursion named 
Operation Musk Ox, which combined efforts by the militaries of Canada and the United States 
and reinforced notions that the Canadian Arctic represented the first line of defence against a 
potential attack on North America.3 Less well-known but also important to the Canadian military 
and defence establishment was Sun Dog One, a one-month exercise carried out in an effort to 
study and overcome environmental challenges unique to Arctic military operations. 
Sun Dog One served a scientific and military purpose. During the exercise, Defence 
Research Board scientists observed trials of Canadian, American, and British cold-weather 
clothing and equipment. Scientists from the DRB also conducted experimental trials on 
participating soldiers as part of an acclimatization and indoctrination program that aimed to 
determine the physical and psychological requirements of cold-weather soldiery. Symptomatic of 
broader Cold War desires to understand and overcome the natural environment, indoctrination 
training in the Canadian Arctic gave planners, observers, and participants a sense of control. 
Although training proved effective and educational, the lessons learned came at a cost. Scientists 
deemed some troops physically or temperamentally weak for cold-weather operations and thus 
                                                 
“Deer Fly One, Two and Three,” and “Prairie Tundra One” (1952); “Prairie Tundra Two” (1952-1953); and “Bull 
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by Army Personnel for Ground Navigation in the North, 30 June 1954. For an abbreviated list of Canadian army 
exercises in the North between 1945 and 1953, including dates, locations, and aims, see Andrew B. Godefroy, In 
Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War Army (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2014), 87-88. 
3 See Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse, Cold War Canada: The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945-1957 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 141-142; Robert Teigrob, Warming up to the Cold War: Canada and 
the United States' Coalition of the Willing, from Hiroshima to Korea (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 
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less suitable for Arctic service than men whose physical and mental attributes posed no apparent 
or potential detriment to the morale and effectiveness of the other participating soldiers. 
Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish have argued that postwar Western military 
interest in the Canadian Arctic signalled not only “the systematic consolidation of nature as 
military entity, but also an extension of the scope and terms of militarization to reflect the 
cautious longevity of the Cold War.”4 Situating postwar northern military exercises in a broader 
environmental discourse, Lackenbauer and Farish explore the pervasive legacy of Cold War 
militarism in Canada in a manner that moves beyond the more traditional diplomatic or social 
analyses of the period. This chapter also examines the pervasive legacy of Cold War 
militarization in the North, but highlights human as well as environmental aspects.  
Cold-weather human testing represents an interesting aspect of military preparedness, but 
as a topic remains largely unexplored by historians. This chapter examines the connection 
between military indoctrination and scientific cold-weather acclimatization research in an effort 
to contextualize an important aspect of Canada’s Cold War legacy while also contributing to a 
growing international literature on human and environmental science in the early postwar period. 
Sun Dog One represents an ideal case study. During the exercise, scientists tested the physical 
and mental qualities of the participating soldiers operating under severe cold-weather conditions. 
The experiments were part of an Arctic acclimatization research and indoctrination training 
program initiated to determine physical characteristics associated with military operations in 
severe cold-weather conditions. In turn, Canada’s defence and military establishment attempted 
to develop a process to identify men deemed physically and mentally valuable to support a 
northern defence. Sun Dog One consequently provides a unique window into the development 
                                                 
4 P. Whiteny Lackenbauer and Matthew Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern 
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and impact of Cold War soldiery, is an intriguing topic related to military masculinity, and raises 
important questions about the ethics of human testing and defence science in the years 
immediately following the Second World War. 
 
The Postwar Canadian Military and the North 
 
While the air threat to North America was a fixture of strategic considerations in Ottawa during 
the early postwar period, defence officials remained cognizant of the vulnerability of the 
Canadian North by sea and land. In advance of a potential Soviet incursion in the North, the 
military turned to science to prepare its men for the potential cold-weather battlefield. Defence 
planners deemed cold climate training important to northern indoctrination and troop 
preparation, and intelligence confirmed the need to prepare a defence against the shortest and 
most direct route over the North Pole. Canadian soldiers were to learn how to survive and use 
their weapons under Arctic conditions, thereby developing efficient techniques to defend the 
expansive northern approaches. 
The Canadian military first tested the capabilities of military personnel and equipment in 
the North during the winter of 1945-1946. Operations Eskimo, Polar Bear, and Lemming were 
designed to determine the effects of severe climatic conditions on the mobility and combat 
efficiency of Canada’s striking forces. The location of each exercise differed, which allowed for 
the testing of equipment in northern environments under varying conditions and challenges of 
both terrain and temperature.5 Exercises Musk Ox and North occurred the following year, as the 
army continued to improve tactics, techniques, and procedures for living and fighting in severe 
cold-weather conditions. None of these field exercises were large-scale operations, nor were they 
                                                 
5 For a brief overview of Canada’s Winter Warfare Programme of 1944-1945, see Hugh A. Halliday, “Recapturing 
the North: Exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar Bear” and “Lemming,” 1945,” Canadian Military History 6, no. 2 (1997): 
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conducted to test the ability of joint land-air operations to resist mock Soviet aggressor forces.6 
As a result, the army continued to conduct both individual and joint exercises with the Royal 
Canadian Air Force.  
Arctic warfare differed considerably from winter warfare in that its potential battlefield 
existed in vast spaces only reachable by air. Whereas units conducting winter warfare could rely 
on roads, railheads, and other supply infrastructure, Arctic warfare units trained to maximize 
sustainment and rely only on resupply by air to the often limited extent possible in the difficult 
flying conditions.7 Canada took part in cold-weather warfare exercises in both Arctic and sub-
Arctic conditions. Canadian and American military planners defined the “true” Arctic as any 
terrain north of the tree line, including tundra and mountain ranges. Conversely, planners defined 
the sub-Arctic as any northern treed terrain, including the treed plain of northern Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories, the mountains of northern British Columbia, the 
Yukon, and southern Alaska.8  
In May 1946, the Canadian chiefs of staff approved the formation of an inter-service 
committee on winter warfare, with a sub-committee on winter warfare research. By 1947, 
defence science expanded significantly in Canada and the sub-committee was subsequently 
reorganized as the Arctic Research Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Hugh 
Keenleyside, the deputy minister of mines and resources and commissioner of the Northwest 
Territories.9 The committee held its first meeting on 15 May and decided that, while science 
                                                 
6 Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 85. 
7 Halliday, “Recapturing the North,” 29-38. 
8 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2484, file HQS-736-10-17-2-5, Dr. O.M. Solandt, Exercise “Sweetbriar”: An Address to The 
Empire Club of Toronto, 30 March 1950. 
9 LAC, RG 85, vol. 298, file 1009-2[2], Defence Research Board Arctic Research Advisory Committee, 5 December 
1949, Appendix A “Summary of Activities of the Arctic Research Advisory Committee”. 
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could assist military operations in the Arctic, the military could also provide occasional 
assistance to scientific research by provision of transportation, facilities, and personnel. 
Although top officials in the Canadian defence establishment showed little interest in 
placing standing forces in the North, support for cold-weather military exercise training ran deep. 
Speaking to the House of Commons on 17 March 1950, Minister of National Defence Brooke 
Claxton spoke about his experience as an observer of exercise Sweetbriar, which took place 
during the winter of 1949-1950.10 The exercise tested the latest developments in clothing, food, 
aircraft, vehicles, weapons, and other equipment and materials, but the primary objective was to 
develop doctrine and procedures for the employment of combined Canada-United States forces 
operating in the sub-Arctic.11 Over 5,000 combined forces took part in the ten-day exercise, 
which also included 978 motor vehicles and more than 100 aircraft. Sweetbriar was the largest 
joint Canada-United States northern military exercise at the time, so when speaking to the House, 
Claxton congratulated all officers and men who had contributed to the success of the exercise “in 
accordance with the best traditions of the Canadian forces.” Claxton further applauded the 
exercise by noting specifically the effectiveness of cooperation between the army and air force, 
and Canadian and American troops.  
A few weeks later on 30 March, Omond Solandt addressed the Empire Club of Toronto 
and spoke about his experience as a scientific observer of Sweetbriar.12 Echoing Claxton’s 
comments, Solandt spoke of Sweetbriar with specific reference to training and equipment for 
combined sub-Arctic operations. The exercise did not involve new weapons and took place in 
                                                 
10 Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd Session: Vol. 1, 17 March 1950, 853-
854. 
11 Ibid. 
12 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2484, file HQS-736-10-17-2-5, Dr. O.M. Solandt, Exercise “Sweetbriar”: An Address to The 
Empire Club of Toronto, 30 March 1950. 
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weather conditions that were less severe than those encountered by both Canadian and American 
troops in training, but it did inspire novel equipment development and the need for further 
controlled cold-weather environmental training. The most important single lesson of Sweetbriar 
was, according to Solandt, the importance of and ease with which the armies of Canada and the 
United States operated harmoniously and effectively in severe cold conditions. When questioned 
about the success of the exercise, other Canadian and American military officials who attended 
as observers were noncommittal. Some expressed shock at the state of defences in the Canadian 
North, while others optimistically believed that joint military preparedness remedied any existing 
deficiencies in defence.13 With regard to both the training of men and the use of equipment in 
cold weather, Canada’s military and defence establishment identified many weaknesses in its 
northern defences. The exercise also made clear that neither Canada nor the United States was 
ready to conduct winter warfare; additional training was required.  
Exercise Sweetbriar demonstrated the potential ability of soldiers to operate efficiently in 
the sub-Arctic and demonstrated the adequacy of logistical support under such conditions.14 
Canada-United States support was an essential component of exercise Musk Ox, but not for the 
force strength that was available during Sweetbriar. Observers of Sweetbriar pointed out certain 
aspects of northern exercises that required improvement, but overall the exercise dispelled fears 
of the efficiency of cold-weather military operations. With proper clothing, equipment and 
training, soldiers were able to manoeuvre under sub-zero temperatures with fewer mock 
casualties than estimates had forecast. Observers concluded that logistic support was adequate to 
maintain larger forces and ongoing military operations in Canada’s northern environment. 
                                                 
13 Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd Session: Vol. 4, 9 June 1950, 3408. 
14 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2484, file HQS-736-10-17-2-5, Extract from US Army Field Forces Newsletter, 1 May 1950. 
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Participants and observers drew similar conclusions from military exercise Sun Dog One, which 
occurred about 2,000 kilometres east at Fort Churchill, Manitoba. 
 
Defence Research Northern Laboratory and Sun Dog One 
 
After visiting the Defence Research Northern Laboratory at Fort Churchill on a review 
assignment in December 1954, E.F. Schmidlin of the DRB’s Arctic Section emphasized the 
importance of the establishment to Canadian defence in his official report:  
DRNL is unique in defence research. It is the only station of its kind in the tripartite 
family. There is much to be done yet, before warlike operations can be successfully 
prosecuted in the high latitudes. Because of this I think we are justified in providing 
adequate facilities, both scientific and domestic. Unless we do, we cannot expect the 
maximum results for the effort expended.15 
 
The tripartite emphasis placed on DRNL by Schmidlin reflected wider attitudes within the 
Defence Research Board. As a principal user of DRNL, the DRB conducted basic research 
concerned with military problems peculiar to living, working and fighting in the Arctic but also 
used the facilities to house visiting scientists operating out of Fort Churchill on short term or 
seasonal projects. In order to achieve this goal, military and civilian agencies of the governments 
of Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States utilized DRNL to conduct trials, research, 
and training under Arctic conditions. 
The terms under which visiting scientists and military personnel operated pre-dated the 
formal establishment of the Defence Research North Laboratory. On 25 March 1947, 
representatives of the Department of National Defence accepted a formal agreement with the 
United States War Department that required the Canadian Services to provide facilities for the 
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US Army at Fort Churchill.16 In exchange for the construction of new and renovation of existing 
facilities, the Canadian government received $350,000. The agreement stipulated that the US 
Army Corps of Engineers would supervise the construction. One month later, a Canadian inter-
service committee on winter warfare drafted a memorandum that outlined a proposed long-term 
plan for the establishment of a joint Canada-United States experimental and training station at 
Fort Churchill.17 The impetus of the plan was clear. As stated in the memorandum, the creation 
of a permanent operating station would “provide facilities to develop the art of warfare in the 
Canadian Arctic through study, experimentation, and training.” This framework satisfied two 
important requirements of Canada’s early postwar Arctic defence policy: the training of 
personnel, and the development and testing of equipment for research related to military 
equipment. More precisely, the plan outlined the need for a directed program at Fort Churchill to 
study the environmental conditions of the Canadian Arctic and the effect of those conditions on 
personnel, supplies, equipment and logistics. Exercise Sun Dog One helped contribute to the 
achievement of these goals. 
Sun Dog One was an extension of infantry training that had taken place at Fort Churchill 
during the winter of 1948-1949. The exercise comprised 251 personnel, which made the exercise 
significantly smaller than Sweetbriar.18 The exercise consisted of an entirely self-contained and 
mobile force that lived and carried out manoeuvres for nearly one month close to Fort Churchill. 
The tactical goal of Sun Dog One was to determine the capabilities of armour, field artillery, and 
engineers in support of one infantry company operating in a severe cold-weather environment.19 
                                                 
16 LAC, RG 24, vol. 7329, file DRBS-100-30/0, “Department of National Defence Agreement for Expenditure of 
U.S. Funds, Fort Churchill, Manitoba, Canada; Appendix “D” to Long Term Plan for the Combined Experimental 
and Training Station Fort Churchill, 21 April 1947. 
17 LAC, RG 24, vol. 7329, file DRBS-100-30/0, Long Term Plan for the Combined Experimental and Training 
Station Fort Churchill, 21 April 1947. 
18 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One”. 
19 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, Training Wing Fort Churchill: Exercise Sun Dog 1. 
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All appreciations assumed that supply to all units was available. The one-month time frame 
allowed for repetition of certain trials, photographic retakes, and variation in weather.20 Planners 
sacrificed some measure of realism for scientific observation. 
The operational concept of exercise Sun Dog One was the pursuit and destruction of an 
enemy party approximately fifty strong, which dropped near the Hudson Bay railway at 
Chesnaye. The exercise began on 16 February 1950 and ended on 15 March. Planners chose the 
route and terrain of the exercise specifically to test the supply and communication organisation 
of participating units. The first leg of the route took soldiers through heavily bushed terrain on a 
trail prepared by a Royal Canadian Engineers Test Team. The remaining distance traversed flat 
and open tundra lands broken by many small lakes and sloughs. In open areas, snow was hard, 
shallow, and rough with wind anvils, while in treed areas it collected in deep and soft powdery 
drifts. Temperatures during the exercise were somewhat below the normal mean for that winter. 
The lowest temperature recorded was minus forty-two degrees Celsius and the mean 
approximately minus twenty-nine degrees Celsius. The maximum recorded wind chill was 2,300 
or approximately minus fifty degrees Celsius and the mean was 1,700 or approximately minus 
thirty degrees Celsius.21 While these temperatures were comparatively higher than other Arctic 
locales from the same winter, high winds experienced during the exercise did at times drastically 
increase the rate of body heat loss. 
Canadian exercises in winter and Arctic warfare prior to Sun Dog One demonstrated the 
limits of troops operating in demanding conditions, not of survival but of endurance. Varying 
topography and climate in both dry and wet cold conditions reduced the operational effectiveness 
of all forces. Sun Dog One was a combined military exercise of a tactical nature in Canada’s 
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21 Ibid. 
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eastern Arctic. The exercise served to test certain military assumptions about cold-weather 
operations and demonstrated many operational difficulties peculiar to Canada’s northern 
environment. For instance, soldiers found that the same clothing that enabled them to conduct 
operations in the Canadian Arctic also reduced their maneuverability and overall effectiveness. 
Clothing restricted motor control, particularly during periods of high wind chill when closed 
parka hoods reduced visibility and hearing. Mitts restricted dexterity of the hands and the 
soldiers’ ability to handle weapons. Frequent and rapid weather changes also significantly 
decreased the operational effectives of both men and equipment during Sun Dog One. As noted 
in a diary of the exercise, the constant breakdown of snowmobiles was a dominating feature of 
the troop experience.22 Reoccurring failures of equipment significantly reduced opportunity for 
tactical study and in turn slightly obscured the value of recorded information. Nevertheless, the 
exercise allowed observers to make useful conclusions about cold-weather military operations.  
 
Acclimatization and Indoctrination 
 
Considering the vast range of the potential cold-weather battlefield, acclimatization of personnel 
to the Arctic environment was a chief scientific concern of Canada’s defence establishment early 
in the Cold War. While making his remarks about exercise Sweetbriar to the House on 17 March 
1950, Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton stated: “Fighting in the north we know requires 
specially trained personnel of high morale and top physical condition with first-class equipment 
and air supremacy. These have been our targets and we are making good progress.”23 At the 
time, the logistical difficulties of cold-weather military preparedness of both men and equipment 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Government of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 21st Parliament, 2nd Session: Vol. 1, 17 March 1950, 854. 
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had extended beyond the institutional capabilities of the Army, or so was the belief of Canada’s 
top military advisers.  
Despite rapid demobilization and cost cutting, the Canadian military maintained a notable 
contribution to national security in the immediate postwar years. As argued by Andrew 
Godefroy, “[that] the postwar Canadian Army was ultimately capable of innovating and adapting 
to meet new threats alongside its two main allies under such conditions suggests that a great deal 
of military enterprise and innovation occurred within the institution.”24 Godefroy does not 
suggest that all changes in postwar military structure were novel and successful, but he 
nonetheless maintains that historical scholarship is too critical of the Canadian military during 
the early Cold War period. Godefroy’s assessment finds support when we consider northern 
cooperation between the military and the Defence Research Board.  
By order of Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, Chief of the General Staff, the Canadian 
Army conducted exercise Sun Dog One in part to assist the Defence Research Board in the 
execution of its “Acclimatization Research Programme.”25 The DRB was civilian staffed and 
directed, but a significant portion of its personnel had military experience from conducting 
operations research in the Second World War.26 Operational researchers and defence scientists 
helped the military to better understand the many characteristics of winter warfare by collecting 
                                                 
24 Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 49. 
25 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, Army Headquarters, 3 January 1950. 
26 Operational research involved scientific investigations carried out in the field of operations and became widely 
recognised during the Second World War when careful observations, analyses, and conclusions were first applied 
profitably to wartime operations. For information on Canada’s wartime OR in the Second World War, see Terry 
Copp, Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe (Waterloo, Laurier Centre for Military, 
Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 2000). Postwar OR concentrated primarily on combinations which involved 
weapons, communications, transports and other systems that employed electronic and mechanical components; see 
University Archives and Special Collections, University of Saskatchewan, JGD/MG01 (John G. Diefenbaker fonds), 
vol. 76, file VII/A/614, 44327—The Defence Research Board Canada. The Operational Research Group of the DRB 
was specifically responsible for projects of joint-service or general defence interest and for supply and coordination 
of civilian scientific personnel. See LAC, RG 24, vol. 4210, file 69-180-262, Defence Research Board: Debate of 
the Annual Estimates in the House of Commons 1952. 
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raw data for further analysis through study of army physical training exercises.27 Among the 
more active of DRB’s research facilities in the early Cold War period was its Defence Research 
Northern Laboratory at Fort Churchill.28  
Although northern military exercises aimed to determine the requirements and tactical 
techniques of supporting arms and services operating in cold climate conditions, a select number 
also supported Canada’s wider military and defence research that aimed to understand the 
physical and physiological requirements of cold-weather soldiery.29 The DRB conducted its 
Acclimatization Research Programme as part of this process at Fort Churchill during the winter 
of 1949-1950. The research aimed to study the effect of vitamin C on the physiological 
adaptation to cold of personnel while operating in Canada’s Arctic environment. Scientists 
administered two sets of pills to two groups of soldiers who conducted physically demanding 
military operations under severe cold as part of exercise Sun Dog One.30 The first group received 
placebo pills containing no vitamin C while the second group received pills containing 500 mg 
per day. Each test participant underwent a medical examination prior to and following the 
experiment. Scientists also conducted urinalysis, blood pressure measurements, and blood 
analysis twice weekly on soldiers throughout the duration of the programme, which lasted from 
January to March 1950. Each participant received pills prior to, during, and following exposure 
to cold and was granted one week extra leave following the completion of the test period.  
Vitamin C research and physiological screening allowed the Defence Research Board to 
test scientific hypotheses related to human performance in the cold. The scientific evaluation of 
                                                 
27 Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 85. 
28 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4150, file 52-751-268-1 vol. 2, Programme of Works for 1948-49 Joint Testing Station Fort 
Churchill, Manitoba. 
29 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One”. 
30 The exact number of test participants remains unclear, but the DRB initially requested the volunteer participation 
of thirty soldiers. See LAC, RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, Defence Research Northern Laboratory: 
Acclimatization Research Programme 1949-50 Fort Churchill. 
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the capabilities and limitations of military personnel was important to the Services in evolving 
tactical doctrine for northern warfare.31 While senior military officials showed little desire to 
station standing forces in the North, the DRB supported cold-weather research on the human 
body in an attempt to develop techniques to select and prepare men for service work in the 
North. The Soviet Union increased its scientific activities in the Arctic during this period, and the 
DRB carried out cold-weather research on the human body as a means to find a scientific 
advantage for the Canadian military. In their capacity as observers, DRB scientists received 
instructions to avoid doing anything that would interfere with the conduct of exercise Sun Dog 
One. Their role was strictly scientific, but their experiments had potential for a military 
applicability.  
The DRB’s acclimatization research associated with Sun Dog One was not the first 
attempt by scientists to deduce information about cold-weather operations from participants. 
Scientists utilized volunteers as test subjects in similar trials a year prior to Sun Dog One in 
January and February 1949. Arrangements at the time were in place to use volunteer soldiers 
stationed in the North, but the army pulled its participation before the tests commenced. In order 
to meet the requirements of British scientist Norman Mackworth, working in Canada on an 
extramural research grant from the DRB, representatives from the DRB and the military held a 
meeting and attempted to find a resolution: “After much controversy over morale and other 
problems … it was realised that the absolute limit had been reached on the provision of test 
subjects.”32 Tests went ahead nonetheless and the scientists utilized persons already employed at 
Defence Research Northern Laboratory.  
                                                 
31 LAC, RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, General Instruction for Observers Participating in Exercise “Sun 
Dog One”. 
32 LAC, RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-17-11, Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board. 
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Funded jointly by Canada and the United Kingdom, the tests conducted at DRNL were 
the first in a series of two.33 Fort Churchill provided researchers the opportunity to conduct 
fieldwork in the Canadian North under “natural conditions of cold” and to compare results to 
data recorded from physical observations of participants who underwent similar examinations in 
a simulated cold-weather experiment at Cambridge, England (Mackworth’s home institution). 
Although reluctant to cooperate, it seems the Canadian army eventually provided soldiers 
already stationed at DRNL as volunteer participants for the study.34 Mackworth and his team 
conducted two experiments to test the hypothesis that cold exposure may bring about changes in 
skin texture that act as a “glove,” thereby improving manual dexterity and performance in the 
cold by protecting the hands against the transmission and loss of heat. In the first test, researchers 
compared the sensitivity of a group of Indigenous soldiers considered “well acclimatized” to that 
of “unacclimatized” white soldiers. In the second, researchers compared recorded skin sensitivity 
measurements taken before and after exposure to severe cold while on exercise to results of 
similar tests conducted in the Cambridge laboratory simulation. Results from both cases reported 
no significant differences between those considered already acclimatized and those not.35 
Thirty-five volunteers comprised the first test group, of which twenty were members of 
the Canadian army, nine were scientists, and the other six were “labourers.” Mackworth and his 
                                                 
33 The acclimatization research conducted by Norman Mackworth and his team received joint funding from the 
Defence Research Board, the Medical Research Council, and the Medical Department of the Royal Navy. For a 
published account of the experiments, see N.H. Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in Very Cold Winds,” Journal of 
Applied Physiology 5, (1953): 533-543 and N.H. Mackworth, “Cold Acclimatization and Finger Numbness,” 
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, Biological Sciences 143, no. 912, (1955): 392-407. 
34 Available records are slightly ambiguous on this point. Military documents suggest troops from exercise Prairie 
Tundra Two (1952) were utilized as test subjects, whereas Mackworth’s published report in the Journal of Applied 
Physiology dates the experiments to January and February 1949. The dates provided by Mackworth coincide with 
the operational dates of Sigloo, seemingly making it the exercise during which troops also volunteered to participate 
in acclimatisation research. It is also plausible that troops volunteered to take part in DRNL research while not as 
part of a formal military exercise. 
35 LAC, RG 85, vol. 299, file 1009-2[5], M.F. Coffey, “Results of a Test for Changes in Skin Sensitive after a Period 
of Acclimatization to the Cold,” DRNL Technical Paper No. 16, November 1953. 
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team conducted finger numbness tests on volunteer participants using an experimental V-test 
apparatus. As shown in Figure A.F4 and A.F5 (Appendix A), the apparatus consisted of a flat 
wooden ruler cut in half. The two halves of the ruler were bolted together at one end, and at the 
other end were separated by half an inch. The gap between the two inner edges of the device 
ranged between zero and thirteen millimetres, according to the particular part that touched the tip 
of the tested finger. Instructed to look away as researchers administered the test, participants said 
whether they felt a gap when the examiner firmly pressed the two edges against the tip of the left 
forefinger. Researchers obtained ten such threshold readings from each participant prior to cold 
exposure and averaged the readings to establish an individual control.36  
To test participants in the cold, researchers constructed a canvas-lined tunnel equipped 
with a system of adjustable shutters designed to channel prevailing winds. Researchers 
administered the test only on “cold” or “very cold” days, when temperatures ranged from minus 
twenty-five to minus thirty-five degrees Celsius and wind speeds in the tunnel ranged from zero 
to ten miles per hour.37 Each test participant entered the wind tunnel and stood at such a position 
that their test hand was to the direction of the wind. A woolen glove fully covered the test hand, 
except for one finger, left entirely bare for an exposure time of three minutes. While exposed to 
the cold, researchers obtained ten threshold readings from each participant. The first reading was 
after one minute had passed and the others roughly at twelve-second intervals thereafter. 
Administrators of the test used these readings to devise a “numbness index” and compared the 
effect of cold and wind speed on manual dexterity.38 
                                                 
36 Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in Very Cold Winds,” 533-543. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 535. 
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Mackworth calculated his data based on results obtained during cold exposure at five to 
ten minute intervals. He used measurements from the two-point tactile discrimination V-test to 
assess the finger numbing effects of severe cold and wind chill conditions. Researchers recorded 
109 pairs in total, and Mackworth concluded that even moderate winds lowered skin 
temperatures and increased the risk of frostbite. He made this assessment partly in response to 
injuries that occurred during the tests. On 9 February 1949, three “test subjects” reported to the 
local station hospital complaining of pain in the left index finger. The hospital report dated two 
days later stated that all three men were “in a painful stage of defrosting” that “render[ed] their 
fingers useless for an average of seven days.”39 Prevented from carrying out their regular duties 
because of their physical injuries, these men were also reported to have suffered from a “morale 
problem.”40 
Mackworth told a slightly different version of the story. In a published report of the 
experiments, he noted two rather than three injuries: “Two of the subjects later developed a 
minor frostbite in the finger that had been exposed and both were from the small group of four 
persons who experienced the worst environment of all—the highest wind speed of 8.1 to 10.0 
mph and the very cold air temperature.”41 Under such extreme conditions, a change from normal 
sensitivity to “total anesthesia,” or the complete loss of feeling in the finger, occurred in under 
two and half minutes from the beginning of exposure. The sudden onset of numbness resulted in 
a “[p]rolonged lowering of skin temperature … especially in subject D, who later developed a 
rather more severe lesion perhaps because of the nutritional impairment [that] lasted longer 
[possibly as a result of reduced blood flow].”42 Both frostbite “subjects developed definite 
                                                 
39 LAC, RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-17-11, Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Mackworth, “Finger Numbness in Very Cold Winds,” 538. 
42 Ibid., 539. 
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surface reddening of the exposed finger” in under three minutes of return to the warm room, at 
which point “their fingers were still nearly freezing.”43 
Mackworth further described both frostbite victims with specific reference to each injury: 
“Subject C had a pale, white area about two inches long and one-quarter of an inch broad on the 
index finger on the side that had been nearest the wind source. This stretched from the proximal 
inter-phalangeal joint to the tip of the index finger where it broadened to about half-an-inch 
across.”44 The injury was severe enough to restrict movement of the measured joint by forty-five 
degrees and caused “some pain and tenderness but no detectable swelling.” Yet by comparison, 
the other frostbite victim fared worse, according to Mackworth: “Subject D was more severely 
affected and had a definitely red and swollen forefinger … [that] was markedly tender and 
painful, although it did not keep the subject awake at night.”45 Fortunately, for both men, these 
injuries, what Mackworth referred to as “accidental” and “temporary” effects of research, did not 
prevent complete recovery. In both cases, the injured soldiers returned to work after being off for 
four days.  
Although Mackworth concluded that only two out of all tested personnel succumbed to 
frostbite, another thirteen recorded single skin temperature readings lower than five degrees 
Celsius following exposure to severe cold. Of the thirteen, seven had skin temperature readings 
in the range between those recorded of “subjects C and D,” or three point four degrees Celsius 
and minus two point three degrees Celsius respectively. At such low skin temperatures the onset 
of pain felt by participants, especially those subjected to wind chill conditions, resulted in reports 
of “definite discomfort.” The provision of “test subjects” stopped immediately following the 
                                                 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 540. 
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reported injuries, but on 24 February DRNL and Mackworth submitted a further request for test 
subjects for use in “modified less-severe tests.”46 In response to the request, the army agreed to 
provide volunteers for use in manual dexterity tests where, according to military records, “no 
temporary or permanent injury [would] result.”47 Moving forward, the army agreed only to 
provide volunteers if experimental trials did not interrupt military training.  
Sun Dog One offered an opportunity to extend acclimatization research conducted at 
DRNL. While scientists limited testing to a select number of volunteers, all participating soldiers 
underwent a three-week long indoctrination course prior to the exercise at either Shilo, Manitoba 
or Petawawa, Ontario, followed by an additional two weeks of Arctic acclimatization training at 
Fort Churchill.48 Training involved manoeuvres in severe cold as well as the attempted 
development of a specific mental acuity derived specifically from the necessity to overcome the 
determinants of manual dexterity in northern military operations. To meet this goal, 
indoctrination training included lectures and exercises on snow craft, sea ice, bush living, and 
over snow vehicles.49 Soldiers learned how to erect tents, use sleeping bags, give first aid, use a 
cooker, ski and snowshoe, transport by sled and sleigh, navigate, and protect their hands in order 
to properly and effectively handle metal weapons and supplies in extreme cold.50  
The extent of northern military training highlights the perceived value the Canadian 
Services placed on environmental and scientific knowledge. As pictured in Figure A.F6 
(Appendix A), indoctrination also adopted cold-weather living and survival techniques known to 
Inuit. Soldiers learned to construct snowhouses similar to an igloo, tested clothing and dress 
                                                 
46 LAC, RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-17-11, Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research Board. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Wainwright, Alberta was also used as a location for indoctrination training but not in preparation for Sun Dog 
One—the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry were indoctrinated there in training for Sweetbriar; see George 
Bain, “Canadians Show Up Favorably,” The Globe and Mail, March 6, 1950, p. 17. 
49 “Arctic Training Cuts Casualties,” The Globe and Mail, February 21, 1948, p. 3. 
50 “Will Teach War This Winter At Four Canadian Schools,” The Globe and Mail, November 29, 1948, p. 17. 
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techniques other than army standard, and practiced Arctic navigational methods that utilized 
demarcation points in the natural environment around Fort Churchill.51 Scientists with the 
Defence Research Board observed military personnel and equipment to determine any existing 
deficiencies that modern science and engineering might overcome. Indeed, the marriage of 
traditional environmental knowledge and modern science was central to military research at 
DRNL.   
 
Cold-Weather Performance and Military Masculinity 
 
The direct effect of cold and climate on military personnel during northern training was a 
considerable issue for the Canadian military. Low temperatures were not the primary concern of 
study, however. Medical literature in the early postwar period reflected psychological anxieties 
associated with the inability to protect oneself from cold. According to psychologist and DRB 
grant recipient T.J. Boag, the fear of cold rather than the cold itself could disturb “subnormal, 
supersensitive, and ill-disciplined people.”52 Boag drew this conclusion from a series of 
interviews in which government employees with Arctic experience responded to questions about 
the problems of adjustment to living in the North. The term “temporary” applied to workers who 
travelled to northern Canada to fulfill a department requirement that all permanent employees 
spend a certain time at an isolated station. The term “permanent” described persons involved 
with the north and its inhabitants on a continuing basis, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police and federal representatives concerned with the “health and welfare of the Eskimo.” While 
                                                 
51 The term igloo derives from the Inuit word iglu (plural igluit), which can refer to a structure built of any material 
and is not restricted exclusively to snow houses. For details on “snowhouse” construction at Fort Churchill as part of 
indoctrination training, see LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One”. 
52 LAC, RG 128, vol. 236, file Psychology and Psychiatry in the North, T.J. Boag, “The White Man in the Arctic: A 
Preliminary Study of Problems of Adjustment,” December 1952. This document is a reprint, published under the 
same title, in The American Journal of Psychiatry 109, no. 6 (1952): 444-449. 
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temporary workers tended to have little or no contact with Inuit, permanent workers assumed 
“many responsibilities toward the Eskimo and derive[d] satisfaction of his needs for power and 
prestige from this paternal position.” 
Dominance over the Arctic was closely associated with postwar perceptions of gender as 
well. For military personnel, problems associated with performance in the North extended 
beyond the psychiatric or psychological to include physical indoctrination and training.  In a 
discussion of Boag’s study, Australian polar explorer Sir Hubert Wilkins, stated: “the proper 
man for service in the Arctic is the average, common-sense man with keen sensitivity and normal 
physical and mental ability … The Arctic is no place for the subnormal, a difficult place for the 
supernormal, and impossible for the supersensitive man who lacks control.”53 The DRB’s Arctic 
experiments align closely with this line of thought, as demonstrated by the types of scientific 
work financed by the extramural research program. For instance, the DRB provided financial 
support for a study on the relationship between exposure to cold and deterioration of motor 
performance.54 Scientists working as part of Sun Dog One drew similar conclusions.  
Based on the collective experience of Arctic acclimatization and indoctrination, the final 
report of Sun Dog One declared that ten weeks was the minimum period acceptable for northern 
cold-weather training up to the battalion level. A proposed schedule of training suggested three 
weeks indoctrination, two weeks trades training, three weeks cold-weather familiarisation, and 
two weeks collective training. The report further suggested that training only take place in 
conditions of climate and terrain comparable to those of the projected theatre. Otherwise, the 
                                                 
53 LAC, RG 128, vol. 236, file Psychology and Psychiatry in the North, Sir Hubert Wilkins, “Discussion of T.J. 
Boag – The White Man in the Arctic: A Preliminary Study of Problems of Adjustment,” December 1952. 
54 LAC, RG 128, vol. 236, file Psychology and Psychiatry in the North, B.M. Springbett, “Physiology 3: The Effects 
of Exposure to Cold on Motor Performance,” (Ottawa: Defence Research Board, 1951): 231-242, document labelled 
SECRET. 
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success of the military operation “would be seriously prejudiced.”55 The report concluded that 
properly trained and equipped soldiers could operate successfully and with a degree of high 
morale in climates of extreme cold for periods up to thirty days under active conditions. The 
“ordinary” soldier conducting “normal” duties was comparable in efficiency in the North to the 
solider operating in other, more temperate theatres. Yet the efficiency of the tradesman in tasks 
requiring manual dexterity was as little as 50 per cent of “normal” under severe cold weather and 
high wind conditions.  
Observers of Sun Dog One also noted that tactical mobility, both dismounted and 
mechanised, was a primary deficiency of the exercise. Three out of every five men were required 
to either haul or carry the group living equipment, which left only a maximum of 40 per cent 
human strength to transport infantry support weapons, additional ammunition, and fulfill other 
necessary operational duties. Observers considered this unacceptable and recommended in the 
exercise report that weight reductions in rations, fuel, tentage, and other operational equipment 
be implemented to produce the “lower standard of comfort” necessary to overcome the “dangers 
and hardships of the cold [that] have been brought into reasonable perspective” by Sun Dog 
One.56  
Manliness was a characteristic of the successful soldier on Sun Dog One. Although the 
conclusions of the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps conceded, “there is no requirement for special 
troops” to conduct cold-weather military operations, the experience had shown that “special 
Arctic training” was necessary to acclimatize and indoctrinate “ordinary” soldiers. The final 
report of Sun Dog One noted the necessity of indoctrination to “weed out any soldiers who are 
weak physically or who are NOT temperamentally suited to be part of a small group for a long 
                                                 
55 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One”. 
56 Ibid. 
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period.”57 Indoctrination aimed specifically to remove the “undesirables” who “only cause a 
lowering of morale and do not pull their share of the weight.” This extended to persons with 
glasses or persons who had undergone skin grafting on the face, as both might be unable to 
operate to the required level of efficiency in certain cold-weather capacities.  
In exceptional circumstances, frostbite necessitating medical attention was a matter of 
disciplinary action. Planners of Sun Dog One recommended that soldiers receive penalty for 
personal injury that resulted from negligent exposure to severe cold.58 If frostbite were to occur, 
soldiers were to assume personal responsibility for their injuries and report for subsequent 
punishment. While this might have been a test of virility, the more likely explanation points to 
the responsibility of the soldier for his personal health and safety. In other words, a soldier could 
be found guilty of carelessness or willful self-injury if he had suffered frostbite after moderate 
exposure to cold. In this scenario, the soldier violated a health and safety measure because he had 
the proper protective clothing, knew the dangers of cold exposure, and was negligent. Despite 
the recommendation, there seems to be no record of disciplinary action ever having resulted from 
a frostbite injury.  
The military ultimately concluded that “troops need not be hand-picked” for Arctic 
service, but “some weeding out during the training period must be permitted to eliminate 
temperamentally or physically unsuitable men who would otherwise become liabilities during 
operation.”59 According to DRB scientist and Arctic military exercise observer Cecil Law, well 
trained and indoctrinated soldiers “could run circles around the mobile strike force” and were 
                                                 
57 This is the exact wording and style of the text from the report; emphasis on the word “NOT” is original to the text.  
58 Disciplinary action was “taken against personnel in camp suffering from frostbite when there [was] evidence of 
negligence”; see LAC, RG 24 vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-17-11, Provision of Test Subjects for Defence Research 
Board. 
59 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One”. 
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essentially no match in the cold against untrained and unacclimatized units.60 Military and 
defence records pertaining to Sun Dog One paint a similar picture. Reports suggest that Arctic 
acclimatization and indoctrination was effective training for cold-weather military operations. 
Canadian soldiers never fought in an operation that would test their abilities in the cold, so the 
effectiveness of northern training remains questionable. What seems clear is that acclimatization 
did not instill in soldiers certain innate qualities required of northern military defence.  
 
Arctic Research Outside of Fort Churchill 
Research on scientific problems relevant to northern military operations expanded at Defence 
Research Northern Laboratory into the mid-1950s. The biological sciences featured regularly in 
laboratory work that focused on such topics as the rearing of mosquitoes, the cold tolerance of 
small mammals, and on general sanitation problems in the North. Scientists also conducted 
research on northern plants and vegetation specific to the Churchill region, but the primary area 
of research at DRNL remained the physiological response of the human body to severe cold.61 
Studies of the deterioration of human functions in cold and wind chill conditions initiated related 
work into the development of Arctic clothing and military kit. The improvement of individual 
motor functions in cold depended not only on indoctrination training but also on the development 
of ground navigation techniques and cold-weather equipment for northern operations.  
Fort Churchill was not the only Canadian location for Arctic-related research. With the 
expectation that Canada be particularly familiar with problems associated with Arctic warfare, 
the DRB decided to support the establishment of an Arctic medical research unit at the 
                                                 
60 Interview with Cecil Ernest Law [sound recordings]: CWM Oral History Project, 6 August 2008, Interview 
Control Number 31D 9 LAW, Canadian War Museum Archives. 
61 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4168, file 225-1-53-1 vol. 2, “Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence: 
Programme of Scientific Work for the Fiscal Year 1954-1955 – Prepared for the Advisory Panel of Scientific Policy 
of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research,” 11. 
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University of Manitoba to work in cooperation with its existing facilities at DRNL in Fort 
Churchill and the Defence Research Medical Laboratory in Toronto.62 The decision to invest in 
the University of Manitoba resulted in part from a series of successful physiological tests 
conducted for the DRB by Professor B.M. Springbett, who had spent over two years measuring 
the effects of exposure to cold on motor performance.63 In Toronto, scientific work at DRML 
concentrated on occupational and environmental problems of armed forces personnel. 
Researchers focused on improving methods for the preparation and packaging of standard rations 
and meats that permit prolonged storage while retaining palatability. In this regard, DRML 
maintained close liaison with the food industry.64 Scientists conducted experiments on the 
dehydration of vegetables and the storability and transfer of dairy products. 
One of the more intriguing studies produced by DRML scientists pertained to joint 
stiffness suffered because of cold exposure. A series of experiments conducted to assess the 
work decrements of carrying heavy loads over long distances and challenging terrain showed 
that joint stiffness in the cold is due to a physical alteration in the lubricating fluid of the joint.65 
In an attempt to devise a solution to the problem, researchers conducted a follow-up study on the 
effect of ascorbic acid in the human body during periods of cold stress and low calorie intake. 
Other studies conducted at DRML had close ties to the wider interest of the Defence Research 
                                                 
62 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4168, file 225-1-53-1 vol. 3, “Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence: 
Programme of Scientific Work for the Fiscal Year 1955-1956 – Prepared for the Advisory Panel of Scientific Policy 
of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research,” 14. 
63 LAC, RG 128, vol. 236, file Psychology and Psychiatry in the North, B.M. Springbett, “Physiology 3: The Effects 
of Exposure to Cold on Motor Performance,” (Ottawa: Defence Research Board, 1951): 231-242, document labelled 
SECRET. 
64 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4168, file 225-1-53-1 vol. 2, “Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence: 
Programme of Scientific Work for the Fiscal Year 1954-1955 – Prepared for the Advisory Panel of Scientific Policy 
of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research,” 11. 
65 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4168, file 225-1-53-1 vol. 2, “Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence: 
Programme of Scientific Work for the Fiscal Year 1954-1955 – Prepared for the Advisory Panel of Scientific Policy 
of the Privy Council Committee on Scientific and Industrial Research,” 12. 
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Board in human performance under cold duress. While there does not seem to be any direct link 
to the research of the Queen’s University Arctic Expedition (examined in Chapter 5), scientists at 
DRML conducted studies to assess methods for the training and selection of personnel for the 
armed services. In fact, researchers at DRML carried out an experimental scientific program on 
the psychology of individual recruits under operational situations. Designed for implementation 
in 1954-55, the “armed forces classification test” never occurred.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As a small portion of Canada’s early postwar Arctic military training, Sun Dog One does not 
represent the full extent of the scientific collaboration between the DRB and the military. Indeed, 
the Canadian military participated in no fewer than twenty-two northern exercises in the first 
decade of the Cold War.66 Scientists featured regularly as observers, referees and participants. 
Nevertheless, Sun Dog One was unique. When Omond Solandt made his address to the Empire 
Club of Toronto on 30 March 1950, he spoke briefly about Sun Dog One and of the importance 
of collaboration between Canada, the United States, and Britain in defence of the Arctic. In his 
mind, exercises Sweetbriar and Sun Dog One had demonstrated that two or more sovereign 
nations could effectively carry out joint military exercises in severe cold conditions. Solandt’s 
speech was a clear and public Cold War message that the Canadian military and defence 
establishment was fully committed to Arctic defence, and was not alone in its stand. Yet when 
discussing the importance of northern military operations to the Canadian public, Solandt and 
other military and defence representatives chose to highlight only the benefits of indoctrination 
training and joint operational execution. It seems the specifics of vitamin C research and 
                                                 
66 See the second note in this chapter. 
184 
 
 
 
acclimatization testing went unknown to the public, but evidence has survived through military 
and defence records as well as published medical reports.  
Available records indicate that, in the immediate postwar period, the Canadian Army 
sought a deeper understanding of the many characteristics of winter warfare and in its search 
embraced experimental scientific study in an attempt to deduce information unique to the 
development of cold-weather soldiery. Northern environmental conditions required special 
investigation because the Canadian Arctic and sub-Arctic climate deviated significantly from the 
conditions under which most of the army’s concepts, doctrine, and tactics were developed.67 
Operational researchers and defence scientists contributed by collecting raw data for further 
analysis through participatory study of army training exercises. Men were the chosen test 
subjects.  
In scholarship on Canadian history, terms such as acclimatization and indoctrination find 
little reference to the Canadian military. This should be of particular concern to scholars of 
Canada’s military in the Cold War, because acclimatization and indoctrination comprised the 
base upon which a unique form of military preparedness developed in the Canadian North during 
the early postwar years. Canada’s postwar military doctrine derived from societal factors and the 
nature of the Cold War, within which science, defence, and diplomacy occurred. As evidenced 
by cold-weather research and training conducted at Fort Churchill and as part of Sun Dog One, 
defence science, in addition to geopolitics, shaped Canada’s Cold War national security 
apparatus.  
Cold-weather testing on male soldiers supported and perpetuated idealized notions of 
virile soldiery. Involving researchers and scientists in important military investigations on 
                                                 
67 Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 87. 
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northern warfare developed, in theory, a model for future combat development work. From 
proper scientific analyses in “natural” climatic conditions, the Canadian military and defence 
establishment hoped to derive information to improve operational concepts, doctrine, and tactical 
principles pertinent to cold-weather warfare.68 Sufficient knowledge and adequate research 
material was deemed to have been obtained because of Sun Dog One and other comparable cold-
weather exercises. The consequences that resulted from acclimatization research appear only 
briefly in available records. Researchers pursued the potential benefits of cold-weather scientific 
discovery in spite of any moral or ethical issues that stemmed from human testing. As 
documented in the next chapter, acclimatization research on people extended beyond the use of 
military volunteers. 
 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 89. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Acclimatization Research on Inuit 
 
 
“To be an Eskimo is not necessarily to be acclimatized to cold, but it is our conclusion, for the 
reasons given, that our selected Eskimo subjects were so acclimatized.”1 
 
G. Malcolm Brown et al., 1958 
 
 
After having made five trips to the Canadian Arctic, medical scientist G. Malcolm Brown wrote 
a progress report for the Defence Research Board in December 1950 that described a series of 
environmental studies conducted on Inuit2 and white “test subjects.”3 Designed and carried out as 
a long-term study of the effect of cold on the human body, the research aimed to determine how 
much cold exposure was required to achieve acclimatization. To make this determination, Brown 
oversaw the administration of medical treatment services and biochemical work over an eight-
year period with financial support from the Department of National Health and Welfare, the 
DRB of the Department of National Defence, the National Research Council, and the Arctic 
Institute of North America.4 Four trips took researchers to Southampton Island in the north of 
Hudson Bay and a fifth to both Southampton Island and Igloolik in the northeast corner of 
present-day Nunavut. Brown and his team returned to Southampton Island on a final trip in 1954. 
While on location over the eight years, researchers took samples of blood, urine, skin, and liver 
                                                 
1 C.W. Baugh, G.S. Bird, G.M. Brown, et al., “Blood Volumes of Eskimos and White Men Before and During Acute 
Cold Stress,” The Journal of Physiology 140, no. 3 (1958): 354. 
2 The word Inuit means “people” and is plural; the word Inuk is a singular reference to one person.  For a more 
detailed explanation, see Alan Rudolph Marcus, Relocating Eden: The Image and Politics of Inuit Exile in the 
Canadian Arctic (Hanover and London:  University Press of New England, 1995), xv-xvi. See note 5 for more on 
terminology in this article. 
3 LAC, RG 128, Vol. 258, Malcolm Brown, Queen’s University Arctic Expeditions 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950:  
Progress Report, December 1950. The Defence Research Board published the report in October 1951 as Dr. G. 
Malcolm Brown, Progress Report on Clinical and Biochemical Studies of the Eskimo (Ottawa: DRB, Department of 
National Defence, 1951). 
4 For a brief description of DRB Grant No. 80, “Clinical and Biochemical Studies of the Eskimo,” see NARA, RG 
319, Box 865, DRB: Annual Report on the Progress of Defence Medical Research, Report No. D.R. 15 December 
1949. 
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from “Eskimo test subjects” and transported the “specimens” to university labs in southern 
Ontario for independent and comparative biochemical analyses with samples taken from white 
university students.5 Records indicate that Brown and his colleagues worked on no fewer than 
288 Inuit, including at least sixteen children who ranged in age between one and ten.6 Although 
the exact number remains unclear, at least sixty-seven of the 288 were men used to study 
acclimatization.7 
In the absence of a full physiological description of cold acclimatization, scientists 
conducted the research in an attempt to deduce information that might better prepare both 
government and military personnel to work and defend in the Arctic. The theory of 
acclimatization offered a potential solution to the problem of cold tolerance. Inuit represented 
acclimatized “experimental subjects” while “85 male, healthy medical students” from Queen’s 
University represented the “control group” of unacclimatized white “subjects.”8 Researchers 
subjected both groups to similar studies, but Brown and his team of scientists seem to have 
obtained organ samples from Inuit alone. Administered during medical treatment, “needle 
biopsies” resulted in samples of liver from at least ten adult Inuit “test subjects.”9 In the end, 
Brown deemed the studies inconclusive because testing failed to detect definitive evidence of the 
                                                 
5 This chapter uses the word Inuit to refer to persons indigenous to the Canadian North who were the “test subjects” 
of the discussed acclimatization research.  I use the term Inuit because the evidentiary record does not distinguish 
the “Eskimo” persons subjected to the research, other than one reference to “Iviliks.”  It is possible that the scientists 
conducted research on Indigenous persons who might not have been Inuit.  
6 While the December 1950 report detailed experiments on 282 “Eskimo test subjects,” Brown co-published a 
medical article in 1954 that detailed further experiments on an additional six adult “Eskimo” test subjects. See C.W. 
Baugh, G.S. Bird, G.M. Brown et al., “Blood Volumes of Eskimos and White Men Before and During Acute Cold 
Stress,” The Journal of Physiology 140, no. 3 (1958): 347-58.  
7 G. Malcolm Brown, G.S. Bird et al., “The Circulation in Cold Acclimatization,” Circulation: Journal of the 
American Heart Association (1954): 813-22. 
8 Ibid. Also see G. Malcolm Brown, G.S. Bird et al., “Cold Acclimatization,” Canadian Medical Association 
Journal 70, no. 3 (1954): 259. 
9 Researchers performed needle biopsies of the liver in two “subjects” in 1947, see “Northern Research Reports: 
Medicine,” Arctic 1, no. 1 (1948): 65; and three in 1948, see Malcolm Brown, “Northern Research Reports: Medical 
Investigation at Southampton Island,” Arctic 2, no. 1 (1949): 70-1. The December 1950 report (see note 3) states 
that “punch biopsies have been carried out on ten subjects ….” 
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existence of cold acclimatization. Nonetheless, the circumstances and attitudes that gave rise to 
the research point to some important considerations for understanding postwar physiological 
perceptions of Inuit as well as the impact of the Cold War sciences in Canada.  
Operating under racialized perceptions of human biology, the defence establishment 
funded medical science in an attempt to devise a method for selecting male white bodies with 
“Eskimo-like” cold-weather-fighting physiological traits. In the process, scientists supported a 
colonial agenda by imposing medical practices on Inuit communities, asserting claim over the 
Inuk body, and subjecting Inuit to physiological experimentation. This chapter argues that while 
wider government initiatives aimed at Inuit health in the period, as far as cold acclimatization 
research is concerned, assimilation was secondary to the primary goal of biological 
appropriation. In the context of the acclimatization research examined here, I define biological 
appropriation as the attempted use of Inuit biology for a non-Inuit purpose. To be clear, the 
scientific use of Inuit biology was theoretical. Researchers did not attempt to extract and then 
transmit blood or tissue from Inuit bodies, but instead used comparative sampling of Inuit and 
white “test subjects” to pursue a scientific understanding of an abstract physiological response to 
cold tolerance. Under the auspices of the Canadian government, comparative biochemical 
research intended primarily to isolate the vascular characteristics of cold acclimatization. 
Theoretically, the researchers believed, this type of information could be useful for devising a 
process for the “physiological screening of persons considered for service in the far north.”10 If 
scientists could identify the vascular characteristics of cold acclimatization, they thought it 
                                                 
10 LAC, RG 128, Vol. 258, File Miscellaneous Part 2, Recent Research on Cold Acclimatization and Other Arctic 
Medical Problems, G. Malcolm Brown, 14. 
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possible to “provide some guides as to the best method of rapidly acclimatizing a group of men, 
and of selecting those likely to adapt quickly and completely.”11   
The attempted appropriation of Inuit biology for a non-Inuit purpose suggests a new area 
of interpretation for understanding colonial views of Indigenous peoples. In contrast to wider 
perceptions of the Indigenous body, scientists involved in acclimatization research considered 
the Inuk’s ability to live and work in the cold an “enviable” physiological trait. If science could 
unlock the “Eskimo” secret to cold-weather survival, the “functional capacity of white men in 
the Arctic” might increase, thereby improving the ability of Canada’s government and military 
personnel to work and defend in the North.12 In this instance, white peoples viewed Inuit bodies 
as having superior, rather than sickly and inferior physiological traits.13 That the scientists 
conceived the research from an imagined racial dissimilarity suggests they operated under deeply 
entrenched colonialist positions. The biologized Inuk body, according to the interpretation of the 
scientists, was better suited than the white body to survival in the harsh Arctic climate of 
northern Canada. 
At the core of acclimatization research, the socio-medical perception of the Inuk body is 
important to our understanding of the impact of the Cold War in Canada. The studies conducted 
by Brown and his team did not originate from a military or strategic Cold War agenda, but 
Canada’s defence establishment assumed responsibility for the research on the advice of Arctic 
policy makers who championed the widespread applicability of the intended results. Predicated 
on the basis that the environment determines biological traits, acclimatization research in Canada 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 G. Malcolm Brown, “Cold Acclimatization in Eskimo,” Arctic 7, no. 3 and 4 (1954): 351. 
13 For a comprehensive account of southern views towards Indigenous health in the Canadian North, see Liza Piper 
and John Sandlos, “A Broken Frontier: Ecological Imperialism in the Canadian North,” Environmental History 12, 
no. 4 (October 2007): 759-95. 
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first aimed to determine physiological evidence of biological variation between Inuit and white 
bodies as part of a wider international scientific interest in defining the vascular characteristics of 
cold tolerance. Originally financed by the National Research Council, the Defence Research 
Board absorbed the acclimatization research of Malcolm Brown with the intent to apply the 
science of cold-weather physiology to service work in the North. Although the defence of 
Canada in the nuclear age did not depend on the successful appropriation of Inuit biology, 
acclimatization research found and maintained federal support as a potential means to protect the 
lives of white service personnel during an era of intensifying Arctic activity.     
The context in which the acclimatization research took place is extremely murky. At the 
time of the research, Canadian law did not require scientists to obtain written consent to conduct 
research on the Inuit and white “test subjects” studied for cold acclimatization. The Nuremberg 
Code set a base international standard for medical ethics in 1947, but Canada did not implement 
formal ethical guidelines for medical research until 1980.14 Contemporary international standards 
stated that voluntary consent was mandatory for clinical research, which meant that all persons 
subjected must agree to participate without coercion and must understand the risks involved in 
the research. Sources indicate that Brown and his colleagues used an “excellent native 
interpreter” to communicate with Inuit involved in the research, but the details of any verbal 
contract went unrecorded.15 According to the progress report referred to at the outset of this 
                                                 
14 For a brief history of the Nuremberg Code, see Paul Weindling, “The Origins of Informed Consent:  The 
International Scientific Commission on Medical War Crimes, and the Nuremburg Code,” Bulletin of the History of 
Medicine 75, no. 1 (2001): 37-71. For specific reference to the formalization of ethical guidelines for medical 
research in Canada, see Barb Cotton, Andrea Manning-Kroon, and William E. McNally, “An Overview of the Law 
Regarding Informed Consent,” The Barrister 72, no. 10 (2004). 
15 See G. Malcolm Brown, “Northern Research Reports:  Medical Investigation at Southampton Island,” Arctic 2, 
no. 1 (1949): 70. 
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article, “the only method of selection used in these surveys was to take family groups as a whole 
as they became available.”16 Brown expanded this explanation in 1954: 
[The] selection of experimental subjects from among Eskimos who continue to live in 
their traditional dwellings and who still gain their livelihood by hunting and trapping has 
… the merit that such Eskimos as these have an ability to live and work in the cold that 
permits, on the basis of performance, their acceptance as acclimatized individuals.17 
 
Brown’s explanation reflects the findings of the research, and the 1954 publication date is 
significant. When the research began in 1947, Brown and his team pursued innate biological 
factors to explain the vascular characteristics of acclimatization. By 1954, the findings of their 
research pointed instead to environment, culture, and diet as an explanation for Inuit cold 
tolerance. This shift reflects wider scientific changes towards the perceived value of northern 
Indigenous knowledge. As Stephen Bocking has argued, the development of postwar research 
laboratories meant that “scientists no longer needed to live among Indigenous people, learn their 
techniques for travel and survival, or indeed, have any contact with them” by the mid-1950s.18 
The interim years between 1947 and 1954 are thus the focus of this chapter. During this period, 
Brown and his team perceived cold acclimatization in strict biological terms and the Canadian 
defence establishment funded the research in an attempt to appropriate the superficial cold-
fighting physiological traits of Inuit in the North. 
The socio-medical perception of the Inuk body, based on biology rather than cold 
performance, came to bear on Inuit as developments in science and technology pronounced the 
geostrategic significance of the Arctic in the early postwar period. The demands of science that 
                                                 
16 LAC, RG 128, Vol. 258, Malcolm Brown, Queen’s University Arctic Expeditions 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950: 
Progress Report, December 1950. 
17 Brown, Bird et al., “Cold Acclimatization,” 259. 
18 Stephen Bocking, “Indigenous Knowledge and the History of Science, Race, and Colonial Authority in Northern 
Canada” in Rethinking the Great White North:  Race, Nature, and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in 
Canada, eds. Andrew Baldwin, Laura Cameron, and Audrey Kobayashi (Vancouver:  University of British 
Columbia Press, 2011): 39-61; quote on 46.  
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drove imperial policy during the Second World War had woven relationships that influenced 
Western science diplomacy well after the war had ended.19 Not unlike the bureaucrats and 
doctors responsible for carrying out the assimilative agenda of the Canadian welfare state in the 
postwar period, scientists engaged in acclimatization research exploited contemporary 
circumstances to achieve distinctly southern goals. As Ian Mosby explained in his important 
work on the mistreatment of malnourished Aboriginal peoples, shifting attitudes in Canada 
supported racialized medical testing and experiential human science.20 Predicated on the 
exploitation of Inuit bodies and communities, acclimatization research also occurred within the 
edifice of colonial science, but the so-called “Indian Problem” of “dependency” is noticeably 
absent in records pertaining to the work.21 Although researchers used southern understandings of 
Indigenous health and welfare to gain access to Inuit communities, cold-weather research on 
human beings derived specifically from a scientific and medical agenda that sought to describe 
superficial connections between the physical body and the natural world. The research was not 
militarily strategic in origin, but studies on acclimatization were perpetuated in response to Cold 
War anxieties and a desire to pursue science as a solution to military problems.22  
                                                 
19 Roy MacLeod, “All for Each and Each for All:  Reflections on Anglo-American and Commonwealth Scientific 
Cooperation, 1940-1945,” Albion: A Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 26, no. 1 (1994): 79-112; 
quote on 80. 
20 Ian Mosby, “Administering Colonial Science:  Nutrition Research and Human Biomedical Experimentation in 
Aboriginal Communities and Residential Schools, 1942-1952,” Histoire sociale/Social History 46, no. 91 (2013): 
145-72. 
21 Whitney Lackenbauer has challenged protagonist narrative structures that pit “Aboriginal peoples on one hand, 
and the “Euro-Canadian” (non-Aboriginal) camp on the other.” His extensive work on military-Aboriginal relations 
has shown that avoiding dichotomous language can serve well in assessing complex historical interactions. See 
Lackenbauer, “The Irony and the Tragedy of Negotiated Space:  A Case Study on Narrative Form and Aboriginal-
Government Relations during the Second World War,” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 15, no. 1 
(2004): 177-206. 
22 Acclimatization research was not unique in this regard, as evidenced by the diverse range of other federal 
scientific research initiatives that became essential to Canada’s Cold War agenda.  See, for instance, Stephen 
Bocking, “Seeking the Arctic: Science and Perceptions of Northern Canada,” The Dalhousie Review 90, no. 1 
(Spring 2010): 61-74. 
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Although cognizant of the value of oral history material, this chapter relies exclusively on 
written records to examine what insights the colonial archive holds about early postwar 
perceptions of the Inuk body in Canada.23 The findings are the result of archival investigation in 
digital and print repositories. Extensive primary research at Library and Archives Canada and the 
National Archives and Records Administration in the United States yields insight from the 
personal papers of lead scientist Malcolm Brown as well as the federal departments and 
independent agencies that jointly conceived, supported, and financed the scientific work.24  
Published materials in the fields of medicine and the Arctic also proved useful.  Collectively, 
these sources provide sufficient detail to contextualize acclimatization research within a 
framework that shows the interplay of Cold War politics, national defence, and racialized 
experimental science.25   
 
Science and the Cold War Arctic 
To defence policy makers in Ottawa, the North only figured increasingly as a prominent location 
of geostrategic importance towards the end of the Second World War. Outside the small 
                                                 
23 The experiences of Inuit who had contact with Brown and his group of medical researchers may be lost to history.  
Unfortunately, it seems those experiences went unrecorded and untold. I contacted and received no response from 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, and the Nunavut Food Security Coalition. The Government 
of Nunavut’s Department of Health sent a kind response, recommending further contacts, but had no information 
pertaining to environmental or medical research in the 1940s and 1950s. Likewise, the friendly people at the 
Unikkaarvik Visitors Centre of Nunavut Tourism graciously provided a list of contacts, but also had no information. 
The Hamlet of Coral Harbour and the Hamlet of Igloolik also politely responded to my inquiries, but equally had no 
information.  
24 The personal papers of G. Malcolm Brown are located at LAC in Ottawa, Ontario, as part of RG 128 (Medical 
Research Council/Canadian Institutes of Health Research). The papers comprise seven volumes of documentation, 
nearly the entire contents of which were released to me, following review, under the Access to Information and 
Privacy Act. Volumes and files of interest are listed extensively in the notes of this article. Other important files 
from LAC derived from RG 24 (National Defence) and RG 85 (Northern Affairs), while documents from NARA 
were taken primarily from RG 319 (Army Staff).   
25 If Inuit experiences or stories have survived, the details may further elucidate what information we do have and/or 
bring to light important insights for further consideration. Such insights may point to what Mary-Ellen Kelm refers 
to as “medical pluralism,” which recognizes the resistance of Indigenous peoples to colonial medicine. See Kelm, 
Colonizing Bodies: Aboriginal Health and Healing in British Columbia, 1900-50 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1999). Currently, it remains unclear if Inuit subjected to cold acclimatization research resisted or 
embraced medical treatment services. Available records state the “Eskimos” were “very cooperative.” 
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presence of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, federal activity had shown little concern for the 
North and the people living there.26 Officials commissioned an Eastern Arctic Patrol in 1935 to 
investigate the clinical and metabolic health of northern Indigenous populations, and the 
responsibility for Inuit health care passed to the new Department of Mines and Resources the 
year after.27 The provision of health services to Inuit changed again in 1945. Under the new 
direction of Health and Welfare, the federal government again commissioned vessels to patrol 
the eastern Arctic and provide medical and evacuation services to Inuit.28 Northern patrols 
promoted Canadian sovereignty as well, but the onset of a possible Soviet-American conflict in 
the postwar world provided new considerations for the role of the North on the federal agenda.29  
The perceived need to have a white acclimatized body for the North highlights the 
importance of white settlement and the grip of the “colonial project,” especially when we 
consider Canadian defence policy in relation to postwar problems of sovereignty and security.30 
As a well-developed body of literature has shown, Canada’s top officials saw little intrinsic value 
in funding or facilitating a widespread defence of the North in the early postwar period.31 
Nevertheless, Canadian geography dictated a response to key strategic issues. As has been 
                                                 
26 Pat Sandiford Grygier, A Long Way from Home: The Tuberculosis Epidemic among the Inuit (Montréal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997), 58. 
27 For details on the Canadian Government Eastern Arctic Patrol of 1935, see I.M. Rabinowitch, “Clinical and Other 
Observations on Canadian Eskimos in the Eastern Arctic,” The Canadian Medical Association Journal 34, no. 5 
(1936): 487-501. 
28 The Hudson’s Bay Company ship Nascopie patrolled eastern Arctic waters in 1947 but the main patrol belonged 
to the C.D. Howe, which made its maiden voyage in 1950 and sustained operation until the patrol was discontinued 
in 1969. See Grygier, A Long Was from Home, 86-103. 
29 Ken S. Coates, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, William R. Morrison, and Greg Poelzer, Arctic Front: Defending 
Canada in the Far North (Markham, ON: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008). 
30 On the “colonial project,” see Kristin Burnett, Taking Medicine: Women’s Healing Work and Colonial Contact in 
Southern Alberta, 1880-1930 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2010), 7. 
31 See, by date of publication, Lackenbauer and Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern 
Environment,” Environmental History 12, no. 4, Special Issue on Canada (2007), 920-50; Peter Kasurak, A National 
Force: The Evolution of Canadas Army, 1950-2000 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2013); and 
Andrew B. Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War Army (Vancouver:  
University of British Columbia Press, 2014). 
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discussed earlier in the dissertation, if Ottawa was not prepared to defend the northern reaches of 
the continent, Washington might take charge to ensure the protection of the United States. 
Responding to the dual concern for Soviet and American encroachment on Canadian territory, 
defence officials in Ottawa abandoned any thought of an isolationist postwar security posture.32  
Simultaneously to accepting bilateral agreements and the continental defence radar 
network, the Canadian defence establishment pursued inexpensive options to further protect and 
promote northern sovereignty and security. The concept of the Canadian Rangers developed 
consequently in 1947, according to Whitney Lackenbauer, when defence officials created “a 
military space for citizens who live in isolated coastal and northern communities and who would 
not otherwise be suitable for or interested in military service.”33 Equipped with only a “rifle and 
an armband,” the Rangers assisted the Mobile Striking Force (MSF), the airborne brigade 
discussed in Chapter 2.34 If a potential invasion required Canadian soldiers in the North, aircraft 
could theoretically fly and drop the specially trained MSF to form a northern frontline resistance 
and counter the enemy presence. The “Queen’s University Arctic Expedition” led by Malcolm 
Brown became a supplement to this plan. As a northern initiative, the scientific research program 
served a specific scientific research need beyond the area around Churchill. Brown’s 
biochemical work on cold acclimatization contributed to a large body of multi-purpose scientific 
research, designed simultaneously to support Canada’s independent and collaborative military 
needs associated with defence and sovereignty in the North.  
                                                 
32 Daniel Heidt and Lackenbauer, “Sovereignty for Hire: Civilian Airlift Contractors and the Distant Early Warning 
(DEW) Line, 1954-1961,” in Lackenbauer, De-icing Required!: The Historical Dimension of the Canadian Air 
Force’s Experience in the Arctic (Ottawa: National Defence and the Canadian Forces, 2012), 95-112. 
33 P. Whitney Lackenbauer, The Canadian Rangers: A Living History (Vancouver, University of British Columbia 
Press, 2013), 7. 
34 Ken Coates et al., Arctic Front: Defending Canada in the Far North (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008), 
65. 
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The connection between Brown’s medical acclimatization research and the military needs 
of Canada is further evident in the early postwar environmental protection programme of the 
federal government. A progress report published by the Department of National Defence in 1954 
defined the field of environmental protection as research on “the protection of the serviceman 
and his equipment against the adverse physical effects of his environment.”35 The program 
employed a diverse set of scientific disciplines across multiple government divisions, resulting in 
co-operation between the DRB, the National Research Council, the Science Service of the 
Department of Agriculture, the Ontario Research Foundation, and from direct support by 
branches of the Armed Services. While each division made both individual and collective 
research contributions, coordination of all program activities was the responsibility of the 
Environmental Protection Section of DRB headquarters. As a coordinating body of 
environmental protection research, the DRB facilitated “field testing” in the Canadian Arctic and 
liaised international information exchange between Canada, the United States, and Britain to 
improve co-operation on geographical considerations pertinent to security in northern latitudes.  
Scientific investigations on the effect of cold on human physiology and climatic 
adaptation were vital components of the environmental protection research financed by the 
federal government between 1947 and 1954. At the height of Brown’s work in 1951, scientific 
study on “physiological stress produced in men by cold” topped the list of 14 research activities 
conducted at DRNL.36 Scientists conducted blood and urine sampling on service personnel in an 
attempt to determine quantitatively the physiological and biochemical responses to cold in men, 
with the aim to “determine the degree to which adaptation to cold occurs … [and] the best 
                                                 
35 LAC RG 85 299, 1009-2[5], Annual Report on the Progress of Environmental Protection Research, December 
1953: Report No. DR 80 (Ottawa: DRB, Department of National Defence, Canada, 1954), 1. 
36 LAC RG 85 299, 1009-2[3], DRBS 3-750-43-2, DRB: Minutes of the 2/51 Meeting of the Arctic Research 
Advisory Committee, 30 April 1951, “Activities of the Defence Research Northern Laboratory”. 
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methods of bringing about adaptation.”37 Thus, the comparative sampling conducted on Inuit and 
white “test subjects” by Brown and his team did not occur in isolation. The Canadian defence 
establishment showed significant interest in acclimatization research, facilitating and funding 
multiple studies at different locations in the North during the first decade of the postwar period.  
 
Malcolm Brown and the Federal Organization of Arctic Research 
When the threat of Soviet activity captured the attention of Canada’s defence and military 
establishment, the roots of a southern Arctic romanticism came to bear on Inuit. Long-
entrenched cultural beliefs shaped the work of the acclimatization researchers. From a privileged 
position, Brown and his team exploited contemporary understandings of Indigenous health to 
gain access to Inuit communities and bodies. Their intentions of providing medical services were 
sincere. Brown and his team treated Inuit for nutritional, metabolic, and respiratory disease, but 
simultaneously the administration of medical treatment services gave researchers access to Inuit 
bodies for a purpose unrelated to Inuit health and welfare. The circumstances constructed the 
“Eskimo” as a racially pure, cold-weather adapted body. Scientifically, researchers considered 
the Inuk body as the ideal “test subject” to study the vascular characteristics of cold tolerance. A 
discourse of “assistance” gave Brown’s team initial access to Inuit communities and bodies, 
while the longevity of acclimatization research resulted from Cold War anxieties that produced a 
distinct scientific agenda.  
The first “Queen’s University Arctic Expedition” to Southampton Island took place 
during the summer of 1947. Malcolm Brown led a team of four researchers that also included 
medical professor R.G. Sinclair, biochemist L.B. Cronk, and George Clark.38 Brown graduated 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 In the December 1950 progress report, Brown listed the following personnel: R.G. Sinclair, L. Bruce Cronk, G.C. 
Clarke, J.E. Green, John Page, J.E. Gibbons, D.L. (Don) Whittier, Frederick deSinner, J.D. Hatcher, T.J. (Thomas) 
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in medicine from Queen’s in 1938 and obtained a Ph.D. from Oxford University in 1940. 
Following a three-year research term, he served with the Canadian Army Medical Corps between 
1943 and 1946. During two of those years, he was on loan to the Royal Army Medical Corps as a 
physiologist with the Malaria Research Unit. Discharged with the rank of major after having 
served in the United Kingdom, Italy, and northwest Europe, Brown held various academic and 
professional positions following the war. His appointments included an associate professorship 
with the Faculty of Medicine at Queen’s University in 1946 and a membership with the Defence 
Research Board’s Panel on Arctic Medical Research in 1947. While with the DRB, Brown 
simultaneously held a position with the Department of National Health and Welfare, and 
maintained scientific advisory roles in government to the 1970s.39  
Brown’s personal experiences at war shaped his postwar research and views towards 
acclimatization. Having witnessed unparalleled death first-hand, his physiological work on 
wartime malaria gave him cause to pursue and promote blood sciences as a means to prevent 
unnecessary death in the postwar period. Armed with the desire to prevent further loss of life, 
human survival became fundamental to Brown’s acclimatization research and, by extension, his 
work influenced perceptions of acclimatization among defence officials in charge of the 
implementation of Arctic policy. Brown’s research was particularly fundamental to the Arctic 
division of the Defence Research Board.  
Throughout the duration of Brown’s acclimatization research, the administration of the 
Northwest Territories and the Yukon fell under the jurisdiction of the federal government at the 
                                                 
Boag, L.C. Boag, Donald Delahaye, Morley G. Whillans, and Gordon Bird.  Although they did not travel to the 
North, Dorothy Knapman, Eve Minovitch, Claire McAdam, Shirley Davy, and Mary M. Sleeth assisted biochemical 
work in Kingston. See LAC, RG 128, Vol. 258, Malcolm Brown, Queen’s University Arctic Expeditions 1947, 
1948, 1949, 1950: Progress Report, December 1950. 
39 For details pertaining to the personal life and professional working career of Malcolm Brown, see LAC, RG 128, 
Vol. 259, File Dr. G. Malcolm Brown – List of Publications, Curriculum Vitae, etc. (Part 1), Curriculum Vitae – Dr. 
G. Malcolm Brown, 11 March 1978. 
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time of the research. The Northwest Territories Council held the place of provincial 
governments, while the Bureau of the Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs of the 
Department of Mines and Resources managed executive functions. It was the position of the 
Advisory Committee on Northern Development to advise Cabinet on northern matters and ensure 
consistency in policy where the interests of different government departments were concerned. 
The Arctic Research Advisory Committee, although under the auspices of the DRB, had 
representatives of various government agencies and coordinated scientific research activities in 
the North. When scientists aimed to conduct research activities in the Northwest Territories, 
work depended on licences issued by the Bureau of the Northwest Territories and Yukon Affairs.  
Brown’s research conformed to federal standards, according to the minutes of the first meeting 
of the Panel of Arctic Medical Research.40  
The basis of support for acclimatization research formed when the Arctic Research 
Advisory Committee decided to establish a section to meet the needs of Arctic medical research. 
The first meeting of the Arctic Medical Research Panel, a division of the larger advisory 
committee, took place on 16 December 1948.41 As an authoritative body, the panel brought 
attention to advances in Arctic medical research pertinent to defence and suggested areas of 
potential research interest. The terms of reference for the panel stipulated the responsibility of its 
members to review and report on the progress of Arctic medical research projects of both the 
DRB and the Services.42 The work was confidential and all members were bound to an “oath of 
secrecy … sworn before a Justice of Peace or Commissioner for Affidavits.”43  
                                                 
40 LAC, RG 24, Vol. 4129, File DRBS 4-78-53 vol. 1, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Panel of Arctic Medical 
Research, DRB, 16 December 1948. 
41 LAC, RG 24, Vol. 2529, File 801-100-M91 Vol. 1, Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Medical Research 
Advisory Committee – Appendix “C”: Arctic Medical Research Panel, 3 February 1950. 
42 LAC, RG 24, Vol. 2529, File 801-100-M91 Vol. 1, DRB: Arctic Medical Research Panel, 12 January 1949. 
43 LAC, RG 85, Vol. 299, File 1009-2[3], DRBS 3-750-43-2 DRB: Minutes of the 1/51 Meeting of the Arctic 
Research Advisory Committee, Appendix “A” Confidential, 2. 
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Malcolm Brown was one of the six original members of the Panel, and was chair between 
1952 and 1954. He reported directly to both the Defence Medical Research Advisory Committee 
and the Arctic Research Advisory Committee. Under the oath of secrecy, Brown, as an official 
member of a DRB panel, had full security clearance to discuss and write about cold 
acclimatization research.44 His authority to communicate research was autonomous, confined 
only by the limits of the Official Secrets Act, Chapter 49 of the Revised Statutes of Canada.  
Under the Act, it was “an offence to communicate to any person, except under lawful authority, 
information which might be useful to a foreign power — or to fail to take reasonable care of, or 
to endanger the safety of such information in one’s possession or control.”45 These restrictions 
did not prevent Brown from publishing extensively about cold acclimatization, which speaks to 
the popularity of the science but also to the results of the work. When the research failed to 
isolate the vascular characteristics of cold acclimatization, Brown had no secrets to protect.  
The studies administered by Brown and his colleagues were a direct, non-military 
extension of the DRB’s wider cold acclimatization programme that studied the physiological 
adaptation to cold of personnel while operating under the cold environmental conditions of the 
Canadian North.46 About 40 per cent of the total amount granted by the DRB for research in 
Arctic regions in the late 1940s went to medical projects that supported “basic studies of the 
Eskimo and experiments on nutritional problems, on physiological and other responses to cold, 
                                                 
44 For an outline of the security policy of the DRB, see LAC, RG24, Vol. 2529, File 801-100-M91 Vol. 1, DRB: 
Care and Communication of Classified Information, 10 January 1949. 
45 LAC, RG 24, Vol. 2529, File 801-100-M91 Vol. 1, DRB: Care and Communication of Classified Information, 10 
January 1949. 
46 See LAC, RG 24, Vol. 2484, File HQS-726-40-17-11, Defence Research Northern Laboratory: Acclimatization 
Research Programme 1949-50, Fort Churchill.  For further information on the DRB and northern military science, 
see Matthew S. Wiseman, “The Development of Cold War Soldiery: Acclimatisation Research and Military 
Indoctrination in the Canadian Arctic, 1947-1953,” Canadian Military History 24, no. 2 (Summer/Autumn 2015): 
127-55. 
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and on conditions resulting from exposure to cold.”47 The studies provided scientists an 
opportunity to conduct “field work” in an actual cold environmental locale and the defence 
establishment an opportunity to assess a theatre considered imperative to Canadian security in 
the early postwar years.   
 
Acclimatization Research on Inuit 
Arctic research in the early Cold War period was a highly cooperative venture. When the DRB 
began to fund northern research in 1947, the federal government had already supported Arctic 
science through the National Research Council. In addition to participating in a number of 
scientific investigations, the DRB served as a coordinating agency in making arrangements for 
the transportation of scientific personnel and the organization of Arctic research.48 At the request 
of the NRC, the DRB accepted five medical research projects in 1948.49 All five projects were 
concerned with human performance and physical response under varying conditions of stress and 
environment. Among the five projects were an investigation into cold acclimatization by Louis-
Paul Dugal and Malcolm Brown’s study entitled “Clinical and Biochemical Studies on the 
Eskimo.” Both projects were financed by a grant-in-aid from the NRC, but following 
examination “as to their suitability for support by the Defence Research Board, and with the 
permission of the applicants, the Defence Research Board assumed responsibility” for the 
                                                 
47 NARA, RG 319, Box 865, DRB: Annual Report on the Progress of Defence Medical Research, Report No. D.R. 
15, December 1949.  
48 NARA, RG 319, Box 856, “DRB Second Semi-Annual Report:  1 October 1947 – 31 March 1948,” 5 June 1948, 
84. 
49 NARA, RG 319, Box 856, “DRB Third Semi-Annual Report: 1 April – 30 September 1948,” 10 December 1948, 
153–8. The five projects included Grants No. 79 (W.H. Johnson, “Physiology of Motion Sickness”), 80 (Malcolm 
Brown, “Clinical and Biochemical Studies on the Eskimo”), 81 (Louis-Paul Dugal, “Physiological Factors involved 
in Resistance and Acclimatization to Cold Temperatures”), 82 (C.K. van Rooyen and L. McClelland, “Studies on the 
Inhibition of Virus Multiplication”), and 83 (J.W. Stevenson, “Studies of the Effects of the Toxin of Clostridium 
Botulinum type A on the Transmission of Nerve Impulses”). 
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projects.50 Upon acquisition, the DRB absorbed each project into its wider extramural research 
program. 
The first acclimatization project financed by the DRB commenced at Churchill, Manitoba 
in December 1947.51 Louis-Paul Dugal of Laval University and a team of scientists collaborated 
with R.E. Johnson of the United States War Department Medical Nutrition Laboratory to “prove 
that ascorbic acid is necessary for acclimatization to cold.”52 Dugal’s previous work indicated the 
importance of ascorbic acid in the acclimatization of animals to cold, and based on his 
experience the DRB decided to fund his Arctic research. Dugal’s project aimed to determine 
scientifically if ascorbic acid was capable of increasing the ability of the human body to 
acclimatize to cold, and the DRB determined that his research fit well with wider defence 
initiatives in the North. Under the supervision of DRB Arctic scientist Guy Marier, Dugal’s team 
at Churchill experimented on a group of thirty-six “volunteer” Service personnel from the 
Canadian Army who were engaged in winter exercise training. The troops underwent a two-day 
physical examination prior to and following the test program. Examinations included the taking 
of blood samples, urinalysis, chest x-rays, and dental inspections. Split into three groups, troops 
took Vitamin C pills daily without knowing the dosage. Troops in “Group A” unknowingly 
received placebo pills containing zero Vitamin C, while “Group B” received pills containing a 
300 mg dosage, and “Group C” a 1000 mg dosage.  In the end, the trials proved inconclusive 
because of a “shortage of accommodation and other administrative difficulties” on location 
                                                 
50 Ibid., 153. 
51 NARA, RG 319, Box 856, “DRB Second Semi-Annual Report: 1 October 1947 – 31 March 1948,” 5 June 1948, 
90. 
52 Ibid. 
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during the winter of 1947-1948.53 Nevertheless, scientists believed the research produced 
valuable information for further study.   
Aside from collaboration with the United States War Department, Malcolm Brown’s 
DRB research mirrored the trajectory of Dugal’s work. Brown’s experience with peripheral 
blood vessels and diseases made him ideally suited to research cold acclimatization for the 
Canadian defence establishment. He first flew to Southampton Island in the summer of 1947, 
along with the three other members of his team, in RCAF planes by way of Winnipeg and 
Churchill. Former wartime huts at Coral Harbour on the Island provided space for temporary 
housing as well as a medical clinic to examine Inuit and administer tests. 
Brown’s team reportedly brought 80 per cent of the Indigenous population of 
Southampton Island by boat to the clinic for medical examination and testing during the first trip 
in 1947.54 The results of the examinations suggested that respiratory tract infections and 
tuberculosis were the primary causes of illness and death among the local population.  
Researchers also observed that a third of those examined had enlarged livers: “Specimens of 
liver obtained from two subjects showed that the enlargement was due to the presence of large 
amounts of fat, and further work is being done on this problem which is of considerable 
interest.”55 In response, Brown and his team carried out further nutritional intervention 
experiments that draw obvious and grim connections to other federal studies of malnourished 
Aboriginal peoples.56   
                                                 
53 NARA, RG 319, Box 856, “DRB Third Semi-Annual Report: 1 April – 30 September 1948,” 10 December 1948, 
146. 
54 “Northern Research Reports – Medicine: Queen’s University Expedition to Southampton Island,” 65. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See Mosby, “Administering Colonial Science.” 
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Clinical research at Southampton Island extended beyond Inuit health. In a comparative 
physiological study, researchers used water immersion to analyze cold tolerance in Inuit and 
white “test subjects.” Brown and his colleagues studied Inuit “subjects” on location during June 
and July, and white “controls” during October and November in comparable outdoor 
temperatures in Kingston, Ontario. Although described as acute or short-term exposure tests, 
researchers immersed the hand and forearm of each “test subject” in water for a duration of one 
to two hours at temperatures between 5 and 45 degrees Celsius.57 Tables A.T1 and A.T2 
(Appendix B) show the results of the immersion test at 5 degrees Celsius.58  
Researchers measured rectal temperature at the conclusion of each immersion and 
compared the data with measurements taken prior to the test. Inuit tolerated the coldest water 
temperature for nearly an hour longer than the white subjects did, but the coldest conditions were 
so severe that all persons tested experienced a drop in core body temperature. A different test 
measured hand and forearm blood flow, skin, subcutaneous tissue, muscle, and rectal 
temperatures while subjects rested in a room at 20 degrees Celsius.59 Researchers determined 
skin, tissue, and rectal temperature after the subjects’ hand and forearm was clothed with cotton 
wool for 30 minutes. The results of both experiments indicated that Inuit maintained a greater 
blood flow through the extremities than the white students. Researchers attributed the difference 
to hormonal thyroid activity. They postulated that increased metabolic heat production in the 
“Eskimo” body resulted in increased thyroid secretion, which enabled the vascular system to 
                                                 
57 Brown, Bird et al., “Cold Acclimatization,” 259. 
58 Figures 1 and 2 are only two of many data charts from the experiments.  See LAC, RG128, vol. 237, file Ascorbic 
acid – the response to cold and other Dugal work. For additional data charts, see Baugh, Bird, Brown, et al., “Blood 
Volumes of Eskimos and White Men Before and During Acute Cold Stress;” G. Malcolm Brown, G.S. Bird et al., 
“The Circulation in Cold Acclimatization,” Circulation: Journal of the American Heart Association (1954): 813-22; 
and Brown, Bird et al., “Cold Acclimatization.” 
59 Brown, Bird et al., “Cold Acclimatization,” 260. 
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maintain a higher level of heat distribution to the extremities than was measured in the white 
students. 
To Brown and his group of researchers from Queen’s University, the hyperthyroidism 
seen in Inuit represented a potential physiological explanation for the existence of cold 
acclimatization. The wider medical community reacted with intrigue and caution. In reference to 
the findings, the founder of the Department of Medical Biophysics at the University of Western 
Ontario, Alan Burton, stated: “[Brown] finds that the liver in the Eskimo is markedly enlarged by 
clinical standards, and plainly palpable.  Yet liver biopsies obtained from a number of very 
cooperative natives, have shown no microscopic abnormality whatever.”60 To Burton, the 
findings were inconclusive and only a seasonal change could show the existence of 
acclimatization. For Brown and his colleagues, the research continued with the intent to 
investigate further the link between hormonal thyroid secretion, blood circulation, and cold 
tolerance in the human body.  
 
Acclimatization Research Outside of Canada 
Acclimatization science was not restricted to Canada. Strategic considerations also led the 
United States to invest in cold-weather science to support military operations in northern 
latitudes. As documented by Matthew Farish, extensive militarization during and after the 
Second World War turned the North American Arctic into a Cold War “laboratory” for scientific 
investigation.61 Researchers at the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory in Fairbanks, Alaska 
conducted an extensive program on acclimatization and cold survival that included 
                                                 
60 LAC, RG 128, vol. 237, file Acclimatization, Alan C. Burton, Abstract of Discussion on Acclimatization to Cold. 
For details on Burton, see Western University, Medical Biophysics, “A.C. Burton Day,” 
http://www.schulich.uwo.ca/biophysics/research/A.C.%20Burton%20Day/index.html, <viewed 6 May 2015>. 
61 Matthew Farish, “The Lab and the Land: Overcoming the Arctic in Cold War Alaska,” Isis 104.1 (March 2013): 
1-29. 
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experimentation on Indigenous Alaskans. Testing a hypothetical connection between 
hyperthyroidism and cold tolerance, scientists used a radioactive medical tracer to measure 
thyroid activity in 120 subjects, including “19 Caucasians, 84 Eskimos, and 17 Indians.”62 The 
administration of radioactive iodine was “one of many methods deployed to understand the 
physiology of the (singular) Eskimo as a gateway to military success in the North,” according to 
Farish.63 Ethical questions regarding the selection process of the participants and the associated 
medical risks of the research led to a public inquiry in the 1990s. After hearing testimony from 
medical scientists and persons directly involved in the study, the committee leading the inquiry 
published a report that described the details behind what it considered a gross disregard for 
human life.64   
Despite certain and obvious similarities, no direct evidence links the experiments in 
Alaska to the acclimatization research conducted in Canada. The experiments in the United 
States took place after the Canadian researchers returned from their final trip to Southampton 
Island in 1954, and Brown’s personal correspondence does not indicate that he or any member of 
his research team was involved with the Alaska scientists. Brown read extensively on the 
experimental use of radioactive iodine in thyroid treatment, however.65 In a letter dated 2 
November 1954, Brown wrote to Keith Wightman of the University of Toronto’s Banting 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 3. 
63 Ibid., 19. 
64 Committee on Evaluation of 1950s Air Force Human Health Testing in Alaska Using Radioactive Iodine 131, Polar 
Research Board Commission on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources in cooperation with Board on Health 
Promotion and Disease Prevention Institute of Medicine, Board on Radiation Effects Research Commission of Life 
Sciences, National Research Council, The Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory’s Thyroid Function Study: A Radiological 
Risk and Ethical Analysis (Washington: National Academy Press, 1996). 
65 For instance, see LAC, RG 128, vol. 238, file Thyroid Diseases, Henry M. Thomas Jr., “Effect of Thyroid 
Hormone on Circulation,” The Journal of the American Medical Association 163, no. 5 (1957): 337-41; and James 
W. Hendrick, “Diagnosis and Management of Thyroids,” The Journal of the American Medical Association 164, no. 
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Institute to inquire about the practice of administering “therapeutic doses” of radio-phosphorus.66 
In reply, Wightman confirmed that he had treated cancer patients with doses of a radioactive 
isotope of phosphorus and radioactive iodine. The correspondence seems to have ended with the 
reply and evidence does not suggest that Brown inquired with the intent to administer radio-
phosphorus in his own practice. 
Brown was also careful to keep the findings of his research separate from similar studies 
developed in the United States. When George Mann of Harvard University sought permission to 
co-publish results on acclimatization research in 1955, Brown declined: “Despite any estimates, I 
[Brown] don’t believe anyone really knows what is the average fat intake in the Eskimos and it is 
a mistake to say that the results of our carefully done but necessarily restricted dietary 
experiment provide such a figure.”67 Mann specifically wanted to co-publish the results of a 
study that examined the relationship between diet and serum lipid in a group of 161 “Eskimos” 
of various ages, but Brown declined because his results derived from separate and inclusive 
research on the biological characteristics of cold acclimatization. Nonetheless, the 
correspondence in Brown’s personal papers reflects a fascination with race and science. His team 
conducted research in relative isolation, but the acclimatization research that took place in 
Canada fits a wider narrative of Cold War militarism and experiential human science.  
                                                 
66 LAC, RG 128, vol. 259, file Dr. G. Malcolm Brown – List of Publications, Curriculum Vitae, etc. (Part 1), Letter 
from Malcolm Brown to Dr. K.J.R. Wightman, 2 November 1954. Keith John Roy “Kager” Wightman succeeded 
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259, file Dr. G. Malcolm Brown – List of Publications, Curriculum Vitae, etc. (Part 1), letter from Malcolm Brown 
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Perhaps best epitomized in suggestions for future projects submitted to the Arctic 
Medical Research Panel of the Defence Research Board, postwar military science in Canada 
embraced colonial perceptions of the Inuk body. Light reflection from snow made military 
operations difficult on Arctic terrain, and some defence officials thought science might provide a 
useful solution to the problem of “snow blindness.” One concept suggested “a study on the 
special senses of the Eskimo, especially eye function. As the Eskimo is ‘racially pure’ and has 
had high ultra-violet exposure for generations …. ”68 This hypothesis proposed research into the 
biological functions of the Inuk eye, which, based on rudimentary scientific observation, seemed 
effectively capable of resisting “snow blindness.” In other words, researchers thought that 
studying the eye function of Inuit could prove beneficial to developing protective materials to 
assist the vision of white troops in the North. Another idea submitted for further consideration 
was “a study of the adaptability of the Eskimo to unfamiliar tasks.” Although both suggestions 
seem to have gone unexplored scientifically, Arctic policy makers pondered and discussed a 
range of possibilities for the “Eskimo test subject.” Brown made a final request for grant monies 
from the DRB on 15 January 1954 at the tenth meeting of the Panel: “Considerable discussions 
arose regarding acclimatization [and] Brown indicated his reasons for believing that his work did 
constitute a study of acclimatization itself and not racial differences, etc.”69 The specifics of 
Brown’s reasoning went unrecorded, but the Panel did move to approve his funding request. He 
used the funds to make another trip north, which proved to be the last. Brown’s research ended in 
1955 without clinical evidence showing the existence of cold acclimatization. 
                                                 
68 LAC, RG 24, Vol. 4129, File DRBS 4-78-53 vol. 1, Minutes of the First Meeting of the Panel of Arctic Medical 
Research, DRB, 16 December 1948. 
69 LAC, RG 24, Vol. 4129, File DRBS 4-78-53 vol. 2, DRB Panel on Arctic Medical Research: Minutes of the 
Tenth Meeting, 15 January 1954. 
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Federal funding for cold-weather research remained at the conclusion of Brown’s work, 
although DRB grant monies went increasingly to non-human cold studies such as weather and 
terrain. Science continued to support the defence establishment through collaborative projects in 
the North, and the military continued to indoctrinate and adapt its personnel to the potential 
Arctic battlefield. In the process, white service members turned to cultural appropriation of Inuit.  
Military records refer to the value of “Eskimo” shelter and living techniques, and the DRB 
provided funding for scientists to study and make military kit based on Inuit clothing.70 Science 
had failed to appropriate the perceived cold-fighting biological traits of the Inuk body, but 
peoples indigenous to the Canadian North remained valuable to both the military and national 
defence. 
 
Conclusion 
When read more than fifty years following its conclusion, the acclimatization research on Inuit 
and white “test subjects” represents a disturbing and complex symbol of Canadian science in the 
Cold War. The research assumed that human testing might produce civilian as well as military 
applications, and ethical issues concerning the use of human subjects did not deeply penetrate the 
scientific or medical discourse. The studies contributed to a popular and growing area of 
environmental scientific inquiry and unlike the chemical and biological weapons testing that 
occurred in Canada during the same period, acclimatization research was not highly restricted or 
classified. Acclaimed scientists and doctors received support from state and academic institutions 
to conduct the research and publish the findings in reputable scholarly journals, illustrating the 
militarization of science in Canada and an increased integration between the defence 
                                                 
70 For instance, see LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One,” June 1951. Also see, 
for the civilian application of DRB clothing science, CBC News Roundup, “Nylon fur coats introduced,” 3 June 
1949, accessed 21 June 2015, http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/nylon-fur-coats-introduced. 
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establishment and civilian scientists in the early postwar period.71 When the studies failed to 
yield practical results, Canadian science moved on and the experimental work gradually faded 
from relevance. Yet the survival of medical papers, unpublished reports, and defence records 
makes it possible to investigate the purpose of the research and contextualize the studies in the 
perceived scientific intent.   
Records indicate that Brown and his team did not operate with the primary aim of 
“assisting” Inuit to “reduce” any perceived strain on the Canadian state. Although 
acclimatization scientists helped introduce the welfare state to the North by providing medical 
treatment services to Inuit, they did so while pursuing an unrelated goal. Unlike the persons 
responsible for carrying out the government’s extensive Inuit relocation program during the same 
period, intrigue in the Inuk body rather than a desire to reform Inuit health care was the primary 
influence for the scientists engaged in acclimatization research.72 The superficial problem of 
Inuit “dependency” merely opened the door to a different form of colonialism, where the 
biologized Inuk body could serve scientific and Cold War agendas.    
The cold-acclimatized scientific perception of the Inuk body was a constructed idea. The 
scientists engaged in the research pursued an unattainable goal, conceived and perpetuated by 
racialized conceptions of peoples indigenous to the Canadian Arctic. Sources refer to the 
“dependency” of the “Eskimo,” but the majority of those references are outside records 
pertaining to cold acclimatization. Where cold-weather research is concerned, defence reports 
and medical publications largely avoid discussion of the “Eskimo problem.” Those engaged in 
                                                 
71 In the many published reports of the acclimatization research documented extensively in this article, the Canadian 
government goes unmentioned, save for the odd footnote that credits financial support from Grant DRB No. 80 and 
the Department of National Health and Welfare. 
72 For an extensive and well-crafted study of postwar Inuit relocation, see Alan Rudolph Marcus, Relocating Eden: 
The Image and Politics of Inuit Exile in the Canadian Arctic (Hanover and London: University Press of New 
England, 1995).  
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acclimatization research biologized Inuit in a process that advanced southern interests first and 
the colonized second, but the southern interests pursued a dual-purpose agenda distinct from 
cultural assimilation.   
Unfortunately, available sources speak little of the personal convictions of each scientist 
engaged in the cold acclimatization research. Published medical papers describe Inuit and white 
human “test subjects” as material objects. Brown’s personal papers are much the same.  
Correspondence remains between Brown and his colleagues, but written records make seemingly 
no reference to interactions between researcher and subject. Brown was heavily invested in 
Arctic research and medical activities. He enjoyed his work and valued contributing to the 
Canadian medical profession through government initiatives. Brown died in 1977 and entered 
the Canadian Medical Hall of Fame in 2000. Remembered as a pioneer of medicine, his 
participation in acclimatization research should be considered as part of a wider intersection of 
complex circumstances and events. Brown’s personal records provide a window of clarity 
without match, but he was amongst others engaged in the medical treatment services and 
acclimatization research activities described herein. Although they are beyond the focus of this 
chapter, the many persons who jointly conceived, supported, and contributed to the work also 
deserve attention.73   
Imbued with visions of dominance and superiority, cold acclimatization research in 
Canada ultimately provided an opportunity for science to serve multiple agendas. The research 
intrinsically posited the possibility of biological appropriation, contributing another disturbing 
layer to the colonial treatment of Indigenous peoples in Canada. The nordicity of the “Eskimo” 
was absolute in the eyes of the Arctic scientists, and the Inuk body became eminently well suited 
                                                 
73 These persons include, but are not limited to, Omond Solandt, L.P. Dugal, and Hugh Keenleyside.  
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to meet the needs of the Canadian defence establishment when reduced strictly to a biological 
function. As Brown wrote in 1954, “[because] of their performance in the cold it seemed safe to 
assume that [Eskimos] were acclimatized, though in the beginning uncertainty had to be 
admitted.” 74 The defence establishment endeavoured to exploit Brown’s assumption, but cold 
acclimatization extended beyond the control of the state. Adaptation to the cold Canadian Arctic 
remained elusive and, by the end of the research, a dejected Brown could only conclude, “the 
degree of acclimatization seen in the Eskimo is not really important for any purposes but 
theirs.”75   
While available records describe a complex set of circumstances, the perceived 
acclimatization of Inuit served a specific scientific pursuit. Originally conceived from a medical 
effort to define the biological functions of cold tolerance, acclimatization research offered the 
potential to serve yet unrealized military problems. The inability of the scientists to define the 
vascular characteristics of cold acclimatization is thus irrelevant when assessing the impact of 
their research. The intended pursuit of an abstract biological variation between the Inuk and 
white body is the imperative point. An idea conceived by medical science took on an agenda 
distinct and unrelated to its original purpose. Perpetuated by a calculated response to postwar 
anxieties, acclimatization research represents a brief but important intersection between the 
colonial state and defence establishment in Cold War Canada. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 G. Malcolm Brown, “Cold Acclimatization in Eskimo,” Arctic 7, nos. 3 and 4 (1954): 344. 
75 Ibid., 351. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Changing Priorities and the Closure of Defence Research Northern Laboratory 
 
 
During the 1950s, Arctic defence research in Canada changed as the government responded to 
the intensifying circumstances of the Cold War. With tensions running high in Europe, East-
West relations had worsened in 1949 when the Soviet Union successfully detonated an atomic 
bomb. The outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 further exacerbated Western concerns 
over the aspirations of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.1 When the North Korean People’s Army, with 
support from both the Soviet Union and China, invaded the Republic of Korea, the West came to 
the assistance of the South Korean army. Fighting alongside the South Koreans, a multinational 
force led by the United States resisted the invasion from the north. As a signatory to both the 
United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, Canada had committed to support 
multinational efforts to maintain both international and Western security.2 In response to the 
outbreak of war in Korea, the Canadian military underwent a large-scale rearmament that had 
immediate and lasting consequences for the Defence Research Board.  
When the Canadian military rearmed for Korea, the Department of National Defence 
received an influx of funds and a new agenda. DND immediately focused its resources to 
increase its support for Western security in Korea, Europe and North America. For the DRB, 
whose primary mandate was to provide scientific and technical assistance to the armed forces, 
this meant a heightened focus on applied research projects that could produce quick results. The 
                                                 
1 Robert Barnes, The US, the UN, and the Korean War: Communism in the Far East and the American Struggle for 
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DRB sent operational research analysts to Korea to examine the fighting tactics and weapons 
effectiveness of the coalition forces. An international scientific presence strengthened Canada’s 
stature amongst allies and showed DND exactly where the DRB could continue to make an 
important contribution to the Western cause. As the Defence Research Board increased its focus 
on operational research, fundamental laboratory research declined. In the process, the DRB 
began to phase out Arctic research at Defence Research Northern Laboratory, and the 
establishment eventually closed its doors in the mid-1960s. This chapter explores these 
circumstances to explain the origins of the decline of Arctic defence research in Canada.  
 
Canada’s Response to the Korean War 
In January 1950, NATO formulated a plan that required each member of the alliance to make a 
specialized military contribution to an integrated defence structure.3 The plan initially called for 
the United States to provide strategic air power and naval forces, while the European member 
states would concentrate on ground forces. This plan was quickly revised with the outbreak of 
the war in Korea. When South Korean army ground forces proved unable to defend against 
invasion from the north, the United States military diverted three army divisions from Japan to 
support South Korea.4 Although surprised that the United States chose to intervene in Korea, the 
Canadian government was reassured by President Harry Truman’s decision to turn to the United 
                                                 
3 Andrew B. Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War Army (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2014), 75. 
4 The initial aim of the American-led UN forces was to demonstrate to the communist forces that superiority in 
numbers could not overcome determined troops with first-class equipment and fighting tactics. The United States 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had hoped that a successful show of coalition force strength in Korea might deter communist 
operations in other parts of Asia. See Extract from Minutes of Meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee, “VII. 
Contributions to the United Nations Forces in Korea and the Integrated Force in Europe,” 20 February 1951, in 
Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 17, Greg Donaghy, ed., (Ottawa: Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, 1996), 174-177. 
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Nations as a means to resist communist aggression.5 Shortly after the United States diverted 
forces to South Korea, Canada entered into the conflict by sending naval and ground forces to 
bolster the multinational front.6  
The outbreak of the Korean War provoked a philosophical change toward domestic and 
international security policy among senior defence officials in the West. China and the Soviet 
Union concluded the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on 4 February 1950, 
which concerned American officials who worried about Stalin’s intentions in Asia and Europe.7 
At the time, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a diplomatic standoff amid 
military buildup in Europe. The outbreak of war in June, and Stalin’s decision to support the 
North Korean People’s Army, raised concerns in the West about the possibility of a general war 
in Europe. For the first time, the United Nations had to deal with a major military conflict 
involving the superpowers, and had to organize collective military aggression against the 
aggressors.8 In line with their Western partners, Canadian officials believed that Stalin had 
orchestrated events in Korea as a distraction to expose Europe to Soviet aggression. Throughout 
the war, the West feared possible Soviet moves in Europe. In response to the Soviet threat, 
NATO established large standing forces in Europe. Canada played its part by contributing forces 
                                                 
5 Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States Stairs (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1974), 8; Bothwell, The Big Chill, 36. 
6 For details on the Canadian military experience in the Korean War, see William Johnston, A War of Patrols: 
Canadian Army Operations in Korea (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003); David J. Bercuson, 
Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002). 
7 According to Shen Zhihua, the Americans misinterpreted Stalin’s intensions in Asia. Zhihua contends Stalin did 
not want to gain control over the Korean peninsula as he had done with Poland in Europe. In Asia, the Soviets did 
not see themselves as a match for the United States, so Stalin was cautious not to provoke the Americans in the Far 
East. As to why Stalin made the decision to support the North Korean People’s Army only four months later, Zhihua 
suggests Stalin calculated that the People’s Republic of China could pin down American power in Asia and reduce 
its pressure in Europe and the Middle East. See Shen Zhihua, Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral 
Communist Relations in the 1950s (New York: Routledge, 2012), 7-9; 34. 
8 On the United Nations and Korea, see D.J. Goodspeed, The Armed Forces of Canada, 1867-1967 (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1967), 243-244. 
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in Korea and Europe, and also undertook a buildup of forces to defend North America against a 
potential bomber attack.  
The Canadian government announced its commitment to provide military assistance to 
the United Nations forces in Korea at the end of June 1950. Canada’s military contribution 
initially included three RCN destroyers and RCAF No. 426 Transport Squadron.9 Shortly after, 
early in August, Canada agreed to dispatch ground forces, in what would become the 25th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade. The Army contribution represented the most substantial effort.10 A 
total of 26,791 Canadian military personnel served in Korea, during the combat phase of the war 
and in a peacekeeping role afterward.11 In Europe, during the fall of 1950 and the winter of 1951, 
Canada’s contributions to the buildup of NATO integrated forces included a RCAF air division 
of twelve fighter squadrons and a Canadian Infantry Brigade totalling over 12,000 military 
personnel.12 
Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton announced a three-year $5 billion 
rearmament plan in February 1951 that outlined a robust buildup of the RCAF. The plan devoted 
funding and resources for forty regular and reserve squadrons with 3,000 aircraft, an air division 
in Europe, and a radar system with fighters for the continental air defence of North America.13 
According to historian Bertram Frandsen, Korea was the catalyst for this massive expansion of 
                                                 
9 For the details listed here, see Bertram C. Frandsen, “The Rise and Fall of Canada’s Cold War Air Force, 1948-
1968” (Waterloo: ON: Wilfrid Laurier University, PhD dissertation, 2015), 120-121. On the RCN and Korea, see 
Thor Thorgrimsson and E.C. Russell, Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1955 (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 1965); and Richard H. Gimblett, The Naval Service of Canada, 1910-2010: The Centennial Story (Toronto: 
Dundurn Press in co-operation with the Department of National Defence, 2009). 
10 On the Canadian Army in Korea, see Herbert Fairlie Wood, Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and 
their Effects on the Defence Policy of Canada (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1966); Johnston, A War of Patrols. 
11 The last of the Canadian soldiers left Korea in 1957. During the war, 516 Canadians were killed and another 1,200 
were wounded. See Alex Herd, “Korean War,” The Canadian Encyclopedia, accessed 26 April 2017, 
http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/korean-war/; Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, 95. 
12 Frandsen, “The Rise and Fall of Canada’s Cold War Air Force, 1948-1968,” 121. 
13 The rearmament plan also included the establishment of extensive training organization and a strong aircraft 
industry to manufacture aircraft for both the RCAF and other nations; see Bothwell, The Big Chill, 40; Frandsen, 
“The Rise and Fall of Canada’s Cold War Air Force, 1948-1968,” 121. 
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the RCAF.14 Rearmament was an essential measure to address the escalating Cold War threat. 
Where once there was concern mostly for communist subversive tactics, Soviet actions in Korea 
now forced Western officials to consider the possibility of imminent armed aggression.15  
As the reality of the Soviet threat became clear and the possibility of general war 
increased, Louis St. Laurent’s Liberal government had acted to meet the demands of the 
challenge and the Canadian armed forces had substantively rearmed. The changes made to 
Canada’s defence policy and spending for the armed forces had immediate implications, 
regardless of whether those changes occurred in response to the increasingly tenuous 
international circumstances or pressure from within the NATO alliance. No matter the exact 
impetus, the Liberal commitment to domestic and international security came in the form of 
increased spending on defence.  
The Korean War thus marked a turning point for defence spending in Canada. To be 
precise, the budget for defence increased from approximately 1.4 per cent of Canada’s gross 
national product in 1947 to almost 8.8 percent of GNP by the final year of the Korean War in 
1952-53.16 In monetary terms, defence spending increased from a low of $196 million in 1947 to 
$787 million during the first year of the war, and reached $1.95 billion in 1952.17 The influx of 
funds not only doubled the standing forces but also made defence a centrepiece of budgetary 
considerations for the next decade. Defence became the single largest item on Canada’s federal 
budget, and remained so until priorities changed in 1964. Behind only the United States, Britain, 
                                                 
14 Frandsen’s work makes clear that Korea triggered the large expansion of the RCAF, which included the Air 
Division for Europe and the increased capability for the continental air defence of the North American homeland; 
see Frandsen, “The Rise and Fall of Canada’s Cold War Air Force, 1948-1968”. 
15 Daniel J. Kevles, “K1S2: Korea, Science, and the State,” in Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research, 
Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly eds., (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 320. 
16 Godefroy, In Peace Prepared, 76. 
17 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 2007), 94. 
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and France, this financial commitment to defence made Canada the fourth largest contributor to 
NATO.  
The Defence Research Board was an immediate beneficiary of the federal investment in 
defence that resulted from the Korean War. The DRB’s operating budget had increased from an 
initial $2.4 million in 1946-47 to approximately $6.5 million for the fiscal year 1948-49, which 
included $1.5 million dedicated for capital expenditures such as building and equipment.18 In the 
year prior to the war, the DRB’s budget amounted to 2.1 per cent of the overall budget for the 
Department of National Defence. The year 1950-51, however, saw a drastic increase in both the 
operating budget and staff of the Defence Research Board. According to the annual reports of the 
chairman, the total number of employees grew from 1627 to 2137.19 Scientists comprised the 
single largest increase employed by the DRB that year, with the number of qualified personnel 
growing from 242 to 352. Overall growth of the DRB levelled off in 1952, and further increased 
only marginally by the end of the war in 1953. Nevertheless, the response of the St. Laurent 
government to the events in Korea confirmed Canada’s willingness to participate alongside the 
United States and the United Kingdom in any future conflict. While the Defence Research Board 
remained important to the structure and operation of National Defence throughout much of the 
Cold War period, the growth in defence science experienced in Canada between 1948 and 1951 
represents the height of the DRB. As Jonathan Turner suggests, the remaining years of the 
Defence Research Board amounted to a “fight of retention against attrition.”20  
                                                 
18 Jonathan Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” (Toronto: Institute for the History and 
Philosophy of Science and Technology, PhD Dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012), 135. 
19 LAC, RG 24 S F1, vol. 11995, file DRBS 1-0-43-1 Volume 3, “Agenda No 3.4 for the Twelfth Meeting, Annual 
Report of the Chairman, September 1949,” 2; Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 136. 
20 Turner, “The Defence Research Board of Canada, 1947 to 1977,” 138. 
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When the Korean War began in 1950, the DRB allocated approximately $25 million for 
defence research and science in support of the armed forces. By the final year of the war in 1952-
53, the DRB’s estimated expenditure for defence projects increased to $42 million.21 This 
increase allowed for internal growth of the DRB’s research program and facilities as well as 
support to defence projects undertaken by other federal agencies such as the National Research 
Council, the Bureau of Mines, and the Department of Agriculture, and to university and industry 
partners. The DRB also continued its policy of directing defence resources into fields for which 
Canada had special facilities, capabilities, or requirements. This enabled the DRB to produce 
valuable results for the Canadian armed forces whilst maintaining active liaison with the United 
Kingdom and the United States in support of the Western security alliance.22 The result was a 
growing commitment to defence and security in the North. Ultimately, however, technological 
changes introduced in the 1950s affected the role and structure of research laboratories, which 
led to the eventual demise of the Defence Research Northern Laboratory at Fort Churchill.  
 
Defence and Canada-UK Relations 
 
While for Canada the early postwar years marked a period of clear autonomy in foreign policy 
from the United Kingdom and growing interdependence with the United States, imperial ties to 
the British Commonwealth remained important. As Robert Teigrob argues in a comparative 
study of Canada and the United States, “the idea that postwar Canada sloughed off its imperial 
bonds overlooks important evidence to the contrary.”23 With the Ogdensburg Agreement of 
                                                 
21 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2425, file Speeches - Reporting etc 1947 - March 1953 Volume 1, Edmond Cloutier, Canada’s 
Defence Programme 1951-52 (Ottawa: Printer to the King’s most Excellent Majesty Controller of Stationery, 1951), 
28. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Robert Teigrob, Living with War: Twentieth-Century Conflict in Canadian and American History and Memory 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 127. 
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1940, which established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence for the bilateral defence of North 
America, and the Hyde Park Declaration of 1941, Canada and the United States had strengthened 
their economic, political, and military ties. By the end of the war, the United States had replaced 
the United Kingdom as Canada’s leading partner in foreign investment and trade. In 1949, ties 
between Canada and the United States grew even stronger when Canada played a role in the 
founding of NATO. Yet ties to the United Kingdom remained important within government and 
among the public. Indeed, Teigrob contends, English Canadian support for the Korean War 
derived from the recognition that the United States had set aside its anti-imperial stance and 
joined the United Kingdom in its civilizing mission.24  
The perception of American acquiescence to the British worldview eased concerns 
amongst Canadians who were not prepared to support a general war under the United States. At 
the same time, important elements in Canada’s foreign policy developed independently of both 
the United States and the United Kingdom. Although the armed forces emerged from the Korean 
War strong and supported by a healthy defence budget, the federal government showed little 
desire to focus foreign policy initiatives strictly on military affairs. The need to maintain a 
middle power position in the Western security alliance was significant for Canadian officials 
who looked with some alarm at the increasing militarization of American foreign policy. In the 
United States, the national security acts of the late 1940s had established a new Department of 
Defense and institutionalized the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a body that had come into existence to 
coordinate the armed services and provide consolidated advice to the government during the 
Second World War. Those laws codified the American national security state, wherein, 
according to presidential historian Matthew Moten, “the answer to every diplomatic question 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 127-128. 
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came to have a significant if not dominant military component.”25 For Canada, the appetite for 
military affairs never ran as deep. As John Holmes has observed, a pax Americana was not what 
Canadian officials had in mind at the end of the Second World War.26 They nonetheless 
recognized the dangers of international communism to world order and decided to act in support 
of the Western cause. All the while, according to Holmes, Canadian officials did not blindly 
follow the United States; rather, they operated under a clear and astute understanding of 
Canada’s national interests.  
Even before the war in Korea escalated, Canadian officials made concerted efforts to 
shape elements of their foreign policy distinct from that of the United States and to create a role 
for Canada as an international mediator, what had come to be a key element in the concept of 
“middle power.” Although the Canadian government was in general agreement with the 
American policy to contain communism, officials in Ottawa had quite different views on aspects 
of its execution.27 The deliberations of senior officials over the nature and scale of Canadian 
                                                 
25 Matthew Moten, Presidents and Their Generals: An American History of Command in War (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014), 273. 
26 John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace Volume 2: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1982), 10. 
27 Historians continue to debate the nature of the Canadian-American relationship during the Korean War. In 1974, 
Denis Stairs argued that Canadian forces fought in Korea, under the auspices of the UN, to support collective 
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participation in the Korean War suggest that Ottawa developed reservations about the scope and 
direction of the American anti-communist containment strategy.28 Any reservations were 
certainly not new, however. Consider what Brooke Claxton wrote in his 1947 statement on 
Canadian defence policy: “The similar arrangements envisioned between Canada and the United 
States in no way interfere with or replace our Commonwealth connections in matters of defence 
training and organization.”29 The imperatives of Canadian geography certainly necessitated 
strong bilateral ties with the United States, but Claxton considered cooperation with the United 
Kingdom equally important. 
As minister of national defence, Claxton worked hard to position the Defence Research 
Board as an integral component of national defence plans and policymaking. His experiences 
during the Second World War had made him particularly aware of the need to integrate the work 
of military personnel with civil servants and scientists, which was one of the reasons behind his 
decision to establish the National Defence College in 1951.30 The events of the Korean War only 
strengthened Claxton’s resolve for a strong and integrated program of national R&D. In an 
address at the opening of the Defence Research Chemical Laboratory of the DRB at Shirley Bay, 
Ontario on 16 October 1953, the defence minister said:  
It is safe to say that never before in history have research and development assumed such 
preponderant importance. It is not too much to say that the forces of freedom did not go 
                                                 
has shown that senior Canadian officials used the United Nations as a forum to negotiate with Indian officials in an 
attempt “to tone down American policies that it thought could further enflame hostilities and damage the status of 
the West in South Asia”; see Ryan M. Touhey, Conflicting Visions: Canada and India in the Cold War World, 
1946-76 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2015), 60. 
28 J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or for Worse: Canada and the United States  
to the 1990s (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1991), 179-184; Robert Bothwell, Canada and the United States: The 
Politics of Partnership (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 46-52; Teigrob, Warming up to the Cold War, 
168-172. 
29 Honourable Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, “Canada’s Defence: Information on Canada’s 
Defence Achievements and Organization – Part III: Co-operation with Other Nations,” in Canada’s National 
Defence: Volume 1, Defence Policy, Douglas L. Bland, ed. (Montréal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1997), 54.  
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down to defeat in the Second World War owing to the marriage of British science and 
cold courage in the development of radar and superior aircraft.31 
 
Many of the research initiatives undertaken by the DRB after the Korean War reflect Claxton’s 
admiration for British science. Even in the North, which experienced an intense militarization to 
support the continental air defence efforts of Canada and the United States, scientific 
collaboration between researchers from the United Kingdom and the DRB remained strong. 
During and after the war in Korea, British and Canadian scientists continued to utilize northern 
Canada as a “natural laboratory” to conduct research related to the diverse military needs of the 
Western alliance.  
 
The DRB’s Response to Korea 
 
As the Cold War turned hot with the Korean conflict, the mandate for the Defence Research 
Board changed abruptly from support for fundamental to applied research. While basic research 
at universities remained important, the DRB turned its attention to operations research and other 
war-related studies that could pay immediate dividends for the armed forces. The directive from 
National Defence was clear: the Cold War had arrived and the DRB was responsible for active 
support. This meant a direct engagement in scientific and technical fields considered important to 
Canadian defence and security, both at home and abroad. 
One of the first initiatives of the DRB was the placement of scientists in the field. Having 
representatives on the ground, even in small numbers, showed the DRB’s direct investment in 
Korea and enabled the organization to determine areas of research that would support the 
immediate operational needs of the armed forces. In collaboration with the Canadian Army, the 
                                                 
31 LAC, RG 24, vol. 10339, file DRB 1953, “Remarks of Honourable Brooke Claxton, Minister of National 
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16 October 1953.  
224 
 
 
 
Defence Research Board initially sent one scientist to Korea to conduct operations research and 
collect information on the opinions of American Army officers. W.L. “Bill” Archer spent seven 
months in the Japan-Korea theatre. He spent his first five months engaged in a study of close air 
support, examining attack bombers of the United States Fifth Air Force when called by ground 
forces to strike targets within a mile or two of the front lines. He spent his final two months on 
assignment working with the 25th Canadian Brigade on ordnance problems. On his return to 
Canada, Archer produced a report—complete with photographs of his experience—on seemingly 
all aspects of multinational combat capability, from ground and air fighting tactics to the 
effectiveness of flame warfare, napalm, and heavy artillery.32  
Although primarily focused on operations research with the United States Army, 
Archer’s impact extended beyond the direct and immediate interests of the Defence Research 
Board. A.R. Menzies, Head of the Canadian Liaison Mission in Japan, spoke highly of Archer in 
his correspondence with External Affairs: 
I do believe that a useful purpose in international scientific relations has been served by 
sending a man of Dr. Archer’s quiet competence to a theatre such as this, to register the 
Canadian interest in and willingness to contribute to scientific military research 
programmes of the type in which he has been engaged.33 
 
Reflecting on the co-operation between Canadian and British operational research groups in 
Korea, Archer suggested in a report to N.W. Morton, the Director of the DRB’s Operational 
Research Group, that “a tripartite operational research effort, in a theatre of operation, is well 
                                                 
32 The original report was larger than thirty-nine pages, but Appendices “B” and “C” remain classified; see LAC, 
RG 24, vol. 4206, file DBRS 270-180-105-1 Vol. 1, W.L. Archer, “Canadian Army Operational Research 
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33 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file DBRS 270-180-105-1 Vol. 1, A.R. Menzies, Head of Canadian Liaison Mission in 
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Menzies, “Canadian Brigade for Korea – Command and Support Problems,” Letter No. 239, 10 March 1951, in 
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worthwhile and that every opportunity for participation should be taken.”34 In Archer’s opinion, 
the benefits of OR extended beyond Korea. “In this way,” he continued, “mutual aid in the 
development of operational research techniques can be achieved through the accumulation of 
common field experience.”  
Archer’s report was not the only positive correspondence received by Morton. In June 
1951, Ellis A. Johnson, the Director of the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins 
University, praised Archer in a letter to Morton.35 A founding member of the Operations 
Research Society of America, Johnson played a leading role in bringing operations research to 
the United States military.36 In his letter to Morton, Johnson spoke of Archer’s “extreme 
willingness” and efficient work ethic in making a material contribution to the tactical air studies 
of the US Air Force. He wrote the letter intent on strengthening the working relationship between 
his organization and the Operational Research Group of the DRB.  
Following Archer’s successful field experience, the Defence Research Board committed 
another OR scientist to Korea. Attached to an infantry brigade of United Nations forces, George 
D. Kaye spent one year on assignment beginning in July 1951.37 While important from the 
perspective of international cooperation, Kaye’s departure from the Canadian Army Operational 
Research Establishment at the Royal Military College in Kingston created a void in Canada’s OR 
structure. In a letter written prior to Kaye’s departure, the vice chairman of the DRB, Emlyn 
                                                 
34 LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file DBRS 270-180-105-1 Vol. 1, W.L. Archer, Defence Research Scientist, “Report on 
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36 For a brief biography of Johnson, see “Ellis A. Johnson: September 2, 1906 – December 16, 1973,” accessed 25 
November 2016, https://www.informs.org/About-INFORMS/History-and-Traditions/Biographical-Profiles/Johnson-
Ellis-A; also see Thornton Page, George S. Pettee, and William A. Wallace, “Ellis A. Johnson, 1906-1973,” 
Operations Research 22, no. 6 (1974): 1141-1155. 
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Davies, told the chief superintendent of the Suffield Experimental Station (SES) that Archer’s 
excellent performance in Korea had created too many “good problems” for the existing 
operational research capacity of the Defence Research Board.38 Suffield’s superintendent E.A. 
“Ted” Perren hoped that Archer might visit and brief the SES staff on his experiences in Japan 
and Korea, but Davies rejected Perren’s request. Evidently, with Kaye’s pending departure to 
Korea, the DRB lacked personnel qualified in operational research. Davies decided to retain 
Archer in Kingston, citing the need to train younger people for future replacements abroad. The 
subtle undertone of the letter indicates the DRB recognized the importance of operations 
research to its mandate for the armed forces and had committed to expand its capacity in the 
field.  
While two operational researchers from the Defence Research Board hardly constitute a 
numerically significant contribution to the international efforts of the Western security alliance, 
Archer and Kaye do reflect wider governmental attitudes in Canada toward defence and security. 
As historian Isabel Campbell argues in her thorough analysis of the Canadian brigade first sent to 
Germany in 1951, the St. Laurent government showed a “willingness to engage actively in 
international affairs.”39 The decision to send troops overseas was extremely contentious, and 
Campbell cautions against the suggestion that the decision to send troops to Europe represented a 
complete change to Canada’s foreign policy. Continuity certainly remained important to the 
pragmatic policymaking process. Nonetheless, committed to NATO, Canada explored a variety 
of means to help resist communist totalitarian rule. 
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An international presence also provided an opportunity for Canada to reaffirm and 
strengthen its position among allies. “Canada’s officials, its policies, and the presence of its 
brigade in Germany,” Campbell contends, “allowed the nation to assert its right to a formal seat 
in key decision-making forums … Without a seat, officials received only second-hand 
information and had no direct means of expressing national views.” 40 In theory, acquiring a seat 
alongside the powers of the North Atlantic alliance also allowed representatives of the Canadian 
government to assert national views should international tensions escalate. The brigade in 
Germany was, therefore, an indirect avenue to promote Canadian priorities internationally.  
It would be an overstatement to suggest that the operational research contributions of 
Archer and Kaye fulfilled a distinct Canadian agenda to obtain political influence in the Western 
security alliance. The two individuals spent limited time overseas and their work amounted to 
only a small portion of all operations research conducted during the Korean War. Still, their 
work is central to understanding changing priorities within the Canadian defence establishment. 
Soviet actions in Korea showed that they were prepared to fight local wars, despite risking the 
outbreak of a large-scale general war. Canada responded with a robust commitment to the armed 
forces and national R&D. “The Korean campaign [has] added active aggression to the so-called 
cold war,” Omond Solandt told the Manitoba Chamber of Mines during an address in Winnipeg 
on 20 October 1950. “We have now entered upon what some experts have called the 25% war,” 
he added, “[and] we must win it if we are to prevent the 100% war that we all dread.”41 For the 
DRB, this meant a philosophical change to its R&D structure, marked by the shift from 
fundamental to applied research. 
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There is also some evidence to suggest a direct link between operations research in Korea 
and the DRB’s scientific activities that took place in northern Canada. One of the more difficult 
problems facing United Nations forces during the Korean War was frostbite resulting from cold 
exposure. Indeed, the failure of the multinational forces to prepare adequately for military 
operations in cold regions was a defining feature of the wartime experience in Korea.42 While 
Canada and the United States had conducted cold-weather training and simulated operations 
prior to the war, the soldier experience in Korea made clear the many problems associated with 
military operations in cold regions. After the war, the US Air Force increased its capacity for 
cold-weather science at the Arctic Aeromedical Laboratory in Alaska. Research specialists from 
disciplines including biology, civil and materials engineering, geophysics, and physiology and 
psychology traveled to Alaska to devise cold-weather solutions for the military. In Canada, 
military training in cold conditions continued at Fort Churchill and scientists with the Defence 
Research Northern Laboratory increasingly participated as field observers to learn first-hand 
about the effects of cold on the physical and mental conditions of the soldier. As shown in the 
1954 National Film Board production Vigil in the North, Canadian soldiers training at Fort 
Churchill had to overcome the enemies of “fear and fatigue”—the initial response to the Arctic 
environment.43 DRNL scientists studied the human body under military duress to help inure 
soldiers to the rigors of the Canadian North. Yet, while northern military research remained 
important on the ground, in Ottawa, the Defence Research Board had increasingly turned its 
attention to the air.  
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Continental Air Defence and Atomic Warfare 
Two of the more notable research areas for the Defence Research Board were continental air 
defence and atomic warfare. Solandt created the Operational Research Group within the DRB in 
1949 and the year after recruited George Lindsey to join a small OR team in support of the 
RCAF. Lindsey was a friend and former wartime colleague of Solandt; the two met during the 
Second World War while conducting operations research for the British Army. When Solandt 
recruited Lindsey to work in OR for the DRB, strategic concerns in Canada centred on 
continental air defence against Soviet long-range nuclear-carrying bombers. Lindsey quickly 
became an important asset to the Canadian defence establishment. As a key member of joint 
Canada-United States negotiations on continental air defence, he worked with Harold Larnder, 
the originator of the term “operational research,” on the development of a semi-automated radar 
defence system commonly known as the McGill Fence.44 
For the Defence Research Board, contributions to the development and implementation 
of radar represented an important achievement. The DRB year-end roundup for 1953, released to 
the press through the directorate of public relations for National Defence, noted the “outstanding 
accomplishment of the Defence Research Board made public during 1953 was the development 
of an early warning device designed to supplement radar chains in the Canadian north.”45 
Directed by the DRB with the assistance of the Eaton Electronics Research Laboratory of McGill 
University and the National Research Council, the project tested experimental equipment 
manufactured by the RCA Victor Company of Montréal. Summer trials confirmed the value of 
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the device as a warning system, and all reports suggested that manufacturing the device in 
Canada was economical.  
The 1953 investigations were a continuation of earlier DRB research into radar 
equipment. Early in 1951, G.A. Woonton of McGill University, operating under contract by the 
DRB, discussed the use of a doppler detection system with American officials in Washington. 
The so-called McGill Fence was an electronic early warning line meant to detect any penetration 
of Canadian territory by hostile aircraft. The DRB initiated the project under the direction of G.S. 
Field, while electronics scientist L. Guy Eon assumed coordination responsibilities. Most of the 
research and work conducted on the McGill Fence occurred at the Electronics Research 
Laboratory, which the DRB helped establish through its extramural program. In fact, DRB grants 
totalling $55,000 provided all of the initial scientific equipment and materials required to open 
the laboratory.46 The success of the project led the RCAF to study the logistics and construction 
implications of a line of radar stations along the fifty-fifth parallel. Financed by the DRB, the 
project resulted in the construction of the Mid Canada Line, joining the Pinetree Line and later 
the DEW Line to form the North American continental radar defence network. 
George Lindsey’s most significant contribution to the development of North American 
air defence occurred in the strategic assessment and planning phase for the Mid Canada Line. 
During the summer of 1952, a joint Canada-United States study group consisting of scientific 
defence analysts gathered at the Lincoln Laboratory in Cambridge, Massachusetts to consider the 
placement of radar in Canada.47 Lindsey and John Foster of McGill University were the only two 
Canadians to participate in the study. Comprised mainly of scientific defence analysts, the forty-
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five member group estimated the potential impact of a Soviet nuclear strike on North America 
and determined that significant improvements in continental air defences required increased 
early warning. From this conclusion, the Lincoln Summer Study Group made recommendations 
that helped provide a foundation for the initial framework of the North American Air Defence 
Command agreement, which both countries ratified in 1958.48 In the formative days of NORAD, 
officials in Washington considered continental air defence to be the first and last line of defence 
against a potential Soviet attack on North America. In spite of its much smaller forces, Canada 
was anxious to be an equal partner with the United States in continental defence. In operational 
research, brains counted as much as brawn, and the field represented an area where the defence 
establishment in Ottawa could wield considerable influence in Washington. 
Lindsey was particularly effective as a Canadian voice against the American 
determination to place radar stations in southern Canada.49 He articulated clearly that Canadian 
security interests were distinct from those of the United States. His most significant contribution 
to the debate of 1952 was a report that examined the implications to Canada of the proposed 
North American air defence system, in which he emphasized the strategic issues of Canadian 
geography. In the event of a Soviet air attack, the orientation of an air defence network would 
determine the pattern of any resulting devastation. To avoid substantial destruction near highly 
populated Canadian areas, Lindsey recommended that construction of radar lines take place 
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farther north than had originally been proposed by the Americans. Lindsey was firm on this 
stance. According to one report from the Defence Research Board, he injected a strong “sense of 
reality into the assessment of the capabilities of highly mechanized equipment” for Canada’s 
contribution to continental air defence, and “without his work Canada would almost certainly 
have been drawn into participation in a more complex, expensive, and less effective air defence 
system.”50  
The involvement of the Defence Research Board in continental air defence initiatives 
extended beyond strategic and technical assistance with radar. Prior to the Second World War, 
the aeronautical laboratories of the National Research Council conducted the majority of aviation 
research undertaken in Canada. As the aviation industry expanded after the war, defence officials 
in Ottawa realized that the existing aviation infrastructure of the NRC was incapable of meeting 
the high demand for Canadian-built military aircraft. In January 1951, the federal government 
responded by creating the National Aeronautical Establishment and establishing a formal 
committee to direct aviation policy in Canada.51 The committee included the president of the 
NRC, the chairman of the DRB, the Chief of the Air Staff, and the chairman of the Air Transport 
Board. The National Research Council maintained operational responsibilities for the research 
and development facilities of the NAE, which consisted of the former Ottawa Aeronautical 
Laboratories and the Arnprior Flight Research Section of the NRC.  
The creation of the NAE sparked a concerted interest in Canadian aviation, and a number 
of NRC divisions became actively involved in defence research projects. Employees with the 
Radio and Electrical Engineering Division, for instance, became vital to research and 
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development projects for the Canadian radar program carried out by the DRB. The pattern of 
outsourcing defence research within government often mirrored methods used by the Defence 
Research Board when outsourcing to industry. While the DRB exercised general coordination 
and financial supervision over the research and development programs of the armed forces, it did 
not have full control in each case. According to DRB records, the placement of military R&D 
projects with other government agencies and in industry was often the responsibility of the three 
services.52 Indeed, major projects such as the development of the CF-100 fighter and the Orenda 
engine began before the DRB assumed control over research and development for the armed 
forces. Nevertheless, officials with the Defence Research Board wielded considerable influence 
on the direction and scope of military R&D in Canada. In addition to work on fighter aircraft and 
radar, the DRB’s Arctic projects also included, amongst other initiatives, development of over-
snow vehicles and a synthetic rubber for use under low temperatures in high latitude 
environments.  
Atomic warfare was another field in which the Defence Research Board became actively 
involved. Intelligence reports on Soviet technology increased in regularity during and after the 
Korean War, and the DRB responded by furthering its commitment to weapons research. In a 
1954-55 fiscal report prepared for the Privy Council, the DRB confirmed its willingness to 
support the joint continental air defence efforts of Canada and the United States in an official 
research capacity.53 The report was a direct response to the increasing atomic threat, and 
suggested the DRB was in an ideal position to provide strategic analysts and research teams to 
study the position of radar and develop the related communications systems to improve early 
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warning systems. Expert scientific advice was particularly relevant to the RCAF, which required 
assistance to facilitate the transition from research and development to production and use. The 
fiscal report also confirmed the DRB’s official stance on atomic research at home: “It is felt that 
all agencies concerned with the defence of Canada should give top priority to improving 
Canada’s capabilities in the field of atomic warfare.”54 The report noted the special contribution 
of the DRB in fields directly related to the armed forces, including protection of Canada against 
atomic attack and the indoctrination of troops in actual conduct of atomic warfare. In particular, 
the DRB proposed to initiate a program for “the production of atomic power for industry which 
could also lead to the provision of atomic weapons for the Canadian Services should the need 
arise.” The DRB based its proposal on the results of a preliminary study that indicated the urgent 
need in Canada for a sophisticated atomic research program. With deep research ties to industry 
and other government agencies, officials with the DRB considered the organization ideally 
positioned to facilitate applied research at the fore of Canada’s national atomic effort.   
Concerns over Cold War weaponry were not confined to the atomic sphere, however. As 
historian of science Donald Avery has shown, the outbreak of the Korean War produced an 
intensified interest in Canada’s biological warfare program.55 In response, the Defence Research 
Board sought the professional expertise of Guliford Reed, a prominent bacteriologist from 
Queen’s University. The DRB asked Reed to provide a detailed update of the major scientific 
and technical developments that had occurred in the field of bio-warfare.56 Based on open and 
unclassified sources, Reed concluded that Canadian biodefence measures were insufficient to 
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meet the challenge of a potential Soviet biological weapons attack. He recommended the DRB 
increase its efforts in the field and encourage the training of specialists to develop Canada’s 
capacity to detect and immunize against biological agents. In April 1953, the DRB appointed 
Reed as the full-time superintendent of the newly established Defence Research Kingston 
Laboratory (DRKL). Operating in response to anxieties over the perceived Soviet threat, the 
establishment of DRKL reflects the diverse and evolving research agenda of the Defence 
Research Board.   
 
The International Geophysical Year 
 
Although the advent of intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missiles shaped the 
trajectory of defence in Canada and the United States, Canadian officials remained committed to 
the Commonwealth effort. In February 1956, the Defence Research Board hosted the 
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science.57 Scientists from throughout the 
British Commonwealth gathered in Ottawa, Toronto and Fort Churchill to discuss collaboration 
in the application of science to military affairs. One of the important agenda items was long-
distance radio communication. Geographically situated at an area of maximum aurora activity, 
Fort Churchill provided an ideal location for scientific study of magnetism and the upper 
atmosphere. The North Magnetic Pole was an occasional source of interference for ground 
navigation and radio communication equipment operated by military personnel while on winter 
training exercises, so the DRB invested heavily in communications research to find scientific 
solutions and to improve transmissions technologies. The Radio Physics Laboratory, one of two 
research units that comprised the Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment (DRTE) 
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at Ottawa, developed a technique to transmit messages over long distances by reflecting radio 
signals off tiny meteors at approximately sixty miles above the surface of the Earth. Despite the 
atmospheric issues known to affect regular methods for telecommunications, a team of DRTE 
scientists led by Peter Forsyth developed a technique called JANET that reportedly enabled the 
successful transmission of radio signals up to a distance of one thousand miles.58 
In another area of research related to communications, scientists from the DRB and 
Cambridge University worked closely with associates and technical officers of the United 
Kingdom Ministry of Supply and the Royal Air Force on methods to improve aircraft signals. A 
team of research scientists from Cambridge had developed a system called Single Side Band, 
which enabled pilots operating high-speed aircraft to maintain reliable voice contact with a 
central control point over long distances ranging beyond one thousand miles.59 Researchers with 
the DRB assisted successful trials of the system on flights travelling between the United 
Kingdom, Ottawa and Vancouver with the DRB’s Shirley Bay site near Ottawa acting as a 
transmitter and receiving station.  
British scientists were particularly keen to collaborate with Canadian colleagues as part 
of a large-scale contribution to the research activities of the International Geophysical Year 
(IGY) of 1957-58. The IGY was a celebration of global science that focused on the necessity of 
international co-operation in fields such as meteorology, oceanography, and studies of the upper 
atmosphere. Events ran between June 1957 and December 1958, and included participants from 
over sixty countries whose areas of research covered a range of environmental sciences. The 
global impetus behind the IGY was non-military, but governmental military research 
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organizations such as the Defence Research Board provided the personnel and funds required to 
plan, construct and operate much of the scientific and mechanical infrastructure that emerged 
from the IGY celebrations.60 Accordingly, historians of science point to the IGY to show the 
consequences of high technology and militarization during the Cold War. 
As a new target for both geographic knowledge and military defence strategy, the North 
became a region entangled with developments in the geophysical sciences during the late 1950s. 
Ronald Doel’s research has shown that the American military sought the assistance of polar 
scientists whose expertise and international networks could benefit high-level discussions about 
the relationship of science and foreign policy.61 It is within this context that Richard Powell has 
analyzed the Canadian experience with the International Geophysical Year. Considering the 
emergence of new technologies such as intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear-powered 
submarines in relation to the Polar Continental Shelf Project, Powell argues the federal 
government attempted to “mobilize a pan-Canadian nationalism in response to perceived 
American and Soviet incursions upon territorial sovereignty during the IGY.”62 Powell’s 
argument illustrates tensions present in Canada during the IGY, especially between idealized 
notions of scientific globalism and strategic considerations for continental defence and territorial 
sovereignty.  
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While the launch of Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2 in October and November of 1957 
exacerbated Western concerns about the potential danger of the Soviet missile threat, the 
competitive tensions of the period were not limited to the superpowers.63 The International 
Geophysical Year brought widespread attention to scientific competition amongst middle 
powers, as is evidenced when considering Canada’s involvement. In fact, the Canadian research 
contribution to the IGY involved various studies conducted at seventy-six establishments.64 
These research sites included twenty-six in the Canadian North, and each made significant 
contributions towards scientific knowledge of atmospheric physics, glacial ice, and magnetic 
interference in northern telecommunications. Notable amongst the Canadian activities and 
initiatives for the IGY was “Operation Hazen,” conducted by scientists of the Defence Research 
Board on northern Ellesmere Island.65 Researchers carried out glaciological and meteorological 
studies at the base of Lake Hazen as a supplement for wider studies into Arctic geology and 
archeology. In total, according to Trevor Harwood of the Defence Research Board, Canada’s 
research contribution to the IGY was proportionally larger than that of the United States and the 
Soviet Union.66 Yet the influence of the IGY on scientific practices in Canada remain largely 
ignored by historians.  
In addition to its own scientific initiatives conducted in the Canadian North, the Defence 
Research Board became heavily involved in monitoring and tracking the scientific activities of 
the Soviet Union. When the Soviets launched Sputnik 1, a group of scientists at the Canadian 
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Radio Physics Laboratory undertook immediate development of equipment to track satellites.67 
This resulted in Canada becoming one of the first countries to report accurately the orbital track 
of the artificial satellite, a fact that held value for senior officials in Ottawa who wanted to 
demonstrate Canadian technological capabilities at the onset of the Cold War space race. During 
the IGY, the DRB also hosted a series of rocket launches at Fort Churchill. Initiated through a 
bilateral cooperation program with the United States, the launches tested Canadian 
instrumentation on one Nike-Cajun rocket launched by a team of American scientists, and 
combined rocket/balloon (rockoon) instrument packages.68 Research teams also utilized the Fort 
Churchill site to launch sounding rockets and conduct earth-based observations in various 
scientific disciplines.  
Canada’s active participation in the IGY was possible largely because of the resources 
made available for science through the Defence Research Board. Indeed, a substantial number of 
qualified scientists existed in Canada prior to and throughout the IGY. Scientists with the 
Defence Research Telecommunications Establishment participated in numerous specialized 
activities in addition to the rocket and satellites program at Fort Churchill, some of which 
furthered the international space efforts of the Western alliance. In 1958, for instance, Canada 
earned an appointment to the initial United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS) and has served continually since.69 Furthermore, after the United States 
launched Explorer 1 in January 1958, Canada proposed the creation of a novel satellite with 
advanced transmitter/receiver technology. NASA accepted the proposal in early 1959 and 
Alouette 1 later launched successfully from Vandenberg Air Force Base near Lompoc, California 
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on 29 September 1962.  The launch was a significant moment in Canada’s Cold War history. By 
demonstrating advanced technical capabilities then matched only by the superpowers, Canadian 
science surpassed all other Western nations except the United States.70  
 
The Demise of DRNL 
 
Following the IGY, Canada continued to pursue scientific work related to radio technology, the 
aura borealis, and satellite development. In 1959, Canadian scientists at the Fort Churchill rocket 
range conducted the first flight of a Black Brant rocket. Thereafter, rockets became increasingly 
important to the continued exploration of the constantly changing upper atmosphere. Rocketry 
research of this nature had civilian and military applications. Research into atmospheric 
magnetism and radio telecommunications was particularly significant for the air defence of 
Arctic North America, and the change in emphasis for DRB research put the future of the 
Defence Research Northern Laboratory in question.  
As is perhaps evidenced by the various research activities undertaken by scientists of the 
Defence Research Board at the Fort Churchill rocket site, the scope and extent of Arctic research 
changed for the DRB during the mid to late 1950s. The DRB hosted more than 250 scientists 
from fifteen NATO nations in June 1955, when the Fifth General Assembly of the Advisory 
Group on Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD) to NATO convened at the 
Chateau Laurier Hotel in Ottawa.71 Ralph Campney, Canada’s minister of national defence, 
hosted the delegates along with the Canadian AGARD council member J.J. Green. Shortly 
thereafter, sweeping changes occurred to the Arctic research activities of the DRB. The Arctic 
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Section of the Defence Research Board ceased to exist November 1955, when its duties and 
responsibilities transferred to the directorates of physical and engineering research.72 Within the 
Directorate of Physical Research, the DRB created a Geophysical Section to continue many of 
the duties of the disbanded Arctic Section. Trevor Harwood headed the new section, while Moira 
Dunbar and J.P Croal joined his staff in a supporting role. Their research focused on fields such 
as geology, glaciology, ice physics and forecasting, oceanography, hydrography, meteorology 
and navigation. The remaining Arctic activities went to the mechanical and civil engineering 
sections of the Directorate of Engineering Research. Both sections focused on research and 
development in their fields of engineering. Mechanical assumed work on engines, vehicles, 
materials, fuels and lubricants, and civil on snow, ice, soil and permafrost, and survey and air 
photograph interpretation.  
Although the Defence Research Board designated Arctic research away from a central 
overseeing body, officials still considered DRNL important to Canada’s defence structure in the 
North. Hartley Zimmerman assumed the chairmanship of the DRB from Omond Solandt in 
March 1956, and shortly thereafter the new chairman arranged an airborne tour of the Canadian 
North. The tour group consisted of officials from the United States and the United Kingdom, and 
the trip included flights over Canada’s northernmost islands, tours of the Mid-Canada and DEW 
Line radar sites, and visits to Fort Churchill and the RCAF station at Cold Lake, Alberta.73 
Zimmerman also travelled overseas to witness joint British-Australian atomic weapons tests, and 
he worked diligently to maintain the close ties between Canadian and Commonwealth science 
organizations first established under Solandt’s leadership. He spent eleven years as chairman and 
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saw through to fruition many research and development projects initiated under Solandt, 
including variable depth sonar for naval security in the Arctic Ocean and the integration of 
Canada’s rocket and satellite programs within the defence structure of the Western security 
alliance.74 
The Defence Research Northern Laboratory remained active during the transition from 
Solandt to Zimmerman. February 1956 was a particularly eventful month, as the staff at DRNL 
hosted government officials and scientists during the Fort Churchill sessions of the 
Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science.75 Representatives from DRNL and 
other government agencies tied to the Defence Research Board presented research papers on 
topics pertaining to Arctic military problems, and the delegates in attendance toured the DRNL 
facilities to learn about the shift towards operations research at Fort Churchill. DRNL also hosted 
members of the Joint Intelligence Bureau that month. Headed by Ivor Bowen, the director of JIB, 
the group held sessions in the DRNL conference room before touring the Fort Churchill base and 
spending one day on the open tundra learning about northern defence.  
The mid-1950s marked a culmination for Arctic research carried out on the ground in 
northern Manitoba. During 1955-56, the Canadian army assigned a full time test team to 
DRNL.76 The commitment marked a milestone in research progress for the laboratory, because 
the test team served as “human subjects” for field and laboratory trials both for summer and 
winter tests. Records from the Defence Research Board claim the presence of the test team 
exemplified military cooperation and interest in the DRB’s Arctic program, despite the existing 
tensions between DRB scientists and military personnel (documented in Chapter 4).77 
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Nevertheless, the full time presence of the army test team enabled a marked increase in field 
research and laboratory studies at DRNL. The DRB considered this an extremely valuable 
contribution to defence science in Canada.  
As the nature and scope of research and development activities changed for Defence 
Research Northern Laboratory, work at the Fort Churchill establishment was slowly phased out. 
DRNL scientists remained actively involved in Arctic research activities, however. As operations 
research received added interest after the Korean War, scientists from Churchill occasionally 
travelled to participate in Arctic research conducted farther north in Canada or in Greenland. 
Such was the case of D.I. Ross, an OR scientist for DRNL, who attended a United States army 
exercise held at Thule on Greenland. Exercise “Arctic Night” occurred in March 1956 and 
involved a battalion combat team in an airborne assault. Ross represented Canada on the 
exercise, and he briefed scientists and officials from DRNL, the Canadian army, and the air force 
on his return to Fort Churchill. Work at the Defence Research Northern Laboratory continued for 
the next decade, but during the early 1960s the facility increasingly became a transitory stop 
rather than a permanent location for laboratory work. The location closed its doors on 29 June 
1965.78 The DRB continued to fund research into Arctic studies, but DRNL ceased to exist 
because scientists had fulfilled the requirements of the initial research agenda and the demands 
of National Defence no longer called for a permanent research establishment in the North.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Rearmament for the Korean War had immediate and lasting consequences for the Defence 
Research Board. The threat of Soviet aggression to international order translated Canada’s long-
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term plans for defence and security into short-terms plans, which subsequently expanded the 
research and development program of the DRB while reducing the allotted completion time for 
both current and future projects.79 During the formative years of the DRB, the armed forces 
focused on postwar reorganization and showed little need for instant scientific advice. 
Accordingly, the DRB concentrated on establishing a strong internal research and development 
organization.80 Korea changed this approach to defence research. As the services actively 
rearmed and entered the conflict in support of the UN coalition forces, the DRB increased its 
capacity for operational research, reorganized and strengthened the exchange of scientific 
information for the services, and increased the size and activity of its scientific staff in Ottawa.  
The Defence Research Board was only one government agency affected by the changes 
to Canada’s national defence effort. Indeed, the number of scientists working on defence 
research in other agencies also increased to meet the demands of Canadian defence. When 
scientists from other agencies began to devote the whole or part of their time to providing direct 
assistance to the armed forces, as project officers on development programs or as scientific and 
technical advisers on research problems, the DRB assumed more responsibility as scientific 
advisor to Canada’s national defence effort.81 The unique advisory function of the DRB came at 
a cost, however. In the United States and the United Kingdom, defence research organization 
operated as two relatively distinct but complete programs that were capable of covering nearly 
all of the military R&D needs of their respective armed forces. Military forces in both countries 
received scientific advice and assistance as a by-product of research. In contrast, Canada’s 
                                                 
79 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2425, file Speeches - Reporting etc 1947 - March 1953 Volume 1, Edmond Cloutier, Canada’s 
Defence Programme 1951-52 (Ottawa: Printer to the King’s most Excellent Majesty Controllers of Stationery, 
1951), 5. 
80 LAC, RG 24, vol. 2425, file Speeches - Reporting etc 1947 - March 1953 Volume 1, O.M. Solandt, “Fifth Annual 
Birthday Address,” in 5 Anniversary: Defence Research Board Ottawa (Ottawa: Defence Research Board, 1952), 
17. 
81 Ibid., 17-18. 
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limited research program did not allow the DRB to cover all of the needs of the Canadian armed 
forces. For this reason, the initial mandate of the DRB was dual-purpose: the organization as a 
whole concentrated on research where Canada could make a unique or special contribution and 
simultaneously ensured the armed forces had ready access to the best scientific knowledge from 
other countries. 
When national priorities for defence changed in response to the events in Korea, the dual-
purpose mandate of the Defence Research Board was fundamentally challenged. The DRB was 
unable to increase its capacity as scientific advisor while maintaining an active and growing 
commitment to laboratory research. Unfortunately, for staff at facilities such as the Defence 
Research Northern Laboratory in Fort Churchill, fieldwork and laboratory research drew the 
short straw. The economic and political circumstances of the period were too much to overcome, 
and the DRB began to transition towards efficient research and development projects required to 
serve the immediate needs of the armed forces. While northern defence remained a high priority 
item, technological advancements of the 1950s altered the strategic threat to Canada and the 
R&D program of the DRB evolved to meet the challenge. Canada’s commitment to European 
security and international order also created new difficulties for the DRB to overcome. Given the 
available information on the role and structure of research to Canada’s national defence efforts 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, it seems safe to conclude that the gradual phase out of 
DRNL was a mere by-product of extenuating circumstances. We must also consider general cuts 
to Canada’s federal budget when assessing the circumstances that led to the closure of DRNL. In 
1962, the Diefenbaker government adopted austerity measures designed to address Canada’s 
worsening economic situation. The measures reduced federal spending, increased tariffs on 
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imports, and enabled the government to obtain large financial loans from foreign banks.82 Money 
for defence, which had accounted for the largest portion of the federal budget, began to decline 
in 1964. As the budget for defence declined, the DRB could no longer afford the costs associated 
with maintaining an effective research program in the North. The extenuating circumstances 
around the closure of Defence Research Northern Laboratory say more about the reaction of 
government officials to the Cold War, and the reality of budgetary constraints, than they do 
about the internal priorities of the DRB. In other words, the Defence Research Board moved 
away from laboratory research in the North as part of a wider effort to maintain relevance within 
the Canadian defence and military establishment. 
 
 
                                                 
82 For a detailed historical account of Canadian economy in this period, see Bruce Muirhead, Dancing Around the 
Elephant: Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2007).   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Canada’s historical scholarship lags behind in both rate of production and volume of work 
addressing science and its relation to the state during the Cold War. Widely considered a middle 
power in the multifaceted struggle that shaped world affairs during the second half of the 
twentieth century, scholars have paid scant attention to the scientific and technical aspects of 
Canada’s Cold War experience. Only recently have historians begun to pull back the layers of 
Canadian science and Cold War defence, as evidenced by studies about the complex and 
understudied history of the Defence Research Board.1 Yet, while the current body of scholarship 
on the DRB covers the institutional history of the government agency, the intricacies of the topic 
deserve wider attention.  
We now have the sources required to delve deeper into the consequences of Canada’s 
material and monetary investment in defence-related science. Insights from institutional histories 
of the Defence Research Board provide a strong foundation for studies of applied science in Cold 
War Canada, which means exploring, for the first time, the boundaries between politics, 
scientific inquiry and defence research. Did Canada feel the need to keep up with or ahead of the 
Soviet Union? If such a need existed, did it provide the catalyst for political, institutional, 
financial and moral support for defence science? What layers existed between civilian and 
military scientific activities? What impact did defence science have on the wider public? Such 
questions have sparked a wealth of international scholarship on the militarization of the social 
                                                 
1 Andrew B. Godefroy, Defence and Discovery: Canada’s Military Space Program, 1945-74 (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2011); Donald H. Avery, Pathogens for War: Biological Weapons, Canadian 
Life Scientists, and North American Biodefence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013); Jason Sean Ridler, 
Maestro of Science: Omond Mckillop Solandt and Government Science in War and Hostile Peace, 1939-1956 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015). 
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and physical sciences.2 It seems pertinent to suggest that scholars of Cold War Canada explore 
similar themes while also posing new questions to challenge dominant interpretative frameworks 
and extend our investigative reach.  
One of the more exciting trends to have captured the attention of international scholars 
engaged in the exploration of the Cold War sciences is environmental history and historical 
geography. Investigating the application of science in the “field” as an extension of the 
conception of science in government has brought focus to earthly contexts that remained 
unexamined for many years. As J.R. McNeill and Corinna Unger note in a novel collection of 
environmental histories of the Cold War, the period “enlarged the human experience of the 
biosphere by encouraging research and explorations in previously neglected nooks and crannies, 
such as the polar regions, the ocean floors, and the upper atmosphere.”3 Canada may not have 
endeavored to intervene in the workings of the biosphere, but the federal government did support 
and encourage a wide range of environmental scientific research.4  
Concurrently, the history of postwar defence research in the Canadian North serves as a 
warning against definitive statements about the impact of the Cold War in Canada. Whether 
social or environmental, the consequences of Cold War military science resulted from multiple 
and complex factors that resist generalization. Indeed, as Polar historian Adrian Howkins 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The 
Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); 
Margaret C. Jacob, ed., Politics of Western Science, 1640-1990 (Atlantic Highlands. NJ: Humanities Press, 1994); 
Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the Next Silicon Valley 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Audra J. Wolfe, Competing with the Soviets: Science, 
Technology, and the State in Cold War America (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2013). 
3 See J.R. McNeil and Corinna R. Unger, eds., Environmental Histories of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 3. 
4 For an example of biosphere intervention, see Kristine C. Harper and Ronald E. Doel, “Environmental Diplomacy 
in the Cold War: Weather Control, the United States, and India, 1966-1967,” in McNeil and Unger, eds., 
Environmental Histories of the Cold War, 115-137. 
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explains, “the history of the Cold War reveals that the nature of the environment alone does not 
determine political or military histories.”5 That the Arctic became an unparalleled battleground 
of Cold War activity resulted only in part because of its geography and perceptions of its harsh, 
barren and scientifically challenging environment. 
Reconnaissance of the Cold War Canadian North need not be restricted to military topics. 
Although the “systematic consolidation of nature as a military entity” certainly took place in 
Canada, as evidenced by the northern scientific activities of the Defence Research Board, 
government-supported science also sought solutions to non-military and non-strategic problems.6 
If we are to accept Joy Parr’s process of “corporeal embodiment,” then all human interactions 
with sciences and technologies are inherently environmental.7 Where Canada’s experience with 
defence research is concerned, that the science occurred in the Cold War does not mean that is 
was Cold War science. The research activities of the DRB deserve attention on par with wider 
perceptions of civil-state relations and science in the postwar years. We must also keep in mind 
that Arctic research served to advance the individual professional careers of participating 
scientists, engineers and doctors while also meeting the needs of bureaucrats and officials in the 
Canadian defence and military establishment. Researchers received financial support, published 
findings and took up both academic and government positions, while in turn, the federal 
government learned much about the Canadian North and postwar modernization. While the 
complexities of defence research are often difficult to discern, the integration of military, 
                                                 
5 Adrian Howkins, The Polar Regions: An Environmental History (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016), 126. 
6 To read more about the militarization of Canada in the Cold War, see P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Matthew 
Farish, “The Cold War on Canadian Soil: Militarizing a Northern Environment,” Environmental History 12, no. 4, 
Special Issue on Canada (2007): 920-950. 
7 Joy Parr, Sensing Changes: Technologies, Environments, and the Everyday, 1953-2003 (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2010). 
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industrial and academic institutions provides important lessons for understanding the residual 
consequences of the Cold War in Canada. 
The scientific and technical activities of the Defence Research Board are particularly 
useful for learning about the complex interplay between state and scientific authorities, and the 
federal solutions to the unique issues resulting from the Cold War circumstances facing the 
Canadian security state. Highly acclaimed scientists from a number of academic institutions in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States received monetary assistance to travel to 
northern Canada and investigate such problems as cold-weather survival, movement of sea ice, 
over snow travel, and the impact of magnetism on technical communications and equipment. The 
stated aim of this research was the development of methods and techniques to reduce and 
overcome impediments to military personnel and equipment operating in the harsh environment 
of the Canadian North, but the agenda behind government science in the North was much more 
complex.  
During the Second World War, military officials with the Canadian government realized 
the need to involve scientists and engineers in preparations for postwar national defence. The 
rapid pace of scientific and technological change demanded a concerted response from the 
Canadian defence establishment, or so was the belief of the senior officials who championed the 
apparent necessity to involve scientists in policymaking for the North. A strong belief in the 
power and authority of science (and personal connections) meant that Omond Solandt received 
autonomy and political influence as the founding chairman of the Defence Research Board. In 
his position, Solandt was a member of the Cabinet Defence Committee and made key decisions 
that outlined the role and structure of the agency under his direction. He trained as a civilian in 
medicine but once in government used his position to advance science on the federal agenda. 
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Indeed, Solandt was a pioneer of Canadian science and he made important contributions that 
strengthened Canada’s international position among research partners in the Western security 
alliance. His efforts also developed working relations among government, industrial, and 
academic scientists and their institutions. He helped convince the federal government to fund 
science, which proved beneficial to practitioners in and outside government. Yet the 
circumstances and structures that enabled Solandt to further science in Canada also created the 
conditions for the unintended consequences of defence research documented here.  
It would be disingenuous and trivial to suggest that science alone deserves blame for the 
consequences of Cold War defence research in Canada. The scientist, broadly speaking, 
represented one voice and one position among varying interests. Multiple actors, including both 
government officials and state-sponsored civilian scientists, made important decisions in 
response to the difficult (and at times advantageous) circumstances of the period. This 
dissertation has attempted to explore and explain, rather than blame or condone, the persons and 
actions described. Nevertheless, important lessons stem from the critical appraisal of the Cold 
War sciences. A select group of scientists in postwar Canada received enough position, power 
and resources to negotiate, design, implement and oversee self-serving research initiatives. The 
sweeping changes introduced to government because of the Glassco Commission stemmed from 
a critical review process that identified scientific management structures as flawed. Despite the 
establishment and growth of a largely successful defence research program, business and public 
administration models prevailed.  
The demise of the Defence Research Board began prior to the Glassco Commission, 
however. As the science-state relationship developed over the course of the early Cold War, the 
DRB responded to changes in the organization and operation of the broader Canadian defence 
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establishment. Whereas the period between the late 1940s and early 1950s marked the largest 
expansion of scientific and technical research in Canadian history, this growth stopped after the 
Korean War and the federal defence budget entered a period of decline. The perceived value of 
science to defence remained, but shifting priorities concerning the role of Canada internationally 
pushed the DRB from support for fundamental to applied research. The strategic significance of 
the North also shifted in considerations of Canadian defence. Scholarship on the postwar North 
illustrates the open and dynamic contexts of space, where constructed identities of place 
transform within wider networks of social relations and knowledge exchange.8 The many 
identities of the North as both a social and physical place are present in the documentary record 
of the Defence Research Board. Both imaginatively and materially, the DRB envisioned and 
created a northern space in the name of science and military necessity. This history helps to 
explain the power of ideas in shaping and perpetuating the Cold War.  
Where the Defence Research Board and northern science in the early postwar period is 
concerned, ideas of progress and dominance outpaced the creation of adequate and objective 
administrative oversight structures. Knowledge production held value to a Canadian defence 
establishment in search of solutions to military, political and economic problems. In an 
atmosphere of high anxiety, the potential benefits of science outweighed significantly the 
dangers of inactivity.  
The consequences of the circumstances, attitudes, and decisions that contributed to the 
creation and growth of defence research deserve our full attention. While additional research is 
required to elucidate the deep consequences of postwar defence research in Canada, this is a field 
                                                 
8 See, for instance, Fael L. Korsmo and Amanda Graham, “Research in the North American North: Action and 
Reaction,” Arctic 55, no. 4 (December 2002): 319-325; Matthew Farish, “Frontier engineering: from the globe to the 
body in the Cold War Artic,” The Canadian Geographer 50, no. 2 (2006): 177-196; Stephen Bocking, “Seeking the 
Arctic: Science and Perceptions of Northern Canada,” The Dalhousie Review 90, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 61-74. 
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critical to both Canadian history and the history of the Cold War sciences. Canadian defence 
research in the North offers particularity useful insights for considering Canada’s international 
relations during the early Cold War. Although the Defence Research Northern Laboratory was a 
relatively small facility, the Fort Churchill base supported a diverse and extensive scientific 
research program between 1947 and 1965 that attracted military representatives, high-ranking 
politicians, and senior security officials from the North Atlantic Alliance. In the face of 
increasing scientific activity on the Soviet side of the Pole, the United States and the United 
Kingdom were particularly interested in furthering Western science in the North as a preparatory 
measure. Churchill’s geography made it an ideal location for northern scientific and 
technological research in both summer and winter conditions, and the Canadian defence 
establishment used the full extent of its diplomatic capital to benefit from providing in Churchill 
an essential and unique resource to the Western security alliance. The base at Churchill also 
served as an access point to more remote northern locations, and gave the federal government a 
tangible geostrategic asset to leverage Canada’s sovereignty and security interests in the Arctic. 
The history covered in this dissertation is also valuable to modern considerations in the 
development of policy for science, security, and defence in the North. As climate change and 
environmental degradation provide increasing access to the Arctic, and competition for northern 
resources grows among government and non-state actors, Canada will need to develop new 
policies to protect northern residents and Canadian interests in the Arctic. During the period 
examined here, policymaking for the North was too limited. Although the federal government 
utilized a whole-of-government approach in the North, the development of Canada’s postwar 
Arctic defence policy empowered scientists and senior officials to impose their will on a range of 
policies that had unintended consequences for military personnel and civilians exposed to 
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scientific defence research. Effective policymaking requires open and collaborative dialogue 
among government and civilian representatives. This lesson becomes poignantly clear when we 
examine the history of Canadian defence research in the North during the early Cold War. 
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Appendix A 
Figure A.F1: “A patrol on the barrens.” (LAC, RG 24, vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, Brief on 
Exercise “Sun Dog One,” 25 February 1950). 
 
 
 
Figure A.F2: Types of Arctic clothing tested during Sun Dog One (left to right: American, 
Canadian X50, camp issue, British); (LAC, RG 24, vol. 2484, file HQS-726-40-39-7, Brief on 
Exercise “Sun Dog One,” 25 February 1950). 
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Figure A.F3: Defensive position during indoctrination training on exercise Sun Dog One. (LAC, 
RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One”). 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.F4: V-test apparatus for Mackworth’s tactile discrimination test. (Mackworth, “Finger 
Numbness in Very Cold Winds,” 534). 
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Figure A.F5: The V-test as pictured at Fort Churchill. The “test subject” indicates when he first 
feels the two edges as one, the width of the gap becoming the discrimination score to be charted 
on the “numbness index.” (LAC, RG 85, vol. 299, file 1009-2[5], M.F. Coffey, “Results of a 
Test for Changes in Skin Sensitive after a Period of Acclimatization to the Cold,” DRNL 
Technical Paper No. 16, November 1953). 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.F6: “Snowhouse” construction at Fort Churchill as part of indoctrination training. 
(LAC, RG 24, vol. 4206, file 270-0-89-6, Winter Exercise “Sun Dog One”). 
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Appendix B 
Table A.T1: Effect on Skin Temperature and Insulation Index  
of Immersion of Right Hand and Forearm  in 5o C Waterbath 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.T2: Average Temperature During Second Half-Hour  
of Immersion of Hand and Forearm in 5o C Waterbath  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Control  
Period 
Immersion  
Period 
Recovery  
Period 
Average Skin 
Temperature OC 
     Controls 
     Eskimos 
 
 
 
31.52 
31.53 
 
 
31.10 
31.21 
 
 
30.87 
31.00 
Insulation  
Index 
     Controls 
     Eskimos 
 
 
 
0.5445 
0.5392 
 
 
0.5778 
0.5711 
 
 
0.5990 
0.6097 
Insulation  
Index of Trunk 
     Controls 
     Eskimos 
 
 
 
0.2426 
0.1986 
 
 
0.2093 
0.1667 
 
 
0.2022 
0.1752 
 
 
Controls 
OC       S.E. 
Eskimos 
OC       S.E. 
P 
Skin 
     Toe 
     Calf 
     Thigh 
     Abdomen 
     Chest 
     Lumbar 
     Scapula 
     Shoulder 
     Forearm 
     Hand 
 
 
23.91 
29.51 
31.25 
32.88 
32.69 
35.40 
36.03 
28.63 
32.09 
26.15 
 
0.12 
0.12 
0.08 
0.08 
0.17 
0.04 
0.07 
0.32 
0.14 
0.19 
 
23.71 
30.43 
31.67 
35.07 
33.25 
35.48 
35.49 
30.45 
28.01 
23.15 
 
0.07 
0.14 
0.01 
0.04 
0.06 
0.03 
0.06 
0.06 
0.11 
0.31 
 
0.20 
<0.01 
<0.02 
0.01 
>0.05 
0.10 
0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
 
Muscle 
     Calf 
     Thigh 
     Forearm 
 
 
31.55 
34.83 
34.07 
 
0.17 
0.04 
0.07 
 
28.43 
34.41 
33.09 
 
0.07 
0.05 
0.04 
 
<0.01 
<0.01 
<0.01 
Rectal 
 
 
36.99 0.05 37.09 0.04 0.20 
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